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The goal of the field of decision neuroscience is to understand the 
neural mechanisms that underlie individual choice behavior. The present 
dissertation investigates the behavioral and neural basis of how individuals 
modulate subjective value across monetary gains and losses in response to 
outcome uncertainty. Economic decision making in the gains and losses 
domains were investigated at both the behavioral and the neural levels. In the 
first three studies, separable effects of aging, sleep deprivation, and cognitive 
fatigue were found in gains and losses decision making. Contrary to dominant 
economic theory, we also found no significant correlations between gains and 
losses risk preferences, suggesting independence. In the fourth behavioral 
study, this independence was confirmed using an intermixed-trial design. The 
fifth study, using fMRI, examined the neural mechanism of the value-to-utility 
transformation, the process for converting from count to worth. We 
demonstrated, with independent within-study replication, that the dorsal 
anterior midcingulate cortex (daMCC) contains the information necessary to 
perform the value-to-utility transformation across both gains and losses. 
Overall, these findings demonstrate that there are both dissociable and 
overlapping cognitive/neural mechanisms across domains such as the 
overlapping executive processes (e.g. the value-to-utility transformation) and 
differential valuative processes (e.g. the encoding of value signal) in the gains 
and losses domains.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Decision making is an integral part of our life. Humans make decisions 
everyday throughout the entire lifetime. Interestingly, clear individual 
differences can be seen in the way people make choices and it is the goal of 
the field of decision neuroscience to understand the neural mechanisms that 
underlie individual choice behavior (Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Smith & 
Huettel, 2010). As decision making involves complex cognitive processes, 
investigations are done in both the behavioral and neural levels, typically by 
investigating specific variables from a decision making phenomenon of 
interest and looking for their neural correlates in the brain.  
This dissertation focuses on understanding the behavioral and neural 
basis of how individuals modulate subjective value by looking at risky 
monetary decision making across the gains and losses domains. Overall, three 
research topics were examined: 1) the behavioral effects of state modulations 
on decision making, 2) the behavioral differences and relationships between 
decision making for gains and for losses, and 3) the neural mechanism of the 
value-to-utility transformation. 
 
Behavioral studies investigating risky decision making 
 Clear individual differences can be seen in the way individuals make 
choices depending on their subjective value and preferences. The subjective 
value or utility, which is the worth of an option to an individual, can be 
modulated by individual’s preference depending on the context, for example 
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the ownership of the item of choice, the uncertainty of the outcome of the 
decision, and the effort and time needed to obtain the choice.  
 One of the most common variables that has been extensively studied in 
the topic of risky decision making is risk preference. For decision making 
under risk, individuals are on average risk averse (preferring smaller certain 
rewards to larger uncertain rewards) when making decisions about potential 
gains, but risk seeking (preferring larger uncertain rewards to smaller certain 
rewards) when faced with decisions about potential losses (Laury & Holt, 
2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984; Schoemaker, 1990). This suggests 
that under uncertainty, i.e. the condition of having imperfect knowledge about 
which potential outcome each available option will lead to (Knight, 1921), 
people tend to diminish the subjective value (utility) of gains compared to 
their actual objective value, but tend to enhance the subjective value (utility) 
of losses compared to their actual objective value.  
Apart from differences in how people perceive the value of gains and 
losses, choice behavior may also be affected by the different preferences in the 
strategy they use to guide the decision making process. For example, 
individuals can take into consideration the amount of potential gains or losses 
(Rabin, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the outcomes of prior choices 
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990), or the probabilities of the prospect (Kuhberger, 
Schulte-Mecklenback, & Perner, 1999). With the presence of known 
probabilities in risky choices, individuals may consider their choices based on 
the computed expected value of each option or just based on simple heuristics 
like the likelihood of outcome (Tversky, 1969; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; see 




Risk preference and subjective value modulation 
Subjective value modulation can be clearly demonstrated in individual 
responses to risky gambles. For instance, while the expected value of a lottery 
ticket may be $10 (such as a 50% chance of winning $20 and a 50% chance of 
$0) different individuals would be willing to pay different prices for the ticket, 
depending on the degree and the direction of their subjective valuation. Should 
they be risk averse, they would diminish the expected utility of the ticket 
(value > utility), while a risk seeking person would enhance the subjective 
utility of the ticket (value < utility). In other words, increase risk aversion 
reduces the utility of the gamble, while increase risk seeking enhances the 
utility of the gamble.  
The study of subjective valuation is extremely important as it is the 
integration between sub-components of our executive function (the top-down 
system that manages other cognitive processes in our brain that facilitates the 
attainment of goal directed behavior) and the affective/valuative system 
(Phelps et al., 2014) . One metaphor to describe the role of the executive 
function is the role of the conductor in an orchestra (as illustrated by Brown, 
2006). The conductor directs, modulates and coordinates the musicians to 
produce good music  (e.g. the pace, the volume of the sound, and when to start 
and stop the playing). Just like the conductor of an orchestra who needs to 
enhance and diminish the loudness of the music, subjective value modulation 
involves the enhancement and diminishment of objective value. The process 
of value diminishment likely involves cognitive inhibition by the executive 
function. For example, when someone exercises self-control for not choosing a 
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tasty but unhealthy food (Hare et al., 2009) or when a drug user resists drugs 
on the basis of better long term outcome (Bechara, 2005),  they may be 
diminishing the subjective value of the desired objective through cognitive 
inhibition to suppress the urge to obtain those objects. The process of value 
enhancement may not necessarily involve cognitive inhibition. Only one study 
has looked at the value enhancing and the value diminishing process, showing 
modulated value signal in the lateral prefrontal cortex in the gains domain of 
risky decision making (Tobler et al., 2009). No study has directly investigated 
the neural mechanism of the value-to-utility transformation, and whether the 
same mechanism is performed in both the gains and losses domains.  
 
Functional studies investigating risky decision making 
Existing studies investigating neural correlates of decision making 
have identified several common brain regions related to decision making, with 
most having overlapping functions associated with executive control and the 
affective system (Smith & Huettel, 2010). Some brain areas that are 
commonly reported in decision making studies are the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) and ventral striatum (VS), which have activation found to be 
correlated with subjective value, constituting the valuation system  (Yacubian 
et al., 2006; Breiter et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007; Rolls, McCabe & 
Redoute, 2008; Levy et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2011; Bartra, McGuire & Kable, 
2013); the posterior parietal and lateral prefrontal cortices, related to 
contextual control including stimuli information (Huettel et al., 2006; Weber 
& Huettel, 2008); the anterior insula (AI) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), 
associated with inhibitory control including the avoidance of risk (Kuhnen & 
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Knutson, 2005; Christopoulus et al., 2009); and the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (dmPFC), suggested to play a central role in cognitive control during 
decision making (Venkatraman et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2009) (see Figure 1.1).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Common brain areas associated to decision making. AI = 
anterior insula; dmPFC = dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; IFG = inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG); LPFC = lateral prefrontal cortex; PPC = posterior parietal cortex; 
vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; VS = ventral striatum. 
 
Some prior studies have also investigated the different brain 
activations in different states. For example, 1) decrease activation in the 
striatum and insula during loss anticipation in healthy older adults (Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2007), 2) increase activation for expected gains in the nucleus 
accumbens and decrease activation for losses in the insular and orbitofrontal 
cortices during sleep deprivation (Venkatraman et al., 2007), 3) increase 
activation in the vmPFC and VS in adolescence resulting in more risk taking 
behavior (Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010), and 4) decrease activation in the 
prefrontal cortex during decision making in substance users resulting in 
impaired decisions (Tanabe et al., 2007). These studies are often helpful to 












Besides differences in brain activation modulated by different states, 
some other studies have also reported brain regions showing differential 
responses to gains and losses. Interestingly, most of these brain regions are 
associated to the affective system. For examples, 1) amygdala lesions impair 
decisions regarding gains but not losses (Weller et al., 2007),  2) vmPFC 
lesions result in more risk averse behavior for gains, but more risk seeking 
behavior for losses (Pujara et al., 2015), 3) brain regions involved in decision 
making show differential activation to gains and losses, such as in the vmPFC 
(including regions of the orbital frontal cortex), amygdala, ventral striatum and 
hippocampus (Elliott et al., 2000; Yacubian et al., 2006; Luking & Barch, 
2013), and 4) gains but not losses value signal in the vmPFC (Bartra et al., 
2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014). These studies show that gains and losses 
decision making do not involve the exact same neural mechanisms although 
many of them may be overlapping. 
 
Research aim 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the behavioral patterns and 
neural mechanisms of  decision making, especially to understand the neural 
mechanism of subjective valuation. We specifically focused on risky decision 
making to look at how risk modulates subjective value.  
 
This dissertation aims to answer three specific research questions:  
1) How are gains and losses monetary decision making, 
differentially altered by different kinds of states?  
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Subjective value modulation (measured using risk preference) and the 
use of relevant information to make choices in aging, sleep deprivation and 
cognitive fatigue were behaviorally investigated. No study has contrasted the 
effects of these states on economic decision making within the same task to 
see whether they would produce the same effects. By answering this research 
question, we would be able to infer whether these different states affect 
overlapping or non-overlapping cognitive/neural processes across gains and 
losses decision making by seeing whether they have similar or dissociable 
effects.  
Prior studies have reported that aging, sleep deprivation and cognitive 
fatigue produce deleterious effect on executive function and vigilance 
(Berardi, Parasuraman, & Haxby, 2001; Pang et al., 2006; Persson et al., 2007; 
Lim & Dinges, 2008). Furthermore, aging and sleep deprivation both have 
been reported to attenuate responses to losses in the insula and brain regions 
related to subjective value (Venkatraman et al., 2007; Samanez-Larkin et al., 
2007), while no prior study has investigated the effects of cognitive fatigue on 
risky decision making. Therefore, we can expect to find similar effects across 
all three states on economic decision making, especially for aging and sleep 
deprivation.  
 
2) What are the differences and relationships between gains and 
losses decision making  in terms of subjective value modulation and the 
use of choice information?  
In order to answer this research question, risk preference and the 
strategy of utilizing choice information in gains and losses decision making 
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were contrasted. Although gains and losses differ mainly in sign, numerous 
studies have demonstrated robust decision making differences across gains 
and losses. As mentioned earlier, in terms of risk preference, there is a robust 
finding in the literature that individuals are on average risk averse in the gains 
domain, but risk seeking in the losses domain (Laury & Holt, 2000; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; 1984; Schoemaker, 1990). Moreover, decisions that are 
framed as losses have been suggested to exert more cognitive effort (for 
review see Baumiester et al., 2001), along with longer reaction time (Payne et 
al., 1993) and eye-fixation time (Kuo, Hsu & Day, 2009). The difference in 
the amount of effort exerted may be reflected in the amount and type of choice 
information used to make decisions.  
 
3) How does the brain perform the value-to-utility transformation 
for gains and for losses and how are these brain areas functionally 
connected to other brain areas involved in decision making?  
No study has directly investigated the neural mechanism of the value-
to-utility transformation. Additionally, here we also tested to see whether the 
same mechanism is performed in both the gains and losses domains. Without 
investigating both the gains and losses domains, our understanding about the 
neural correlates of decision making will be greatly limited because our value 
scale should range from negative (losses) values to positive (gains) values, and 
unspecific (e.g. by only studying the gains value signal, we cannot dissociate 





Overall, this research will facilitate our understanding of human 
decision making and executive function. As many debilitating disorders have 
been associated with impairments in decision making and executive function, 
such as in the autism spectrum and attention deficit hyperactivity disorders 
(Coolidge, Thede & Young, 2000; Allman et al., 2005; Happe et al., 2006), 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Kurnianigsih et al., 2011) and addictions 
(Hester & Garavan, 2004; Bechara, 2005), further research will not only 
facilitate our understanding of decision making, but also facilitate the 
production of treatments and interventions for these disorders.  
 
Overview of the studies 
This dissertation consists of five separate studies. The first three 
studies sought to examine how monetary decision making are differentially 
altered by different kinds of states:  aging (Chapter 2), total sleep deprivation 
(Chapter 3), and cognitive fatigue (Chapter 4). In the first study (Chapter 2), 
we looked at behavioral differences between younger and older adults in 
uncertainty preferences and choice strategies (the influence of trial factors on 
choices). We looked at and quantified uncertainty preferences from both types 
of uncertainty, risk (when the probabilities of possible outcomes are known) 
and ambiguity (when the probabilities of possible outcomes are not well 
defined) (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg 1961; Camerer & Weber 1992), but focused 
mainly on risk. 
In the second study (Chapter 3), we did a within-subject comparison in 
younger adults to examine how one night of total sleep deprivation alters 
uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity), choice strategies, and the degree 
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of loss aversion. In the third study (Chapter 4), we did a between-subject 
comparison in younger adults to examine how cognitive fatigue (induced 
through 60 to 90 minutes of taxing cognitive engagement) alters uncertainty 
preferences (risk and ambiguity) and choice strategies.  
The fourth study (Chapter 5) sought to examine the differences and 
relationships between behavioral measures of gains and losses decision 
making. In the three prior studies (Chapter 2-4), we found no relationship 
between gains and losses risk preferences , differing from the expectation of 
theoretical reflection effect. We tested specifically the correlation between 
gains and losses risk preferences and how well cross-domain risk preferences 
could inform individual choice behavior using a gains and losses intermixed-
trial design. Classical behavioral models considered differences between gains 
and losses risk preferences were simply reflection across domain – people are 
risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, with risk preferences across 
domains considered negatively correlated and are the result of the same 
underlying process. In this chapter, we show clear independence between risk 
preferences when considering prospective gains and prospective losses.  
The fifth study (Chapter 6) sought to localize the neural instantiation of 
the value-to-utility transformation – how objective value (count) are translated 
into subjective value (utility/worth), which is a core component in decision 
making. We made use of the dissociability of the gains and losses uncertainty 
preferences reported in previous chapters to construct a within-task replication 
(separate investigation in the gains and losses domains). The results in this 
study suggest that the information necessary to perform the value-to-utility 
transformation is encoded in the dorsal anterior midcingulate cortex (daMCC, 
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also referred to as the dmPFC). Furthermore, functional connectivity analyses 
identified brain regions that may input contextual information to set the value-
to-utility transformation (through positive connections with the inferior frontal 
cortex) and receive modulation of encoded values (through negative 
connections with the nucleus accumbens). The patterns of results were 
consistent across both the gains and losses domains. This study is the first 
study to specifically identify the neural mechanisms of the value-to-utility 
transformation.   
In the next chapter (Chapter 7), we integrate the interpretations of all 
our studies into a general discussion. The consistency across findings and 
further interpretation about the studies’ findings are discussed in more detail in 
this chapter. The similarities and differences between the gains and losses 
domains in terms of risk preference, the encoding of value signal and the 
value-to-utility transformation are specifically discussed.  
In the final chapter (Chapter 8), we discuss future research directions 
building from the results that we have obtained. We proposed a new research 
study that is a continuation of the behavioral and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies reported in this dissertation. The 
background and rationale, aims, methods, preliminary findings and potential 
implications of this proposed future study are discussed.    
 
Overview of the research materials and methods 
Our approach was to first study choice behavior to quantify the 
relationships and differences between the decision components (uncertainty 
preference to quantify subjective value modulation, choice strategy to quantify 
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the degree of reliance on trial information) and then use fMRI to investigate 
the neural correlates of these decision components.  As our main focus was on 
risky decision making, our main task was an incentive-compatible risky 
decision task that was slightly modified across our studies (from Stanton et al., 
2009). Within each trial, participants chose between two options, an option 
with certain monetary amount or a gamble option. Across trials there were five 
different values of the certain option ([$3, $4, $5, $6, $7] for gains and [-$3, -
$4, -$5, -$6, -$7]) for losses, three different probability of winning the gamble 
option (25%, 50%, 75%), a set of relative expected values (ranges from 0.1 to 
4.0 but varies slightly across studies), and a possible zero outcome for the 
gamble option. The task was used to behaviorally quantify individual’s risk 
preferences and the amount of choice information used. 
 
Risk preference. Risk preferences were measured using two 
approaches: 1) psychophysical indifference point analysis (risk premium), and 
2) power function analysis. The risk premium metric directly measures the 
degree and direction an individual modulates the value of a gamble due to 
uncertainty of the outcome. For example, in order to be indifferent between 
the gamble and certain options, a risk premium of 1 means that the expected 
value of the gamble option must be one time more than the value of the certain 
option and a risk premium of 2 means that the expected value of the gamble 
option must be two times more than the value of the certain option. On the 
other hand, the power function risk preference measures the curvature of the 
utility function and shows the degree of the diminishing weight of marginal 
utility (as previously used in Levy et al., 2010 and Tymula et al., 2012, 2011; 
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see Material and Methods in each study for detailed information).  
In the first three studies (Chapter 2-4), our preferred measure of risk 
preference was the risk premium metric. While the power function metric 
assumes that risk preference is due to diminishing weight of marginal utility, 
the risk premium metric assumes a linear relationship between value and 
utility across the range of possible outcomes in our task design (~$100). The 
assumption of linearity is based on the belief that the rate of diminishing 
weight of marginal utility to produce non-negligible nonlinearities within our 
range of outcomes would result in implausible preferences for much larger 
outcome values (Rabin, 2000). However, in the fMRI study, we opted to use 
the power function metric for our main covariate analyses, as it has been more 
commonly used in the literature and accepted by other researchers.   
We show that the risk premium and power function measures of risk 
preference are highly isometric and functionally can be used interchangeably. 
Across all our studies, we found strong correlations (r > |.55|, p < .0001) 
between the risk premium and the power function measures and consistent 
pattern of results. We also compare these metrics in post-hoc analyses in 
Chapter 6 (using fMRI), and demonstrate conserved results across these two 
metrics for capturing individual response to uncertainty.  
 
Choice Strategy. The choice strategy metric measures the influence of 
trial factors on choices for each individual. Choice strategy is quantified 
through the use of linear regressions. Analyses were conducted separately 
within the gains and losses domains through independent linear regressions to 
determine the influence of two factors on each participant choices: 1) the 
	 	
14 
relative expected value of the options (rEV), and 2) the probability of winning 
(pWIN) the gamble option.  
The R-squared value of each factor quantifies the proportion of 
individual’s choice variance (across trials within domain) accounted for by 
each factor. Therefore a high R-squared value for rEV or pWIN indicate that 
choices were influenced by that trial information (for example, an individual 
who accepts all gambles with a 75% chance of winning would have a high R-
squared pWIN value, and an individual who accepts gambles with an rEV 
equal or higher than 1.25 would have a high R-squared rEV value), whereas a 
low R-squared value would indicate that choices were more likely to be based 
on other factors or were made randomly. It is important to note that the pWIN 
and rEV R-squared values do not share any variances as they are independent 
to each other (the inter-trial correlation between rEV and pWIN is always 
zero).  
We also note that the use of linear regression to quantify proportion of 
choice variance is imperfect  –  the relationship between the trial factors, rEV 
and pWIN, on choice is not always closer to a linear fit, sometimes it is closer 
to a sigmoidal fit. To test the robustness of our choice strategy metric, we also 
tested some of our data using logistic regressions. We found very high 
correlations between the R-squared values from the logistic (with McFadden’s 
pseudo R-squared) and linear models (all r  > |.70|, p < .0001). Furthermore, in 
another study, it was empirically shown that linear and logistic regressions 
gave nearly identical outcomes when the dependent variable was a dichotomy 




Using the risky decision task for the fMRI study. The risky decision 
task was also used to investigate the neural encoding of value and the neural 
mechanism of the value-to-utility transformation. Since our trials were 
designed based on a set of predetermined rEVs (we had 9 levels in the fMRI 
study), we were able to visualize the actual neural encoding of the rEV 
formulation in the vmPFC by looking at the degree of brain activation for each 
rEV level. Armed with the behaviorally derived quantification of each 
individual’s value-to-utility transformation expressed in their risk preference 
value, we sought the neural instantiation by covarying the value on each trial 
(constructed from the rEV regressors) against each individual’s risk 
preference. Moreover, as we consistently found no significant correlation 
between gains and losses risk preferences in our previous studies, we were 
able to leverage on this to construct a within-study replication for our fMRI 
study. We replicated the findings in the gains domain to the losses domain by 
repeating the same between-subject covariate analysis using losses risk 
preferences in the losses trials. Through this replication, we were able to 
investigate whether the brain areas involved in the value-to-utility 
transformation in the gains and losses domains overlap with each other.  
The absence of correlation between gains and losses risk preferences is 
an extremely crucial component in this study, as it allows us to dissociate the 
value-to-utility transformation processes from other cognitive processes, such 
as inter-subject level of decision conflict. If risk preferences between the gains 
and losses domains were strongly correlated to each other, an alternative 
interpretation of the result would be that neural correlates of risk preferences 
are associated with individual’s level of decision conflict. For example, if risk 
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preferences were correlated to each other, those people who were further away 
from risk neutrality in both domains would have higher levels of decision 
conflict than those people who were more risk neutral in both domains. Due to 
the absence of correlation between gains and losses risk preferences, we note 
explicitly that our results cannot be due to choice difficulty or decision 
conflict, as the value-to-utility functions are orthogonal to choice difficulty.	  
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Chapter 2: Differential modulation of risky decision making by aging 
across prospective gains and losses1,2 
 
This is the first of three studies examining modulation of economic 
decision making by differential state modulations. As the three different state 
modulations (aging, sleep deprivation, cognitive fatigue) have all been 
reported to have deleterious effects on executive function and vigilance, we 
were interested to see whether they would show similar effects on economic 
decision making. We specifically examined differences in behavioral 
measures of uncertainty preferences and choice strategy across the gains and 
losses domains.  
In this chapter we investigate how aging alters economic decision 
making. In the next two chapters, using the same task and analytic approaches, 
we investigate sleep deprivation (Chapter 3) and cognitive fatigue (Chapter 4). 
The key advantage that we had that was different from previous studies in the 
literature was that we were able to compare the three different state 
modulations in the exact same tasks and that we were able to dissociate 





1 This paper has been previously published as: Kurnianingsih YA, Sim SKY, Chee MWL and Mullette-
Gillman OA (2015) Aging and loss decision making: increased risk aversion and decreased use of 
maximizing information, with correlated rationality and value maximization. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 
9:280. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00280 
2 Contributions: OAMG designed the study. SSKY coordinated data collection. YAK and OAMG 





In this chapter, we investigated how adult aging specifically alters 
economic decision-making, focusing on examining alterations in uncertainty 
preferences (willingness to gamble) and choice strategies (what gamble 
information influences choices) within both the gains and losses domains. 
Within each domain, participants chose between certain monetary outcomes 
and gambles with uncertain outcomes. We examined preferences by 
quantifying how uncertainty modulates choice behavior as if altering the 
subjective valuation of gambles. We explored age-related preferences for two 
types of uncertainty, risk and ambiguity. Additionally, we explored how aging 
may alter what information participants utilize to make their choices by 
comparing the relative utilization of maximizing and satisficing information 
types through a choice strategy metric. Maximizing information was the ratio 
of the expected value of the two options, while satisficing information was the 
probability of winning. 
We found age-related alterations of economic preferences within the 
losses domain, but no alterations within the gains domain. Older adults (OA; 
61 to 80 years old) were significantly more uncertainty averse for both risky 
and ambiguous choices. OA also exhibited choice strategies with decreased 
use of maximizing information. Within OA, we found a significant correlation 
between risk preferences and choice strategy. This linkage between 
preferences and strategy appears to derive from a convergence to risk 
neutrality driven by greater use of the effortful maximizing strategy. As utility 
maximization and value maximization intersect at risk neutrality, this result 
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suggests that OA are exhibiting a relationship between enhanced rationality 
and enhanced value maximization. While there was variability in economic 
decision-making measures within OA, these individual differences were 
unrelated to variability within examined measures of cognitive ability. Our 
results demonstrate that aging alters economic decision-making for losses 








Aging has been suggested to result in alterations in numerous cognitive 
processes, but it is unclear what specific alterations in economic decision 
making may take place. Understanding age-related alterations of economic 
decision-making is important, as elderly persons are often less financially 
resilient and often considered more likely to be targets of consumer fraud (Lee 
& Soberon-Ferrer, 1997; Castle et al., 2012; Ross et al., 2014). In this study, 
we specifically test whether economic decision making is altered in a healthy 
sample of older adults (OA), through tasks that control for dissociable 
processes (such as learning or memory effects).  
At the most general cognitive levels, aging is associated with 
decreased processing speed (Salthouse, 2000) and deficits in a range of 
cognitive processes, including inhibition (Lustig et al., 2007), executive 
functions (Goh et al., 2012), episodic memory (Shing et al., 2008), and reward 
learning (Mell et al., 2005). These changes in cognitive abilities may in turn 
affect economic decision-making, such as the propensity to invest (Christelis 
et al., 2010; Korniotis & Kumar, 2011).  
Prior studies utilizing decision making tasks have suggested alterations 
across a range of tasks, including the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Denburg et 
al., 2005; Wood et al., 2005; Fein et al., 2007; Zamarian et al., 2008; Denburg 
et al., 2009; Baena et al., 2010; Carvalho et al., 2012), the Gambling Task 
(Kovalchik et al., 2005), Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Henninger et 
al., 2010; Rolison et al., 2012) and the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT) 
(Deakin et al., 2004; Henninger et al., 2010). However, it is unclear whether 
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such studies reflect specific alterations in economic decision making, as these 
tasks feature outcome resolution at the end of each trial. As aging has been 
found to impact reward learning (Mell et al., 2005; Eppinger et al., 2011), it is 
unclear if the observed behavioral changes are merely an extension of age-
related decline in learning or if they truly reflect altered preferences or 
strategies (see Mata et al., 2011; Worthy et al., 2011). The former account is 
supported by some (Henninger et al., 2010; Boyle et al., 2011) but not other 
studies (Anderson et al., 2013).  
Here, we examined how economic decision-making may be 
specifically altered in relatively healthy OA, focusing on two aspects of 
economic decision-making: uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) and 
choice strategies. 
Uncertainty preferences are a measure of how an individual responds 
to the unknown future resolution of a probabilistic option (i.e., a gamble). 
Uncertainty can be described as being of two types, as risk when the 
probabilities of possible outcomes are known or can be estimated, or as 
ambiguity when the probabilities of possible outcomes are not well defined 
(Knight, 1921; Ellsberg 1961; Camerer & Weber 1992).  
Uncertainty preferences differ depending on whether individuals are 
facing potential gains or losses (Prospect Theory, Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Given the ubiquity of losses in real-world decisions, it is important to 
understand how aging may differentially impact decision making across both 
the gains and losses domains. Across both the gains and losses domains, prior 
behavioral studies investigating age-related modulation of uncertainty 
preferences have resulted in inconsistent findings. In the gains domain, while 
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some studies found OA to be more risk averse than younger adults (YA) 
(Lauriola & Levin, 2001a; Albert & Duffy, 2012; Mather et al, 2012; Tymula 
et al., 2013), others did not show age-related effects (Mikels & Reed, 2009; 
Sproten et al., 2010). Inconsistencies have also been observed in the losses 
domain with some studies suggesting that OA are more risk averse (Mikels & 
Reed, 2009), and others suggesting that they are more risk seeking (Lauriola & 
Levin, 2001a; Mather et al, 2012). Only two studies have investigated age-
related alterations of ambiguity preferences, with one suggesting that OA are 
less ambiguity averse than YA in the gains domain (Sproten et al., 2010) and 
the other finding no alterations (Tymula et al., 2013). Only one prior study has 
investigated age-related alteration of ambiguity preferences in the losses 
domain, finding OA were slightly more risk averse than YA (Tymula et al., 
2013). Neural evidence further suggests that we may anticipate an asymmetry 
in age-related modulation across the gains and losses domains. Samanez-
Larkin and colleagues (2007) found reduced responsiveness in OA to 
anticipated monetary losses within striatal regions, while showing similar 
modulations to YA in the gains domain. 
Beyond preferences, decision making is also dependent on the strategy 
one employs to utilize available information to reach their decision. For 
example, when choosing between two gamble options, one can simply 
consider the probability of winning for each option, or one can calculate and 
compare the expected value of each. In a potentially-related domain, previous 
studies have reported that OA tend to use simpler and less demanding 
strategies for decision making involving probabilities (Kim et al., 2005; 
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Rafaely et al., 2006). However, no prior study has investigated age-related 
differences in strategy use in monetary decision making.  
In the present study, we examined how aging effects uncertainty 
preferences and choice strategies by contrasting relatively healthy OA with 
YA. To evaluate age-related differences, participants engaged in two 
incentive-compatible decision tasks (one with gains and one with losses), from 
which we computed their uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) and 
quantified the choice strategy they employed to reach their decisions. Our a 
priori hypotheses were that: 1) healthy aging would result in no alteration of 
uncertainty preference in the gains domain, 2) OA would be less risk- and 
ambiguity-seeking in the losses domain, and 3) OA would present diminished 
choice strategies across both the gains and losses domains. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants  
Data for the YA group were collected from 62 undergraduate students 
studying at the National University of Singapore (NUS) (24 males; age range 
= 19 – 26 years, age mean ± SD = 21.90 ± 1.69 years). Data for the OA group 
were collected from 39 cognitively healthy participants of the Singapore 
Longitudinal Brain Aging Study (Chee et al., 2009). These participants were 
screened, to exclude any of the following: 1) history of significant vascular 
events (i.e., myocardial infarction, stroke or peripheral vascular disease), 2) 
history of malignant neoplasia of any form, 3) history of cardiac, lung, liver, 
or kidney failure, 4) active or inadequately treated thyroid disease, 5) active 
	 	
24 
neurological or psychiatric conditions, 6) a history of head trauma with loss of 
consciousness, 7) a Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 
1975) score <26, 8) a 15-point modified-Geriatric Depression Screening Scale 
(GDS) (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986), or 9) a history of illicit substance use.  
All participants provided informed consent under a protocol approved 
by the National University of Singapore Institutional Review Board.  
Two OA were excluded from analyses due to gross task performance 
issues in the monetary decision tasks, resulting in a final sample of 37 OA (22 
females; age range of 61 to 80 years, mean ± SD = 68.66 ± 5.15 years). The 
demographics of the final sample of YA and OA participants are listed in 
Table 2.1. During their sessions, participants also performed additional 
behavioral tasks and surveys unrelated to this study. 
 
Table 2.1. Participant demographics 
Younger Adults 
    Female, % 
    Age, years 
N = 62 
61.29 
22 ± 1.7 
Older Adults 
    Female, % 
    Age, years 
    Education, years 
    MMSE 
    GDS 
N = 37 
56.76 
69 ± 5.5 
12.1 ± 3.4 
28.1 ± 1.4 
.97 ± 1.38 
Abbreviations: MMSE, Mini mental state examination; GDS, Geriatric 
depression screening 
 
Experimental design  
Data was collected as part of a larger-ongoing study. For the measures 
included in this report, participants underwent multiple measures of cognitive 
ability and performed two monetary decision making tasks (the first for the 




Measuring Cognitive ability in OA 
Cognitive ability in OA was evaluated across five domains: 1) 
attention and working memory, 2) verbal memory, 3) visuospatial memory, 4) 
executive functioning, and 5) processing speed. Attention and working 
memory was assessed with the Digit Span (Wechsler, 1997) and a 
computerized version of a Spatial Span task. Verbal memory was evaluated 
using Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) (Lezak et al., 2004). 
Visuospatial memory was evaluated using a Visual Paired Associate test. 
Executive functioning was evaluated using a Categorical Verbal Fluency test 
(using categories of animals, vegetables, and fruits), the Design Fluency test 
(Delis et al., 2001), and the Trail Making Test B (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985).  
Processing speed was assessed with the Trail Making Test A (Reitan & 
Wolfson, 1985) and the Symbol-Digit Modalities Test (SDMT) (Smith, 1991). 
To limit the number of comparisons, individual test scores were standardized 
(z-transformation) and combined within each categorical domain. We 
examined whether these cognitive domains are related to economic measures 
by correlating the composite scores from each of the five cognitive domains 
with our uncertainty preference and choice strategy metrics. The significance 
of these correlations was adjusted using Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons with a threshold of p < .01 (i.e., correcting for the five cognitive 
domains).    
 
Uncertainty Preference Tasks 
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Uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) were gathered through 
two monetary decision making tasks (see Figure 2.1), with each task oriented 
towards either the gains or losses domains. All participants performed the 
uncertainty-gains task followed by the uncertainty-losses task. On each trial of 
each task, participants chose between a certain option and a gamble option. 
Participants were informed that reimbursement would be determined at the 
end of the experiment based on random selection and resolution of one trial 
from each task. No resolutions were provided before the end of the entire 
experiment to eliminate alterations of preferences and choice strategies due to 
inter-trial learning from trial outcomes. Data collection and analyses were 
achieved using MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with Psychophysics 
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) for trial presentation. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Task timelines. Participants performed two monetary decision-
making tasks. One in the (A) gains domain (rewards) followed by a (B) losses 
domain version. In each trial, participants were asked to choose between a 
certain or a gamble option, with unconstrained response time. (C) Participants’ 
payments were based on random selection and resolution of one trial from 
each task, selected and resolved at the end of the entire experiment.   
 
The uncertainty-gains task (Stanton et al., 2011), consisted of 165 
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option, which was either risky or ambiguous. For both gamble types, losses 
always resulted in $0 outcome. For risky gambles, there were five certain 
options ($3, $4, $5, $6, and $7), three probabilities of winning (25%, 50%, and 
75%) and the value of the potential win ranged from $2 to $98, dependent 
upon the ratio of the expected value of the gamble to the certain option 
(relative expected value (rEV) or EVG/ Vc) for that trial. The trial matrix was 
constructed based on examining nine different rEVs (0.5, 1.0, 1.3, 1.6, 1.9, 
2.2, 2.5, 3.0, and 3.5). With three probabilities of winning and the 5 different 
certain values, there were 15 trials for each level of rEV. For ambiguous 
gambles, six rEVs were examined (0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 6.0), calculated 
using an assumed 50% probability of winning (by the law of large numbers). 
This resulted in 5 trials at each rEV, given the 5 values of the certain option.  
The uncertainty-losses task consisted of 200 trials, closely mirroring 
the uncertainty-gains task, save for shifting the valence and adjusting the rEV 
values to allow for an anticipated increase in risk-seeking preferences 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). There were five certain loss options (-$3, -$4, -
$5, -$6, and -$7,) with ten examined rEVs (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 
3.0, and 4.0); this adjusted range resulted in potential gamble losses ranging 
from -$0.4 to -$112. With three probabilities of winning (25%, 50%, and 75%) 
and the 5 different certain values, there were 15 trials for each level of rEV, as 
in the gains domain. These ten rEV values were also examined for ambiguous 
gambles, calculated using an assumed 50% probability of winning. This 





Quantifying uncertainty preferences 
Within each task, we quantified risk and ambiguity preferences by 
utilizing individual’s choice functions to find the ratio of the expected values 
of the gamble to the certain option at which participants were indifferent 
between the two. Each preference value is an expression of the degree and 
direction in which the participant’s choice behavior suggests they are 
modulating the subjective expected value of the gamble due to the outcome 
being unknown.  
For each participant, four preference values were calculated (risk and 
ambiguity for the gains and losses domains) through psychometric 
indifference point analyses (Stanton et al., 2011). For each, a choice function 
was constructed based on the proportion of gamble options selected at each 
rEV. Examples of choice functions for individual participants within the gains 
domain are shown in Figure 2.2A and for the losses domains in Figure 2.2B. 
The indifference point was defined as the first point at which the projected 
choice function crossed 50%. We subtracted 1 from this indifference value to 
generate a ‘premium’ value. As such, the premium measures the degree to 
which the participant subjectively modifies the absolute expected value of a 
gamble due to outcome uncertainty. A zero premium reflects no change, a 
positive premium shows diminished valuation, and a negative premium 
indicates enhanced valuation. These calculations were performed separately 
for risk and ambiguity in each domain, gains and losses, resulting in four 





Figure 2.2. Example participant choice functions. (A) Gains domain, the 
range of risk preferences across participants is represented from risk seeking 
(left) to risk averse (right). The indifference point of each choice function is 
shown with a red inverted-triangle. Risk premium is defined as the value on 
the ‘(EVG / Vc ) -1’ (x-axis) at this indifferent point.  (B) Losses domain, the 
range of risk preferences is represented from risk averse (left) to risk seeking 
(right). (C) Relationship between premium metric and risk preference. 
Premium value corresponds to the slope of the line. Note that, as the premium 
value modulates the absolute expected value of the gamble, its relationship to 
preference (averse or seeking) is inverted between the gains and losses 
domains – e.g., positive premium values reflect risk-averse preferences in the 
gains domain and risk-seeking in the losses domain. 
 
On a technical note, our quantification of uncertainty preferences 
assumes a linear relationship between value and utility across the range of 
possible outcomes (~$100 in each task). While non-linearities may be evident 
when dealing with much larger sums (i.e., the difference in marginal utility for 
a dollar when you have fifty or when you have one million), the required rate 
of diminishing marginal utility to produce non-negligible nonlinearities within 
a $100 range would result in highly untenable preferences when dealing with 
any large economic choice (Rabin, 2000). 
As the premium metric quantifies the relative alteration of the absolute 
expected value of the gamble, its relation to preference (aversion and seeking) 
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is inverted over the gains and losses domains (see Figure 2.2C). A positive 
premium in the gains domain indicates diminished absolute valuation of the 
gamble, which is also diminished valuation relative to the certain option. In 
the losses domain the same positive premium value still indicates diminished 
absolute valuation of the gamble, however, this is a relative increase in 
valuation compared to the certain option as the expected value of the gamble 
becomes less negative. As such, the interpretation of premium values into 
preference requires a reversal across domains (see Figure 2.2C). Therefore, in 
the gains domain, positive premium values show aversion and negative 
premium values indicate seeking, while in the losses domain, positive 
premium values indicate seeking and negative premium values indicate 
aversion. Neutrality corresponds to zero premium values in both domains.  
We note that in a prior study using the uncertainty-gains task in a 
larger sample (N~300, Stanton et al., 2011), our psychometric premium values 
were highly correlated (correlations over |.60|) with power function preference 
values (Prelec 1998). We note now, similar high correlations between these 
measures of risk preference within the losses domain (Risk losses r(93) = -.71, 
p < .0001; Ambiguity losses r(92) = -.77, p < .0001). For empirical reasons, 
due to the specific design of this task, we prefer the psychometric premium 
metric over the power-function measure (for a full description of these 
reasons, please see Stanton et al. (2009), Supplemental).   
A small number of participants had choice functions that did not cross 
the indifference point (50% acceptance of gamble), preventing the 
psychometric determination of their premium values. Our data cannot resolve 
whether such participants were simply not performing the task correctly or if 
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such participants had extreme preferences (we cannot differentiate between a 
participant who employed a strict heuristic (such as ‘always choose the 
certain/gamble option’) from one that considered the options but always 
selected the certain/gamble option because they are truly that averse/seeking to 
the gamble). This resulted in the exclusion of variable numbers of participants 
across the uncertainty metrics and domains (risk gains: 10 OA and 10 YA; risk 
losses: 2 OA and 2 YA; ambiguity gains: 14 OA and 23 YA; and ambiguity 
losses: 1 OA and 3 YA). Importantly, there were no significant differences in 
the proportions of participants excluded across the OA and YA for any cell 
(risk gains: χ2 (1, N = 99) = 1.71, p = .19; risk losses: χ2 (1, N = 99) .284, p = 
.59; ambiguity gains: χ2 (1, N = 99) .005, p = .94; and ambiguity losses: χ2 (1, 
N = 99) .27, p = .60).  
 
Quantifying choice strategy 
We examined whether aging altered what information participants 
relied upon to make their decisions through the use of a choice strategy metric. 
For each participant, we performed four independent linear regressions, two 
for each domain. Each regression determined the influence of a specific 
informational factor on choice in risk trials. We examined two factors: 1) the 
relative expected value of the option (rEV), and 2) the probability of winning 
in the gamble option (pWIN). Importantly, our task designs fully-
orthogonalize the pWIN and rEV factors (i.e., in each task the correlation of 
the values of pWIN and rEV across trials is zero).  
The R-squared value derived from each regression is a direct 
expression of the maximal amount of an individual’s choice variance (across 
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trials) that can be accounted for by the examined factor (for examples, see 
Figure 2.4A to 2.4D). We directly contrasted utilization of these two 
competing trial-information sources by subtracting the R-squares of the rEV 
and pWIN factors. This results in our choice strategy metric (see Figure 2.4E 
to 2.4H), which directly measures how much more each participants’ choice 
behavior can be explained by the cognitively demanding calculation of the 
relative expected value of the options than by simple utilization of the 
visually-available probability of winning the gamble.  
This choice strategy metric is positive when participants utilize the 
rEV information more, negative when they focus on the pWIN information, 
and zero when they use the two equally. For example, a participant whose 
decisions were solely based on the value of pWIN (e.g., accepting all gambles 
with a 75% chance of winning) would have a high pWIN R-squared value, a 
low rEV R-squared value, and therefore a highly negative choice strategy. 
Similarly, a participant whose choices were determined by comparing the 
expected values of the gambles would have a high R-squared value for rEV 
and low pWIN, resulting in a positive choice strategy value. Participants were 
considered to be ‘maximizing’ when they used the rEV information more and 
‘satisficing’ when they used the pWIN information more, as focusing on 
pWIN allows for decisions through extremely simple heuristics (‘how much of 
the gamble pie is green?’) requiring little cognitive effort, while utilization of 
the rEV information maximizes long-run outcomes but requires several layers 
of effortful cognitive calculation.  
We note that we opted to focus on the rEV and pWIN factors due to 
task design. While rEV and pWIN are orthogonal, other trial factors do not 
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share this feature. For example, in the gains task the absolute value of the 
possible win is highly correlated to both the rEV and pWIN factors (rEV: 
r(133) = .604, p < .0001; pWIN: r(133) = -.576, p < .0001), with similar 
correlations in the losses task.  
 
Relationship between risk preference and choice strategy 
 As we found significant age-related effects for both uncertainty 
preferences and choice strategies within the losses domain, we looked for a 
possible interaction by examining the correlation between these metrics within 




Cognitively intact older sample 
Our OA participants were cognitively unimpaired (MMSE ≥ 26), 
exhibiting psychometric test scores comparable to healthy participants studied 
elsewhere (Table 2.2, comparing Trail-Making Test A, SDMT from Hsieh & 
Tori, 2007; Trail Making Test A and B from Tombaugh, 2003; Digit Span 









Table 2.2. Cognitive measures in OA 
Cognitive Domain Psychometric Test Mean ± SD 
Attention and 
working memory 
Digit Span forward 10.0 ± 2.3 
Digit Span backward 7.2 ± 1.9 
Spatial Span forward 7.5 ± 1.5 
Spatial Span backward 6.9 ± 1.5 
Processing speed SDMT (written) 44.6 ± 10.0 
SDMT (oral) 51.0 ± 12.0 
TMT A (s) 40.5 ± 14.0 
Verbal memory RAVLT  
   Sums of trials 1-5  51.4 ± 7.5 
   Immediate recall list A 4.8 ± 1.6 
   Delayed recall list A 10.9 ± 2.4 
   Recognition list A 14.1 ± 1.9 
Visuospatial 
memory 
Visual paired associates  
   Sums of trials 1-4 16.9 ± 5.8 
   Delayed recall 5.1 ± 2.0 
Executive 
functioning 
Categorical fluency 43.2 ± 7.3 
Design fluency 27.1 ± 7.5 
TMT B (s) 92.2 ± 41.8 
Abbreviations: SDMT, Symbol digit modalities test; TMT, Trail Making Test; 
RAVLT, Rey auditory verbal learning test.  
 
Relationship between economic measures and cognitive ability in OA 
To examine whether differences in cognitive ability within our OA 
sample may alter economic preferences, we examined the relationships 
between our economic metrics and cognitive ability within our OA sample. 
Cognitive ability was quantified across five cognitive domains − attention and 
working memory, verbal memory, visuospatial memory, executive 
functioning, and processing speed (Table 2.3). To compare each of these five 
domains to each economic metric, we set a Bonferroni corrected significance 
threshold of p < .01 (correcting for the five examined cognitive domains), 
followed strictly as this was an ancillary component of the study. No 
significant correlations were found between performance on these cognitive 
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domains and our uncertainty preferences (risk or ambiguity) or choice 
strategies.  
 
Table 2.3.  Relationships between decision making metrics and cognitive 




Premium Strategy Premium Strategy 
Attention and 
working memory 
r(25) = -.03 
p = .94 
 
r(31) = .28 
p = .12 
r(33) = .43 
p = .010 
r(35) = .02 
p = .89 
Verbal memory r(25) = -.10 
p = .62 
 
r(31) = -.20 
p = .27 
r(33) = .08 
p = .64 
r(35) = -.08 
p = .63 
Visuospatial 
memory 
r(25) = -.06 
p = .77 
 
r(31) = .01 
p = .95 
r(33) = .29 
p = .10 
r(35) = -.14 
p = .40 
Executive 
functioning 
r(25) = -.01 
p = .95 
 
r(31) = .13 
p = .47 
r(33) = -.18 
p = .31 
r(35) = .14 
p = .41 
Processing speed r(25) = -.09 
p = .65 
 
r(31) = .18 
p = .32 
r(33) = .28 
p = .11 
r(35)  = .22 
p = .20 
To account for multiple comparisons across the five cognitive domains, a 
Bonferroni corrected significance threshold of p < .01 was applied. 
 
Effects of aging on risk and ambiguity preferences 
To examine whether aging alters risk and ambiguity preferences, we 
contrasted our YA and OA samples, with comparisons listed in Table 2.4 and 
shown in Figure 2.3. Within the gains domain, YA and OA were similarly risk 
averse (mean ± SD YA = .64 ± .66, OA = .55 ± .61, between group difference 
t(77) <1 , p = n.s.). Within the losses domain, we identified significant age-
related differences, with YA risk seeking (mean ± SD = .22 ± .59) and OA risk 






Figure 2.3. Risk preferences. Distribution of individual risk premium values 
for (A) YA in the gains domain, (B) YA in the losses domain, (C) OA in the 
gains domain, and (D) OA in the losses domain. The “*” shows the mean of 
each distribution. 
 
A similar pattern of age-related effects was also found for ambiguity 
preferences (Table 2.4). In the gains domain, participants in both age groups 
were equally ambiguity averse (mean ± SD YA = 1.54 ± 1.46, OA = 1.46 ± 
1.04, between group difference t(60) <1, n.s.). While in the losses domain, YA 
were ambiguity seeking (mean ± SD = .24 ± .77) and OA were ambiguity 
averse (mean ± SD = -.19 ± .30; t(93) = 3.14, p = .002). Calculation of 
Cohen’s d indicated moderate to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) for age-
related differences in both risk and ambiguity preferences within the losses 







Table 2.4. Comparison of economic measures between YA and OA  
 YA 
Mean ± SD 
OA 
Mean ± SD 




     Uncertainty Premium 
     Risk 
     Ambiguity 





.65 ± .66 
1.54 ± 1.46 
r(35) = .33, 




.55 ± .61 
1.46 ± 1.04 
r(19) = .55, 







     Information Strategies 
     Choice strategy 
     r2 rEV 
     r2 pWIN 
 
 
.16 ± .24 
.26 ± .14 
.10 ± .12 
 
.12 ± .22 
.21 ± .16 






     Response Time (s) 
     Risk 
     Ambiguity 
 
 
1.55 ± .61 
1.35 ± .52 
p = .046 
 
2.49 ± .90 
2.34 ± .83 







     Uncertainty Premium 
     Risk 
     Ambiguity 




.22 ± .59 
.24 ± .78 
r(56) = .77, 




-.17 ± .31 
-.18 ± .40 
r(33) = .68, 






     Information Strategies 
     Choice strategy 
     r2 rEV 
     r2 pWIN 
     
 
.38 ± .15 
.40 ± .13 




.35 ± .13 






     Response Time (s) 
     Risk 
     Ambiguity 
 
 
1.74 ± 0.51 
1.69 ± 0.46 
p = .57 
 
3.17 ± 1.27 
3.37 ± 1.25 
p = .49 
 
< .0001 
Abbreviations: rEV, Relative Expected Value; pWIN, Probability of Winning. 
Overall participants responded slower in the losses tasks than in the gains task 
with significant difference in OA (p < .01) and marginally significant 
difference in YA (p = .068).  
 
We found correlations between risk and ambiguity preferences within 
the gains domain (YA: r(35) = .34, p = .043; OA: r(19) = .55, p = .009), 
concurring with a recent study (Lauriola & Levin, 2001b). We extend this 
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finding, showing that risk and ambiguity preferences are also correlated within 
the losses domain (YA: r(56) = .80, p < .0001; OA: r(33) = .68, p < .0001).  
Risk preferences across the gains and losses domains were not 
significantly correlated within either age group (all r < |.08|, p = n.s.). 
Similarly, ambiguity preferences across domains were uncorrelated in YA 
(r(35) = -.11, p = n.s.). However, in OA there was a significant negative 
correlation between ambiguity preferences across the gains and losses 
domains (r(20) = -.46, p = .032). Given the inverse relationship between the 
premium metric and preferences across domains, this negative correlation 
shows a positive relationship in OA between ambiguity aversion for gains and 
for losses.  
A potential concern in interpreting the lack of found differences for 
gains risk preferences between OA and YA could be that highly risk averse 
participants were ‘cut-off’ by our task design and analyses, which set a ceiling 
measurable risk premium value of 2.5. This is extremely unlikely, as 
demonstrated by estimating the likelihood of finding values outside of our 
measurable range, based upon the observed risk premium values in the 
remainder of each of our samples and the normal distribution. For YA, the 
edge is 2.9 standard deviations from the mean, which indicates that 
approximately 99.5% of YA should have risk preference values within our 
measureable range. Similarly, for OA the edge is 3.3 standard deviations from 
the mean, indicating that approximately 99.9% of participants should have 
measurable risk premium values. In other words, based upon the means and 
variance of our participants with viable risk preference values, we anticipate 
the presence of fewer than 1 participant with preferences extreme enough to 
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not fall within our measureable range. We note that while an adaptive task 
design would avoid this potential concern by fitting trials to individuals, it 
would also produce additional concerns such as trial order effects. 
 
Differences in choice strategy across the gains and losses domains  
We examined whether aging altered what information participants 
relied upon to make their decisions through the use of our choice strategy 
metric. Choice strategy was determined, within each domain, through linear 
regressions to determine the maximal influence (expressed through R-squared 
values) of the rEV and pWIN trial-by-trial information on individual choice 
behavior. These values were determined separately within each of the gains 










Figure 2.4. Choice strategy – utilization of trial information. Relationship 
of independent R-squared values of rEV and pWIN on trial-by-trial choice 
behavior for (A) YA in the gains domain, (B) OA in the gains domain, (C) YA 
in the losses domain, and (D) OA in the losses domain. Distributions of choice 
strategy metric (difference between R-squares of rEV and pWIN) for (E) YA 
in the gains domain, (F) OA in the gains domain, (G) YA in the losses domain, 
and (H) OA in the losses domain. The “*” shows the mean of each 
distribution. 
 
Within both the YA and OA groups, we observed significantly higher 
choice strategies in the losses domain than in the gains domain (YA: t(117) = 
6.00, p < .0001; OA: t(68) = 4.23, p < .0001) with large effect sizes in both 
groups (Cohen’s d, YA = 1.10, OA = 1.00) (Table 2.4 and Figures 2.4G and 
2.4H). As the choice strategy metric is a combination of two factors, we also 
examine the effects of aging on these factors individually, revealing that the 
differences were driven by alterations to both components - increased use of 
the relative expected value (rEV) information (YA: t(60) = 8.45, p < .0001, d 
= 1.06; OA: t(34) = 5.13, p < .0001, d = .94), along with decreased use of the 
probability of winning (pWIN) information (YA: t(56) = 4.62, p < .0001, d = 









































































































individual choice strategies across the gains and losses domains was present 
for YA (r(55) = .42, p = .001), but absent for OA (r(31) = .20, p = n.s.).   
 
Effects of aging on choice strategy  
Examining for age-related differences in choice strategy, we found no 
differences within the gains domain (mean ± SD YA: .16 ± .24, OA: .12 ± .22, 
t(89) < 1, n.s.) (Table 2.4 and Figures 2.4E and 2.4F).  
Examining for age-related differences within the losses domain, we 
found that OA exhibited lower choice strategies than YA (mean ± SD YA: .38 
± .15, OA: .31 ± .16, t(96) = 1.97, p = .052, Cohen’s d = .41) (Figures 2.4G 
and 2.4H). As this change in the composite strategy metric could be driven by 
either decreased use of rEV information or enhanced use of pWIN 
information, we examined each component individually. OA showed 
marginally significant lower use of rEV information (mean ± SD rEV r2 values 
YA: .40 ± .13, OA: .35 ± .13, between group difference t(97) = 1.92, p = .058, 
Cohen’s d = .40), without alteration in the use of pWIN information (mean ± 
SD pWIN r2 values YA: .03 ± .04, OA: .04 ± .04, between group difference 
t(96) = 1.27, p = .21, d = .27).  
 
Relationship between risk preference and choice strategy within OA 
 Given the observed alterations of OA in both risk preferences and 
choice strategies within the losses domain, we looked for interactions between 
these metrics (Figure 2.5). We excluded one OA from this analysis, as his/her 
risk preference and choice strategy interaction was a strong outlier (> 4.95 
SD). OA exhibited a highly significant correlation between risk preference and 
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choice strategy in the losses domain (r(32) = .77, p < .0001), such that the 
closer their risk premium was to zero, the higher their choice strategy. In other 
words, the greater their reliance on the maximizing information, the more risk 
neutral their risk preference was. This relationship was absent in YA (r(57) = -
.11, p = n.s.). Importantly, such a relationship in OA is not due to our task 




Figure 2.5. Interaction between risk preferences and choice strategies in 
the losses domain. Within older adults, a positive correlation between risk 
premium and choice strategy was identified, such that increasing use of the 
rEV information (maximizing) results in more risk neutral preferences 
(increased ‘rationality’). The included black line is the total least square line 






We investigated the effects of aging on economic decision-making, 
focusing on alterations of risk preferences and choice strategies within both 
the gains and losses domains, contrasting cognitively healthy OA with YA. 
OA were significantly more risk and ambiguity averse in the losses domain, 
but were not significantly different from YA within the gains domain. OA also 
made significantly less use of the maximizing choice strategy in the losses 
domain. Finally, we found a correlation between risk preference and choice 
strategy such that the more OA utilized maximizing choice strategies, the 
more risk neutral (or ‘rational’) their preferences.  
 
OA are more risk averse for losses 
OA were significantly more uncertainty averse in the losses domain, 
but were not significantly different from YA within the gains domain. YA 
demonstrated the classic pattern of being risk averse for gains and risk seeking 
for losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Contrastingly, OA were risk averse 
across both the gains and losses domains.  
Given that OA have less time to recover from financial catastrophe, 
they are typically advised to shift their retirement savings away from risky 
investments, (Jagannathan & Kocherlakota, 1996). The preference differences 
we found between YA and OA matches this advice. Our finding also expands 
upon a study by Ebner and colleagues (2006), who found OA to be generally 
oriented towards prevention of losses while YA focused on pursuing gains. 
Our results suggest that such a change can be extended to the domain of 
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monetary decision making and could be the result of enhanced uncertainty 
aversion for losses, rather than reduced responses to gains.  
It is unclear how such age-related alterations in economic risk 
preferences may generalize to other domains, such as medical or social 
decision making (Weber et al., 2002). In fact, while risk aversion may be 
beneficial in specific circumstances, an overall increase in risk aversion would 
not be beneficial in all situations. Good decision making is derived from the 
ability to tailor our preferences to the specific context and goals of the choice. 
We note that our risk preference metric, the risk premium, is not the 
result of a specific theoretical model, but is simply a zero-centered transform 
of the psychometric indifference point. A potential pitfall of this empirical 
formulation of risk preference is that it does not ascribe to any specific 
theoretical model of risk preference, and therefore is not interpretable 
specifically in-line with those models. However, a potential advantage of such 
a model-free metric is that it does not rely on specific theoretical assumptions. 
For example, expected-utility theory states that the power function risk metric 
is the result of the diminishing weight of marginal utility, but it is unclear if 
that is a viable mechanism (Rabin, 2000). Similarly, Prospect Theory suggests 
that the risk preferences of individuals should be highly correlated across 
gains and losses (reflection effect), but we find no correlation between risk 
preferences across domains, concurring with other empirical studies (Cohen et 
al., 1987; Schoemaker, 1990; Laury & Holt, 2000; Tymula et al., 2013). We 
note, however, the very strong correlations we find between individual risk 
premium and power function risk preference measures, indicating that these 




OA have decreased maximizing strategies within the losses domain 
Within the gains domain, there was no significant difference between 
the choice strategies of YA and OA. However, within the losses domain, OA 
showed lower choice strategies than YA, specifically attributable to lower 
utilization of the calculated rEV information while maintaining equivalent use 
of the readily available pWIN information as YA.  
A possible explanation for why choice strategy was only altered in the 
losses domain is that participants may have engaged in more effortful 
cognitive processing within the losses domain, which may have helped reveal 
age-related differences. The presence of greater effort is backed by the longer 
response times in the losses domain (Table 2.4), significant in OA and 
trending in YA. Further, across both YA and OA, we see higher overall choice 
strategy and specifically increased utilization of maximizing rEV (not just 
reduced pWIN), suggesting higher motivation in the losses domain than in the 
gains domain. Such increases in cognitive effort for loss-related decision 
making concurs with the standard concept of loss aversion, in which people 
weigh losses more intensely than gains of the same magnitude (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). High levels of motivation and cognitive effort have been 
shown to help reveal age-related effects in complex tasks (McDowd & Craik, 
1988; Huxhold et al., 2006). It may be that as aging reduces cognitive 
capacity, OA adapt by conserving processing resources for highly motivated 
decisions (Hess et al., 2009). Increased utilization of the maximizing strategy 
in loss-related decision making may reflect OA consciously choosing to 
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engage in more effortful cognitive processing, but due to limited cognitive 
resources, OA are unable to match the high performance of YA.  
Our finding, that OA made lower use of maximizing information in the 
losses domain (i.e., lower overall choice strategy metric and specifically 
decreased rEV), is consistent with prior studies showing that older investors 
(age 60 and above) are less effective in applying their investment skills due to 
age-related cognitive decline, even though they have greater investment 
knowledge and experience than younger investors (Korniotis & Kumar, 2011), 
although other studies point out that reduced strategy may not necessarily lead 
to diminished decision quality when simple strategies are viable (Mata et al., 
2012). 
  
Correlation between risk preferences and choice strategies in OA 
Within the losses domain, the OA who utilized the maximizing rEV 
information, were more risk neutral. In classical economic utility theory (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) rationality is characterized by utility 
maximization, which translates into consistent use of risk preferences. Within 
our sample of OA we see a correlation between preferences and strategy, with 
maximizing strategy driving risk neutral preferences. This pattern is intriguing 
for three reasons. Firstly, consistent choice behavior is required for high 
values on the choice strategy metric. As participants show consistent choices 
over trials, their behavior can be considered more rational. Secondly, OA, as a 
group, show convergence on a single preference value, driven by the degree to 
which they utilize the effortful strategy. In an individual, such consistent 
application of preferences would result in consistent choice behavior and 
	 	
47 
enhanced rational choice. Thirdly, the specific risk preference value that they 
converge on is risk neutrality, at which utility maximization converges with 
value maximization. This suggests that the more OA were motivated and 
engaged in effortful strategies, the more they focused on maximizing the 
objective value of their choices. In other words, this specific linkage between 
risk preferences and strategy suggests that OA are exhibiting a relationship 
between enhanced rationality and enhanced value maximization. Within YA, 
we see greater variability in the relationship between risk preference and 
strategy.  
One possible explanation for these differences is that OA have 
acquired experience over their lifetime about not just what information to pay 
attention to (rEV vs. pWIN), but also how to utilize that information. 
Consistent with our findings, a study conducted by Tentori and colleagues 
(2001) observed that OA make more ‘rational’ choices (i.e., less violations of 
transitivity while selecting hypothetical supermarket discount cards) than YA, 
suggesting that age-related accumulation of experience leads to greater 
rational choice. Such wisdom gained through experiences would then produce 
our found relationship, with higher motivated engagement in the task (i.e., 
choice strategy) leading to more neutral preferences.  
An intriguing question is whether the effects of aging on economic 
decision-making are non-linear. Middle-aged adults have been suggested to be 
better economic decision makers than either YA or OA, at least borrowing at 
lower interest rates and paying fewer fees (Argawal et al., 2007). Potentially, 
middle-aged adults could have the highest quality decision making as they 
have the benefits of acquired life experience without cognitive decline. In 
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addition, further studies are needed to understand how performance on lab-
based economic tasks translates to real-world economic behaviors (for 
example, see Li et al., 2015). 
 
Conclusions 	
Understanding the effects of aging on uncertainty preferences and 
choice strategies has vital implications for OA. Our study investigated the 
effects of aging on economic decision-making across both the gains and losses 
domains, specifically examining alterations in uncertainty preferences, choice 
strategies, and the interactions of the two. We found clear differences in 
economic decision-making between YA and OA in the losses domain, with no 
alterations in the gains domain. Within the losses domain, OA were more risk 
and ambiguity averse and made less use of maximizing choice strategies. 
Additionally, we identified a positive effect of aging, a correlation between 
preference and strategy such that the more engaged a participant was (higher 
choice strategy), the more rational and value maximizing their behavior was. 
Our results show that healthy aging results in both positive and negative 
alterations of economic decision-making preferences and strategies.  
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Chapter 3: Sleep Deprivation Alters Choice Strategy Without Altering 
Uncertainty or Loss Aversion Preferences3,4 
 
The behavioral findings in Chapter 2 demonstrate how gains and losses 
economic decision making are differentially altered by aging, with significant 
alterations found only in the losses domain and not in the gains domain. The 
study in this chapter sought to examine another state modulation, how 23 
hours of total sleep deprivation alters gains and losses economic decision 
making. As most previous studies looking at the effect of sleep deprivation on 
decision making focused on the gains domain and reported no alterations, it is 
interesting to see whether aging and sleep deprivation would show similar 
effects on decision making.  
 
Abstract 
 Sleep deprivation is known to alter decision making; however, it is 
unclear what specific cognitive processes are modified to drive altered 
choices. In this chapter, we examined how one night of total sleep deprivation 
(TSD) alters economic decision making. We specifically examined changes in 
uncertainty preferences dissociably from changes in the strategy with which 
participants engage with presented choice information. With high test-retest 
reliability, we show that TSD does not alter uncertainty preferences or loss 
aversion. Rather, TSD alters the information the participants rely upon to 
make their choices. Utilizing a choice strategy metric which contrasts the 																																																								
3 This paper has been previously published: Mullette-Gillman, O.A., Kurnianingsih, Y. A, & Liu, J.C.J. 
(2015). Sleep Deprivation Alters Choice Strategy Without Altering Uncertainty or Loss Aversion 
Preferences.  Frontiers in neuroscience, 9, 352. 
4 Contributions: OAMG designed the study. JCJL coordinated data collection. OAMG and YAK 
analyzed and interpreted the data. OAMG and YAK wrote the manuscript with comments from JCJL.	
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influence of maximizing and satisficing information on choice behavior, we 
find that TSD alters the relative reliance on maximizing information and 
satisficing information, in the gains domain. This alteration is the result of 
participants both decreasing their reliance on cognitively-complex maximizing 
information and a concomitant increase in the use of readily-available 
satisficing information. TSD did not result in a decrease in overall information 
use in either domain. These results show that sleep deprivation alters decision 
making by altering the informational strategies that participants employ, 






Total sleep deprivation (TSD) has been found to induce cognitive 
impairments and reduce the ability to make good decisions and judgments. 
The effects of TSD on behavior range from alterations of emotional 
processing (Gujar et al., 2011; Yoo et al., 2007; Killgore et al., 2008; see 
Kerkhof & Van Dongen, 2010 for review), the desirability of food options 
(Greer, Goldstein &Walker, 2013), decision making across multiple domains 
(Harrison & Horne, 2000), and can even increase the likelihood of unethical 
behavior (Barnes et al., 2011). Recent studies indicate that a large percentage 
of people regularly suffer from sleep loss globally (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), 2011). As such, it is important to understand 
how TSD influences economic decision making.  
TSD has been shown to alter economic decision making across various 
tasks. For example, sleep-deprived persons have been reported to show an 
increase in effort discounting (Libedinsky et al., 2013), a shift in behavior 
from preventing losses to pursuing gains (Venkatraman et al., 2011), a change 
in the willingness to take risks on the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) 
(Acheson, Richard and Wit, 2007; Killgore, 2007), and poorer performance on 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Killgore et al., 2006). However, it is unclear 
whether these alterations result from specific alterations of economic 
preferences, or from alterations of other cognitive aspects of the decision-
making process. Accordingly, in this study we sought to specify the effects of 
sleep deprivation on economic decision making, focusing on preferences 
(uncertainty and loss aversion) and the information participants utilize to make 
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their decisions (strategy), through a task that controls for potentially-
confounding effects on other cognitive domains (such as learning). 
Our first goal was to investigate whether sleep deprivation alters 
uncertainty and loss aversion preferences. Uncertainty preferences quantify 
how participants alter the valuation of a gamble due to an unknown 
probabilistic outcome. This can relate to risk (gambles of known 
probabilities), or ambiguity (gambles with unknown probabilities) (Knight, 
1921; Ellsberg 1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992). Empirical evidence has shown 
that people tend to be risk averse when making decisions about gains and risk 
seeking when making decisions about losses (Prospect Theory, Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003). Given such clear behavioral differences 
between gains and losses, it is important to dissociably investigate the gains 
and losses domains.  
The effects of TSD on uncertainty preferences have only been 
examined in a small number of experimental studies. Most such studies have 
focused on risk preferences in the gains domain and have found no modulation 
by TSD (Acheson, Richard & Wit, 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2007; Menz et 
al., 2012). Utilizing a task that involved altering 5-outcome gambles 
(involving both possible gains and losses within each trial) Venkatraman and 
colleagues (2011) suggested increased risk-seeking preference under TSD. 
One study by McKenna et al. (2007) explored choices to risky and ambiguity 
options in both the gains and losses domains, finding decreased risk aversion 
in the gains domain and decreased risk seeking in the losses domain. In this 
study, we sought to directly test the effects of TSD on risk preferences 
(independently in the gains and losses domains), while separately assessing 
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alterations of loss aversion or strategy, and avoiding potential confounds (such 
as learning effects). 
Loss aversion refers to the relative weighting of potential gains and 
losses in decision making, with the average person weighing potential losses 
approximately twice as strongly as potential gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992; Tom et al., 2007). Venkatraman and colleagues (2011) found neural 
evidence that TSD may alter economic choice behavior from ‘defending 
against losses to seeking increased gains’, which would suggest decreased loss 
aversion. However, they also specifically tested and found no alteration in loss 
aversion within their task. Here, using a task specifically designed to measure 
loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007), we directly test the hypothesis that sleep 
deprivation produces a decrease in loss aversion, either by decreasing the 
weighting of losses, increasing the weighting of gains, or both.  
The final goal of this study was to investigate whether TSD alters the 
strategy with which participants engage with the available choice information. 
Our choice strategy metric quantifies the differential utilization of available 
information in decision making by contrasting between a simple satisficing 
strategy (the probability of winning the gamble) and a more cognitively-
effortful maximizing strategy (determining the relative expected value of each 
of the available options) (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 
2015). To date, no study has investigated the effects of TSD on such strategy 
utilization during economic decision-making. We hypothesized that TSD 
would result in a decrease in the use of maximizing information (e.g. 
calculated expected value information) with an increase in the use of readily-
available satisficing information (e.g. probability information).  
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Recent studies have indicated that TSD may result in a decrease in the 
ability to process available information, including reduced visual short term 
memory information processing (Chee & Chuah, 2007), limited selective 
attention (Lim et al., 2010), reduced processing of peripheral information 
(Kong et al., 2012), and reduced rapid picture processing (Kong et al., 2014). 
This presents a secondary hypothesis for us to examine with our strategy 
analyses – whether TSD produces an overall decrease in the use of available 
information. 
In this study, we examined how TSD alters economic preferences and 
choice strategy using three incentive-compatible decision-making tasks: 1) the 
gains choice task, 2) the losses choice task, and 3) the loss aversion task. We 
hypothesized that TSD would not alter uncertainty or loss aversion 
preferences, but would result in alterations of the information participants 
relied upon to make their decisions.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Subjects 
Data were collected from twenty-nine members of the National 
University of Singapore community (17 males; age range = 19 – 26 years, 
mean ± SD = 21.66 ± 1.88 years). Participants selected for this study indicated 
that they: 1) had good habitual sleep (sleep duration of 6.5-9 hours daily, 
sleeping before 00:30 and waking before 09:00), 2) were not of an extreme 
chronotype (as assessed by an abbreviated version of the Horne-Öbsterg 
Morningness-Eveningness questionnaire; Horne and Östberg, 1976), 3) had no 
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history of sleep, neurological, or psychiatric disorders, 4) were nonsmokers, 
and 5) drank fewer than three caffeinated drinks per day.  Additionally, 
participants’ sleep patterns were monitored throughout the duration of the 
study through the use of wrist actigraphy (Actiwatch, Philips Respironics, 
USA); only those who evidenced good habitual sleep were included. All 
participants provided informed consent in compliance with a protocol 
approved by the National University of Singapore Institutional Review Board.   
 
Study procedure 
Participants made three visits to the lab, each scheduled one week 
apart. In the first visit, participants were briefed about the study protocol, 
trained on study tasks, and given a wrist actigraph to be worn throughout the 
study. Participants then completed the rested wakefulness (RW) and total 
sleep deprivation (TSD) sessions, with session order counterbalanced across 
participants. All participants indicated that they had not consumed any 
medication, caffeine, nicotine, or alcohol for at least 24 hours prior to each 
session. 
For the TSD session, participants arrived at the lab at 19:00 the night 
before the experiment. Throughout the night, participants were monitored to 
ensure they kept awake and engaged only in sedentary activities. Participants 
also completed hourly assessments of vigilance (the 10-minute Psychomotor 
Vigilance Task, PVT; Dinges et al., 1997). 
For the RW session, participants arrived at the lab at 20:30 and were 
given 9 hours of sleep opportunity. Participants performed one assessment of 
vigilance and of subjective sleepiness upon waking up. 
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In the morning, our economic tasks began at 10:15 for the RW session, 
and 7:45 for the TSD session (see Figure 3.1A); as such, the effects described 
here represent the interaction of circadian and homeostatic factors (Goel et al., 
2013). As part of a larger study, participants also completed additional 
computerized tests, behavioral questionnaires, and functional magnetic 






Figure 3.1. Experimental Design. (A) Participants attended 3 sessions, 1 
preliminary session followed by 2 main sessions, which were each ~1 week 
apart. The order of the RW and TSD session was counterbalanced across 
participants. (B) Example trials for the gains choice task and the losses choice 
task. (C) Example trial for loss aversion task. For all the monetary decision 
making tasks, resolution of one trial from each task was given at the end of the 
experiment to determine participants’ payment. No outcome resolutions were 
given during any tasks until completion of the final experimental session. 
 
All participants completed three tasks in the following order: gains 
choice task, losses choice task, loss aversion task. At the beginning of the 
preliminary session, participants were informed that their final monetary 
payment would be adjusted by $0 to $30 based upon the choices that they 
make. At the end of the entire experiment, we would randomly select one trial 
from each of the three tasks from each main session (6 trials in total), resolve 
their choices, and pay them an unspecified percentage of the total funds they 
accumulated (which was 33%). Importantly, participants were reminded to 
treat each trial as the one that mattered, as it could be the one randomly 
selected and resolved. For the loss aversion task, participants were told they 
were receiving a $20 endowment (see task description), which was added to 
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positive final accumulation. No trials were selected, nor gambles resolved, 
until the conclusion of the entire experiment to eliminate possible alterations 
of preferences and strategies due to learning effects. Participants were paid in 
in Singapore dollars.  
 
Experimental design 
Uncertainty preference tasks. Uncertainty preference (risk and 
ambiguity) and choice strategy were evaluated using our gains choice task and 
losses choice task (Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-
Gillman et al., 2015). Participants performed these two monetary decision 
tasks, one featuring choices between possible monetary gains and the other 
between possible monetary losses. On each trial, participants chose between a 
certain option and a gamble option with varied value and probability of 
winning (Figure 3.1B). Data collection and analyses were achieved using 
MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with Psychtoolbox 
(www.psychtoolbox.org).   
The gains choice task consisted of 165 trials (see full description in 
Stanton et al. 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015 
see full trial metrics in Appendix A). On each trial, the participants chose 
between a certain monetary option (such as $3) and a gamble that was either 
risky or ambiguous. The 135 risk trials contained a gamble with a known 
probability of winning a presented value (such as 50% of $8) against a fixed 
alternative of receiving $0. The 30 ambiguity trials had the same form, except 
that the gamble had an unknown probability of winning. Risk and ambiguity 
trials were intermixed and randomized across participants. The matrix of 
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presented risky gambles was constructed from 5 certain gain options {$3, $4, 
$5, $6, $7}, three probabilities of winning {25%, 50%, 75%}, and nine 
different relative expected values (rEV or the ratio of the expected value of the 
gamble to the value of the certain option, EVG/ Vc) which were {0.5, 1.0, 1.3, 
1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5}. Potential win values ranged from $2 to $98. For 
ambiguous gambles, six rEVs were examined {0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0}, and 
presented gamble values were calculated based on an assumed 50% 
probability of winning, resulting in values ranging from $3 to $84. For both 
risky and ambiguous options, a loss would always result in $0 outcome. 
Gamble values were rounded to the nearest ten cents for presentation during 
choices. 
The losses choice task consisted of 200 trials, with 150 risk trials and 
50 ambiguity trials. The losses choice task was based on the gains choice task, 
with altered valence and adjusted rEV values. The adjusted set of ten rEVs 
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0} were utilized across both risk 
and ambiguity trials, resulting in potential losses ranging from -$0.40 to -$112.  
 
Quantifying uncertainty preferences. We quantified uncertainty 
preferences using psychometric indifference point analyses to identify the rEV 
at which the participant would choose the gamble option 50% of the time, thus 
indicating indifference between the certain and gamble options. Choice 
functions were constructed by plotting a continuous function based upon the 
percentage of accepting the gamble option (y-axis) to each respective assigned 
rEV (EVG/ Vc). Examples of choice functions for both domains are shown in 
Figure 3.2. The choice functions were generally monotonic and the first point 
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where the percentage of accepting the gamble option crossed 50% was defined 
to be the indifference point. We determined the premium value by subtracting 
1 from this indifference point to produce a premium value metric with zero 
indicative of risk neutrality. These analyses were conducted separately for risk 
and ambiguity and across gains and losses, resulting in four independent 






Figure 3.2. Examples choice functions for individual participants. Each 
subplot shows the choice behavior for 1 participant across the trials where they 
chose between a risky gamble and a certain monetary option one task. The y-
axis indicates the percent at which they selected the gamble option, across 15 
trials for each point. The x-axis is the ratio of the expected value of the gamble 
to the value of the certain option (rEV). (A) In the gains choice task, for 135 
risk trials across 9 examined rEV values. (B) In the losses choice task, for 150 
risk trials across 10 examined rEV values. Participants’ choice functions for 
the risk trials from each domain-specific task were plotted to show the percent 
at which they selected the gamble for each examined rEV value. The 
indifference point of each participant was determined as the projected rEV for 
where their choice function indicated 50% selection of the gamble (as 
indicated with an inverted red triangle for these participants). We defined the 
risk premium value for each participant as their indifference point -1 (to make 
zero be risk neutral). 
 
The premium value is a measure of the degree to which participant 
alters the valuation of the absolute expected value of the gamble in relation to 
outcome uncertainty. As such, a zero premium value reflects no change in 
valuation (subjective value (SV) = expected value (EV)), a positive value 
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enhanced valuation (SV > EV). This interpretation of valuation applies for 
both gains and losses premium values. However, in the gains domain, 
positive/negative premium values indicate risk aversion/seeking, but in the 
losses domain negative/positive premium values indicate risk 
aversion/seeking. In both domains, a zero risk premium value indicates risk 
neutrality.  
 Our premium metric cannot be derived for participants whose choice 
functions do not have an indifference point within our sampled range (their 
choice function does not cross 50% acceptance, see Figure 3.2). We opted to 
remove such participants from uncertainty preference analyses, as such choice 
functions are the result of participants not modulating their choice behavior 
across our large set of relative values of the gamble and certain options (for 
discussion, see Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). This resulted in the exclusion of: 
risk gains: 7 RW and 6 TSD; risk losses: 1 RW and 1 TSD; ambiguity gains: 
11 RW and 10 TSD; and ambiguity losses: 1 RW and 1 TSD. We note that the 
exclusion rates across RW and TSD sessions are almost identical.  
To facilitate comparison across studies, we note that our risk premium 
formulation has been previously shown to result in very high correlations with 
the power function risk preference values, when examined in a large sample 
(N~300, r >|.6| for gains, Stanton et al., 2011) or two moderate samples (N = 
62, r > |.7| for gains and losses, Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; N = 72, r > |.49| for 
gains, and r > |.77| for losses, Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). In the current 
smaller sample, in RW, we find slightly lower correlations for risk preferences 
in gains (r(20) = -.41, p = .06) and very high correlations in losses (r(26) = -
.87, p < .0001). For ambiguity preferences, we find uniformly high 
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correlations (gains, r(16) = -.81, p < .001; losses, r(26) = -.90, p < .0001), in 
concurrence with our prior results (N = 72, r > |.77| for gains, and r > |.87| for 
losses, Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). These consistently high correlations 
indicate that these two measures of risk preferences are largely capturing the 
same variance across participants.  
 
Quantifying choice strategy. Choice strategy refers to the relative use 
of two conflicting information types present in each trial that the participant 
can rely upon to make their choice – the first is the relative expected value of 
the two options (rEV), and the second is the probability of winning the gamble 
(pWIN) (see Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). While 
rEV is more likely to lead to higher average rewards, it requires multiple steps 
to calculate. In contrast, while pWIN information is readily available 
perceptually, it will lead to lower average rewards. Importantly, across the risk 
trials of our task, the pWIN and rEV of each trial are fully dissociable (their 
correlation is zero).  
To quantify the choice strategy of each participant, for each domain 
(gains or losses) we utilized two linear regressions (2 factors × 2 domains) 
(Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). Each of these four 
linear regressions determined the influence of one factor (pWIN or rEV) on 
the choices of a participant across all risk trials within one domain (gains or 
losses). The produced R-squared values provide the proportion of choice 
variance that can be explained by each examined factor (see Figure 3.4A to 
3.4D).  Therefore, high R-squared values indicate that choices were most 
likely influenced by that trial information (e.g. a participant that determines 
	 	
64 
their choices solely based on the probability of winning the gamble would 
have a high R-squared value for the pWIN factor, while a participant whose 
decision is solely based upon the ratio of the expected value of the gamble to 
the value of the certain option would have a high R-squared value for the rEV 
factor), whereas low R-squared values indicate that choices were based on 
other factors or were made randomly.  
We produced the Choice Strategy metric by taking the difference 
between these R-squared values (rEV minus pWIN) for each domain (see 
Figure 3.4E to 3.4H). As such, the choice strategy metric directly contrasts 
utilization of the cognitively demanding calculation of the relative expected 
values of the certain and the gamble options against utilization of the 
probability of winning in the gamble option. Choice strategy values are 
positive when participants utilize rEV information more and negative when 
they utilize pWIN information more. Participants are considered to be 
‘maximizing’ when they have positive choice strategy (R-squared rEV > R-
squared pWIN) and ‘satisficing’ when they have negative choice strategy (R-
squared rEV < R-squared pWIN).  
In addition to determination of the choice strategy metric, we also 
utilized the components of these analyses to examine the question of whether 
TSD results in an overall decrease in information use. To test this, we 
calculated a total strategy metric for each participant (for each domain and in 
each state), as the sum of the R-squared values for the rEV and pWIN 
regressions. It is important to note that these trial factors are fully orthogonal 
across trials (i.e., the correlation across trials is zero), so it is mathematically 
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impossible for these factors to account for the same variability in choice 
behavior in their independent regressions.  
We note that as our analytic method only examines the influences of 
the pWIN and rEV information on the choice behaviors of each participant, as 
proxies for satisficing and maximizing strategies, we are unable to speak to 
whether sleep deprivation may have differential effects on the use of other 
unexamined informational factors. However, we note specifically that one 
additional factor is very highly correlated with the rEV factor in both tasks – 
the difference in expected value of the gamble option and the value of the 
certain option (EVdiff = EVg – Vc), Across trials, this factor has an extremely 
high inter-trial correlation with the rEV informational factor (gains: r(133) = 
.926, p < .0001; losses: r(148) = .957, p < .0001), and is almost orthogonal to 
the pWIN factor (gains: r(133) < .0001, p > .99; losses: r(148) < .0001, p > 
.99). 
 
Loss aversion task. We quantified loss aversion, or the relative 
influence of potential losses to potential gains on choice behavior, utilizing a 
modified version of the task and analyses of Tom and colleagues (2007). The 
sole alteration in our version was a reduction in the number of trials to 64 
trials (halving the number of sampled increments in each domain). In brief, 
participants were first endowed with $20 and, on each trial, were given a 
choice to keep their endowment or risk part of it on an offered gamble. 
Gambles always had a 50% chance of a gain and a 50% chance of a loss, with 
gains ranging from $12 to $40 in increments of $4, while losses ranged from -
$6 to -$20 in decrements of -$2 (Figure 3.1C). Participants indicated whether 
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they accepted each offered gamble with options of ‘strongly accept’, ‘weakly 
accept’, ‘weakly reject’ or ‘strongly reject’. No feedback was provided during 
the task, to prevent learning effects, and participants were informed in the 
preliminary session that their final payment would be based upon random 
selection and resolution of one trial from each iteration of the task at the 
conclusion of the final session.   
   
Quantifying loss aversion. Loss aversion preferences were quantified 
following the analyses of Tom and colleagues (2007). In brief, a logistic 
regression was fit to the choices of each participant to determine the 
differential influence (beta weights) of the potential loss and gain values of the 
offered gambles on choice behavior (accept or reject). The ratio of these beta 
weights produced the loss aversion (λ) metric for each participant. Loss 
aversion values greater than 1 indicate that an individual’s choices were 
more strongly influenced by the value of the potential losses than the potential 
gains, while values below 1 indicate the reverse, and values of 1 indicate equal 
weighting. We collected data from 21 participants. We excluded 4 participants 
whose behavior in either session indicated unreasonable loss aversion values 
(such as a lambda of 38). These can be the result of the participant ignoring 
the value of the possible gain – such as employing a fixed response of 
accepting all gambles whose loss is below a threshold. Such strategies result in 
strikingly high loss aversion values, and are not well captured by the 
theoretical concept of loss aversion. This resulted in a final sample of 17 




Statistical analyses. All comparisons between TSD and RW 




Relationship of economic task metrics 
As a baseline, we examined the inter-relationships of our economic 
metrics within the RW state. Risk and ambiguity premiums were highly 
correlated within each domain (gains: r(15) = .86, p < .0001; losses: r(26) = 
.84, p < .0001). Risk preferences were uncorrelated with choice strategy 
within either domain (gains: r(19) = .17, p = .46; losses: r(26) = -.12, p = .53). 
These results concur with our prior results using these tasks in young adults 
(Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). 
We found no significant correlation (all p > .26, uncorrected) between 
loss aversion and uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) or choice 
strategies within either domain. As loss aversion is the ratio of the relative 
weighting of losses to gains, we examined for potential relationships between 
loss aversion and the ratio of risk premiums and choice strategies across 
domains (losses / gains). No significant correlations were found (all p > .05, 
uncorrected), indicating that loss aversion is an independent measure of choice 
behavior from risk preferences and choice strategy. 
In summary, we show very high correlations between risk and 
ambiguity preferences within a domain, and found no other significant 




Sleep deprivation reduces vigilant attention 
 To confirm the robustness of our TSD manipulation, we examined for 
alterations of PVT response times and attentional lapses, as impaired vigilance 
is among the most robust effects of sleep deprivation (Lim & Dinges, 2010). 
PVT data were available for a subset of 18 participants. On average, 
participants showed slower median reaction times in TSD than in RW (mean ± 
SD, RW: 242.8 ± 22.3 ms, TSD: 300.9 ± 50.1 ms; t(13) = 6.41, p < .0001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.54). There was also an increase in the number of attentional 
lapses under TSD (mean ± SD RW: .56 ±.78; TSD: 7.67± 6.74; t(13) = 4.16, p 
< .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.52).  
 
Sleep deprivation does not alter the response times of economic decisions  
Given that TSD alters PVT response times, we examined whether TSD 
also alters response times for economic decisions (Table 1). We found no 
significant effects of sleep deprivation on response times within either the 
gains (mean ± SD risk difference: .002 ± .23; t(28) = .06, p = .95, Cohen’s d = 
.008; mean ± SD ambiguity difference: -.02 ± .26; t(28) = .48, p = .63, 
Cohen’s d = .07) or the losses domains (mean ± SD risk difference: -.04 ± .20; 
t(28) = .97, p = .34, Cohen’s d = .12; mean ± SD ambiguity difference: -.03 ± 
.24; t(28) = .62, p = .54, Cohen’s d = .10.). Within both states, participants 
exhibited faster response times for the gains choice task than the losses choice 
task (risk RW: t(28) = 3.52, p < .003, Cohen’s d = .33; TSD: t(28) = 2.16, p < 
.039, Cohen’s d = .38; ambiguity RW: t(28) = 2.50, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .46; 




Table 3.1. Comparison of economic measures between RW and TSD  







RW vs. TSD 
p-value*** 
Gains choice task 
     Uncertainty premiums  
        Risk (22, 23)* 
        Ambiguity (18, 19) 
        Risk × Ambiguity 
 
 
.48 ± .68 
1.52 ± 1.37 
r(15) = .86, p < .0001 
 
 
.52 ± .78 
1.28 ± 1.46 





     Strategy 
        Choice strategy (29, 29) 
        rEV r2 (29, 29) 
        pWIN r2 (29, 29) 
        Total strategy (29,29) 
 
-.007 ± .27 
.19 ± .15 
.19 ± .17 
.38 ± .14 
 
-.09 ± .30 
.15 ± .14 
.23 ± .19 






     Response time (s)** 
       Risk (29, 29) 
       Ambiguity (29, 29) 
 
 
1.02 ± .31 
1.04 ± .35 
 
1.01 ± .34 




Losses choice task 
     Uncertainty premiums 
        Risk (28, 28) 
        Ambiguity (28, 28) 
        Risk × Ambiguity 
 
 
.01 ± .43 
.01 ± .50 
r(26) = .84, p < .0001 
 
 
-.03 ± .29 
-.10 ± .38 





     Strategy 
        Choice strategy (29, 29) 
        rEV r2 (29, 29) 
        pWIN r2 (29, 29) 
        Total strategy (29,29) 
 
.36 ± .15 
.40 ± .12 
.04 ± .04 
.43 ± .10 
 
.34 ± .13 
.38 ± .11 
.04 ± .05 






     Response time (s)** 
        Risk (29, 29) 
        Ambiguity (29, 29) 
 
Loss aversion task 
        Loss aversion (17, 17) 
 
1.14 ± .30 
1.19 ± .32 
 
 
1.98 ± 1.40 
 
1.10 ± .29 
1.16 ± .27 
 
 








* Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each group (N 
RW, N TSD) 
**Median response time 
***Paired-sample t-tests  







Sleep deprivation does not alter risk or ambiguity preferences  
 To examine the test-retest reliability of our uncertainty preference 
metrics, we ran a correlation across sessions. With approximately 1 week 
between sessions, and no resolution of any gambles until the end of all 
sessions, we found very strong test-retest reliability between uncertainty 
preferences for all four uncertainty preference measures (correlations; risk 
gains: r(19) = .78, p < .0001; risk losses: r(26) = .79, p < .0001; ambiguity 
gains: r(12) = .55, p = .04; ambiguity losses: r(26) = .81, p < .0001).     
Sleep deprivation did not shift risk preferences within either the gains 
(mean ± SD difference: .04 ± .47; t(20) <1, p = .73, Cohen’s d = .06) or the 
losses domains (mean ± SD difference: -.04 ± .26; t(27) <1, p = .40, Cohen’s d 
= .12) (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3). Risk preferences under both RW and 
TSD followed the classical pattern (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), with people 
being generally risk averse for gains and risk neutral or seeking for losses 
(mean ± SD, Gains RW: .48 ± .68, TSD: .52 ± .78; Losses RW: .01 ± .43, 





Figure 3.3. Uncertainty preferences. Relationship between subjects’ 
preferences across RW and TSD conditions for (A) Gains risk premium, (B) 
Losses risk premium, (C) Gains ambiguity premium, and (D) Losses 
ambiguity premium. 
 
 There was also no significant difference in ambiguity preferences 
between RW and TSD within the gains domain (mean ± SD difference: .12 ± 
1.38; t(13) < 1, p = .76, Cohen’s d = .17). Within the losses domain, there was 
a non-significant trend suggesting higher ambiguity seeking during TSD 
(mean ± SD difference: -.11 ± .29; t(27) = 1.90, p = .061, Cohen’s d = .24), 
with calculation of Cohen’s d indicating a small effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
Overall, participants were significantly more ambiguity averse than risk averse 
in the gains domain (RW: t(16) = 4.71, p < .0001, Cohen’s d =  1.03; TSD: 
t(17) = 2.92,  p = .010, Cohen’s d = .69), while no difference between 
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ambiguity and risk preference was found in the losses domain (RW: t(27) < 1, 
p = .91, Cohen’s d = .01; TSD: t(27) = 1.31, p = .20, Cohen’s d = .21).     
 
Sleep deprivation does not alter loss aversion preference 
 We examined the effect of TSD on loss aversion preferences. With ~1 
week separation and no resolution of outcomes, loss aversion preferences were 
highly stationary, with test-retest correlations of r(15) = .95, p < .0001. 
Examining for modulation of loss aversion by TSD, we found no significant 
effect (mean ± SD difference λ: .18 ± .70, t(16) = 1.06, p = .30, Cohen’s d = 
.11).  
 
Choice strategy is highly stationary over sessions 
 We examined the information that each participant utilized to make 
their choices through our choice strategy metric. Across sessions, with ~1 
week delay and no resolution of outcomes, we found very strong test-retest 
reliability between choice strategy values within both domains (correlations; 
gains: r(27) =  .84, p < .0001; losses: r(27) = .72, p < .0001). This is a strong 
concurrence in the test-retest reliability of these measures, building upon our 
previously published 90-minute delay (correlations; gains: r >  .89; losses: r > 
.77; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015).  
 
For gains, sleep deprivation decreases use of maximizing information and 
increases use of satisficing information  
 Within the gains domain, we found significant modulation of choice 
strategy by sleep deprivation condition (mean ± SD difference: -.09 ± .16, 
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t(28) = 2.78, p = .010 Cohen’s d = .31). Concurring with our hypotheses, TSD 
resulted in decreased choice strategy; that is, diminished use of maximizing 
information relative to satisficing information (see Figure 3.4 and 3.5). As the 
choice strategy metric is a composite metric, we examined the effect of TSD 
on the independent R-squared values for the two component factors – rEV and 
pWIN. Within the gains domain, TSD resulted in significant alteration of both 
components – diminished use of the maximizing rEV information (mean ± SD 
difference: -.04 ± .09, t(28) = 2.58, p = .015, Cohen’s d = .31) and increased 
use of the satisficing pWIN information (mean ± SD difference: .05 ± .11, 
t(28) = 2.27, p = .031, Cohen’s d = .25).  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Choice strategy metric – utilization of trial information. 
Relationship between trial variances explained (R-squared) by the rEV and 
pWIN information for (A) RW gains domain,  (B) TSD gains domain, (C) RW 
losses domain, and (D) TSD losses domain. Distribution of choice strategy 
values (difference between rEV R-squared minus pWIN R-squared) for (E) 
RW gains domain,  (F) TSD gains domain, (G) RW losses domain, and (H) 
TSD losses domain. The “*” indicates the mean of each distribution.” 
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Figure 3.5. Choice strategies. Relationship between subjects’ choice strategy 
across rested wakefulness (RW) and total sleep deprivation (TSD) conditions 
for (A) Gains choice strategy, and (B) Losses choice strategy. Distribution of 
differences in choice strategy (TSD minus RW) for the (C) Gains domain and 
the (D) Losses domain. 
 
Given this clear decrease in strategy in the gains domain, we examined 
if this change in behavior was related to found reductions in vigilance. Within 
the 18 participants with vigilance data, we found that individual differences in 
the effects of TSD on reaction times (PVT RT, TSD-RW) were significantly 
negatively correlated with the effects of TSD on choice strategy (TSD-RW) in 
the gains domains (r(16) = -.47, p = .047) – individuals in which TSD led to 
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longer reaction times in the psychomotor vigilance task also showed reduced 
choice strategy in the gains choice task. 
 
For losses, sleep deprivation does not alter information use  
Within the losses domain, we did not find a significant mean shift in 
choice strategy between RW and TSD (mean ± SD difference: -.02 ± .10, t(28) 
= 1.01, p = .32, Cohen’s d = .14).   
 
Sleep deprivation does not alter total information use 
 To test whether TSD resulted in a decrease in the total information that 
participants used to make their economic choices, we examined our total 
strategy metric (the sum of the R-squared values of the rEV and pWIN 
regressions). The total strategy metric showed high within-subject stationarity 
across states within both domains (gains, r(27) = .72, p < .0001; losses, r(27) = 
.67, p < .0001). Testing for TSD effects, we found no significant differences 
between RW and TSD within either the gains or losses domains (mean ± SD 
gains difference: .005 ± .11, t(28) = .04, p = .81, Cohen’s d = .03; losses 
difference: -.01 ± .09, t(28) = .57, p = .57, Cohen’s d = .09).   
 
Replicating information use analyses with logistic regressions 
The choice patterns of subjects range from linear to logistic across the 
rEV values (as can be seen in Figure 3.2). Use of linear models could 
potentially produce misestimations in participants whose choice functions are 
more logistic (specifically, a participant with a sharp transition will have a 
lower R-squared value than a matched participant with a gentle slope). 
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Nonetheless, we chose to use linear models due to a number of competing 
items: 1) answering our hypotheses required two independent regressions for 
each participant, to determine the independent contributions (R-squared 
values) of the pWIN and rEV trial factors; 2) with linear models, the cross-
trial correlation of zero between the pWIN and rEV factors prevents omitted-
factor bias (i.e., the misestimation of the contribution of a factor due to the 
absence of the second factor in the regression); and 3) with independent 
logistic models, omitted-factor bias would be present regardless of  the 
correlation between the included and excluded factors. Although our use of 
linear models is imperfect, the impact on our principle findings is likely 
negligible (Hellevik, 2009). 
Critically, any such misestimations are independent of the 
manipulation that is the focus of this manuscript. In each condition (RW or 
TSD), reduced precision of the degree to which a participant utilized the rEV 
factor would result in on-average symmetric noise of the point-estimation 
(reducing overall power), but without a directional bias on the examined 
manipulation effects (as there is no relationship to the manipulation). We note 
that the high individual test-retest stationarity we reported previously (section 
3.6, with correlations gains r = .84 and losses r = .72) suggests that the 
cumulative effects of any such imprecisions are small. In fact (below), we find 
the exact same pattern of manipulation effects using logistic models as was 
previously found using linear models.  
To test the analytic robustness of our found patterns of change in 
information use, we replicated our analyses replacing the linear regressions 
with logistic regressions, and calculating McFadden’s pseudo R-squared 
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(McFadden, 1974). We found very high correlations between the R-squared 
and pseudo R-squared values from the linear and logistic regressions across 
the RW and TSD sessions, within both the gains (rEV: r(56) = .90, p < .0001; 
pWIN: r(56) = .90, p < .0001) and losses (rEV: r(56) .73, p < .0001; pWIN: 
r(56) = .99, p < .0001) domains. We replicated all results contrasting the RW 
and TSD sessions - a significant decrease in the use of rEV information and an 
increase in pWIN information in the gains domain only (rEV: gains, t(28) = 
2.95, p = .006, Cohen’s d = .29; losses, t(28) = 1.45, p = .16, Cohen’s d = .23; 
pWIN: gains, t(28) = 2.15, p = .041, Cohen’s d = .24; losses, t(28) = .46, p = 
.65, Cohen’s d = .06), and no alteration of total information used in either 
domain (the sum of rEV and pWIN pseudo R-squared values; gains, t(28) = 
.59, p = .56, Cohen’s d = .09; losses, t(28) = 1.36, p = .18, Cohen’s d = .24).   
We note that we could not simply run a multi-factor regression, as it 
would provide only a single R-squared value (accounting for the joint variance 
accounted for by both the pWIN and rEV factors) and the estimated 
coefficients definitionally address a different dimension of behavior (the 





 We show that sleep deprivation alters economic decision making 
through alterations of choice strategies. TSD did not significantly alter 
economic preferences (risk, ambiguity, or loss aversion), decision response 
times, or the total information used by participants. In contrast, we found that 
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one night of sleep deprivation altered the information that participants relied 
upon to make their choices, specifically within the gains domain.  
In the gains domain, TSD produced a general decrease in choice strategy, 
which was the result of both decreased use of maximizing information (rEV) 
and increased use of satisficing information (pWIN). TSD did not alter the 
total amount that participants utilized these types of information, indicating 
that in economic decision making TSD produces a switch in what information 
participants rely upon rather than a decrease in overall information use.  
 
TSD does not alter uncertainty preferences 
 Our participants exhibited the standard pattern of average uncertainty 
preferences across the gains and losses domains, during both RW and TSD; 
that is, participants were, on average, risk averse for gains and risk 
seeking/neutral for losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). With high test-retest 
reliability, we found no alterations in uncertainty preferences in either the 
gains or the losses domains. This represents the first study to explicitly test 
sleep deprivation effects on uncertainty preferences while controlling for 
potentially confounding factors such as strategy and learning.   
We note that, as compared to our findings, several prior studies have 
suggested that TSD results in altered uncertainty preferences. This discrepancy 
may be due to task and metric differences, with previous studies unable to 
dissociate alterations in uncertainty preferences from related cognitive 
processes such as reward learning (as in the Iowa Gambling Task, Killgore, 
2006). Beyond explicitly testing uncertainty preferences, our task design also 
allowed us to distinguish alterations of preferences from alterations of 
	 	
79 
strategies. We suggest that this conflict can be resolved through consideration 
of our observed alterations of choice strategies (see below). That is, prior 
studies may have ascribed behavioral alterations to preference shifts that may 
actually have been due to changes in choice strategy.  
 
TSD does not alter loss aversion preferences 
We also examined whether TSD results in a change in loss aversion, or 
the relative weighting of losses and gains. We found no alteration of loss 
aversion preferences, concurring with the behavioral findings of Venkatraman 
and colleagues (2011) and their suggestion that behavioral alterations are due 
to other factors. 
 
TSD decreases choice strategy in the gains domain 
 Within the gains domain, TSD resulted in a significant decrease in our 
choice strategy metric. As this is a compound metric, we examined the 
components and found that TSD both decreased the use of the relative 
expected value information (rEV) and increased the use of probability 
information (pWIN). Use of the rEV may be considered a form of 
‘maximizing strategy’ (maximizes expected outcomes, but requires multiple 
cognitive steps to calculate), while use of pWIN may be considered a 
‘satisficing strategy’ (a simplifying heuristic that utilizes readily-available 
information at the cost of maximizing rewards). As such, in the gains domain 
TSD led to decreased use of maximizing strategies and concomitant increased 
use of satisficing strategies. This result concurs with a recent study by Menz 
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and colleagues (2011), which found a reduction in decision-making quality 
(higher stochasticity) without a change in preferences.  
Further, the individual change (TSD-RW) in choice strategy in the 
gains domain showed a negative correlation with change in performance on 
the psychomotor vigilance task. Given the inversion between these scales, 
with poorer performance corresponding to higher PVT response times and 
lower choice strategy values, this relationship shows that the individuals who 
had the most detrimental effect of TSD modulation on PVT also had the 
greatest reduction in maximizing behavior. This relationship suggests that the 
mechanisms through which sleep deprivation alters choice strategy in the 
gains domain is related to the mechanisms for altered response times in the 
PVT.  
  
Inferring cognitive alterations 
 Does this pattern of alterations allow us to determine what cognitive 
processes are affected by sleep deprivation? TSD specifically altered strategy 
in the gains domain, with decreased use of maximizing information and 
increased use of satisficing information. Notably, there was a correlation 
between the degree of change (TSD-RW) in choice strategy and the change in 
psychomotor vigilance. However, TSD did not alter uncertainty preferences 
(risk or ambiguity) or loss aversion. These results clearly show the 
independence of effects in the gains and losses domains, suggesting that the 
cognitive or neural mechanisms are not simple mirrors. In addition, the 
domain-specificity of our alteration suggests a possible alternate explanation 
for the TSD-produced optimism bias found by Venkatraman and colleagues 
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(2011). In brief, a gains-specific increase in satisficing behavior could have 
biased behavior in their 5-outcome mixed gamble task (rather than a change in 
valuation).   
 Are these results interpretable through a simple two-system model of 
affect vs. reason? If TSD specifically alters affective processes, such as the 
subjective valuation of gains or losses, then we may have seen clear changes 
in risk preferences in either domain. If TSD alters the relative valuation of 
gains and losses, then we may have seen clear changes in loss aversion. We 
saw neither of these. 
 Rather, the effects of TSD were limited to the strategy measures. 
Based on a dual-system model, this pattern of changed strategy with unaltered 
preferences could be interpreted to suggest that TSD alters cognitive processes 
related to reason without altering affect. However in disagreement, we also 
found no reduction in overall information use, and the changes in strategy 
were limited to the gains domain. 
 We caution against interpreting these results based upon such a dual-
system approach. Simply, changes in strategy could be the result of changes in 
reason or motivation. Similarly, changes in risk preferences or loss aversion 
could not only be produced by altered affect, but could also be derived from 
changes in reasoning alone.  
 The clearest indication of the altered cognitive processes responsible 
for our found alteration in gains strategy come from the strong relationship 
between the change in strategy and the change in psychomotor vigilance 
(PVT). This relationship suggests that these effects share an underlying 






 TSD alters the information participants rely upon to make their 
decisions, without modulating uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity), 
loss aversion, or decision time. In gains, we identified a decrease in use of 
maximizing information with a concomitant increase in the use of satisficing 
information. TSD did not decrease the overall information use.  
These results clearly indicate that sleep deprivation negatively impacts 
decision making in the gains domain, which will lead to lost gains. Such 
specification of the effects of sleep deprivation on human decision making is 
critical for the production of effective treatments and policy, including 
interventions and training for individuals who face unavoidable sleep 
deprivation (e.g., due to career, medical conditions, or parenting).   
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Chapter 4: Cognitive fatigue destabilizes economic decision making 
preferences and strategies5,6 
 
The previous two studies examined the differential impact of aging and 
sleep deprivation on economic decision making across gains and losses 
domains. The experiment described in this chapter sought to examine the 
effects of cognitive fatigue. As increase in cognitive fatigue is often related to 
sleep deprivation (Krueger, 1989) and aging (Avlund, 2010), a priori, we 
would expect the same effect of all three state modulations on decision 
making. However, in the previous two chapters, aging and sleep deprivation 
showed dissociable effects, with aging showing effect in the losses domain 
only and sleep deprivation showing effect in the gains domain only. By using 
the same task design across the three different state alterations (aging, sleep 
deprivation, cognitive fatigue), we were able to contrast their effects on 
decision making and found clear behavioral dissociation among them and also 
between the gains and losses domains. Overall, these findings suggests that the 
three different states influence different neural/cognitive mechanisms and that 
the gains and losses domains do not share the exact same mechanisms.  
 
Abstract  
 It is common for individuals to engage in taxing cognitive activity for 
prolonged periods of time, resulting in cognitive fatigue that has the potential 
to produce significant effects in behavior and decision making. We sought to 																																																								
5 This paper has been previously published: Mullette-Gillman, O.A, Leong, R. L., & Kurnianingsih, Y. 
A. (2015). Cognitive fatigue destabilizes economic decision making preferences and strategies. PloS 
one, 10(7), e0132022. 
6 Contributions: OAMG and RLFL conceived and designed the experiments. RLFL performed the 
experiments. RLFL, YAK and OAMG analyzed the data. OAMG, RFLFL and YAK wrote the paper.	
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examine whether cognitive fatigue modulates economic decision making. We 
employed a between-subject manipulation design, inducing fatigue through 60 
to 90 minutes of taxing cognitive engagement against a control group that 
watched relaxing videos for a matched period of time. Both before and after 
the manipulation, participants engaged in two economic decision making tasks 
(one for gains and one for losses). The analyses focused on two areas of 
economic decision making – preferences and choice strategies. Uncertainty 
preferences (risk and ambiguity) were quantified as premium values, defined 
as the degree and direction in which participants alter the valuation of the 
gamble in comparison to the certain option. The strategies that each participant 
engaged in were quantified through a choice strategy metric, which contrasts 
the degree to which choice behavior relies upon available satisficing or 
maximizing information. We separately examined these metrics for alterations 
within both the gains and losses domains, through the two choice tasks. 
 The fatigue manipulation resulted in significantly greater levels of 
reported subjective fatigue, with correspondingly higher levels of reported 
effort during the cognitively taxing activity. Cognitive fatigue did not alter 
uncertainty preferences (risk or ambiguity) or informational strategies, in 
either the gains or losses domains. Rather, cognitive fatigue resulted in greater 
test-retest variability across most of our economic measures. These results 
indicate that cognitive fatigue destabilizes economic decision making, 
resulting in inconsistent preferences and informational strategies that may 






Cognitive fatigue is a ubiquitous human condition, the result of 
sustained cognitive engagement that taxes our mental resources. The nature of 
work in our society is changing such that increasingly, work involves 
demanding cognitive activity, as opposed to physical exertion, with working 
hours no longer restricted by daylight. Demanding work schedules lead many 
people to experience cognitive fatigue on a daily basis, and have resulted in 
high burnout rates (Demerouti et al., 2001; Carod-Artal & Vazquez-Carbera, 
2013). Studies examining effects of such fatigue find that persistent mental 
resource burdens result in diminished motivation, increased distractibility, 
changes in information processing and poorer mood (Holdings, 1983; 
Meijman, 2000; Bartlett, 1943; Boksem, Meijman, and Lorist, 2005; Loris, 
Boksem, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Sanders, 1998; van der Linden, Frese, & 
Meijman, 2003; Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006). Moreover, fatigued 
participants are more likely to fail to detect errors and less likely to take 
remedial action, and are more willing to take chances in everyday decision 
making (Hockey, et al., 2000). Such general deficits can easily lead to 
diminished performance and health, such as progressive impairment of 
treatment decisions by doctors (Linder et al., 2014). 
We sought to specify the impact of cognitive fatigue on economic 
decision making, with a focus on uncertainty preferences and strategy. 
Uncertainty refers to the absence of information about the eventual resolution 
of probabilistic events, such as in gambles. The two common forms of 
uncertainty are risk, which involves known probabilities (e.g., a coin flip), and 
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ambiguity, which pertains to probabilities of outcomes that are unknown or 
cannot be estimated (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992).  
Beyond economic preferences, we also examined what information the 
participant utilized to inform their choice (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). We 
contrasted between two dominant types of information presented in each trial, 
corresponding to maximizing and satisficing strategies. Maximizing features 
calculation of the relative expected value of the two options, the determination 
of which requires multiple mathematical calculations. Satisficing focuses on 
the probability of winning, which is simply visually observed as the proportion 
of a circle segment. These strategies differ in terms of cognitive cost, with 
satisficing less cognitively taxing than maximizing. 
A priori, we hypothesized that cognitive fatigue would result in 
increased satisficing strategies, as fatigued participants opt for less effortful 
strategies over those requiring more mental resources. This was based on two 
directions of prior findings. First, studies suggest that cognitive fatigue results 
in compromised top-down control mechanisms with relative sparing of 
automatic processes (van der Linden & Eling, 2006). Secondly, aversion to 
further effort is a common feature of mental fatigue (Boksem, Meijman, & 
Lorist, 2006; Lorist et al., 2000; van der Linden, Frese, & Meijman, 2003; 
Robert & Hockey, 1997). Fatigued individuals may seek to minimize the 
energetic costs by opting for strategies that require lower levels of effort 
(Boksem & Tops, 2008). 
We investigated the impact of cognitive fatigue on economic decision 
making, specifically alterations of uncertainty preferences and/or choice 
strategies. We employed two incentive-compatible economic decision making 
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tasks, examining for alterations in economic decision making independently 
across both the gains and the losses domains. We utilized a between-subjects 
design, comparing participants that engaged in a cognitively taxing task 
(fatigue group) and those that watched relaxing videos for an equivalent 
period of time (control group). We found that cognitive fatigue did not 
produce a reliable shift in individual uncertainty preferences or choice 
strategies, contrary to our initial hypotheses. Rather, cognitive fatigue resulted 
in significantly greater test-retest variability across multiple measures. These 
results indicate that cognitive fatigue results in the destabilization of economic 
decision making, highlighting the dangers of fatigue. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
All participants provided written informed consent under a protocol 
approved by the National University of Singapore Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). Our sample consisted of 76 university students (41 males) with an age 
range of 19-26 years (M = 22.3 years, SD = 1.74), recruited through 
advertisements at the National University of Singapore. Data were collected in 
2 samples. In the initial sample, 44 participants took part in the study and were 
randomly assigned to a fatigue (N = 19) or control (N = 25) conditions. 
Examining the fatigue manipulation for these participants indicated that 
although the fatigue condition reported cognitive fatigue and significantly 
higher levels of cognitive effort expended, there was no decline in 
performance in the N-back task used as the manipulation task. While this 
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effect has been previously reported, we opted to enhance the cognitive fatigue 
manipulation to ensure that our manipulation was sufficient (Shighara et al., 
2013). The second sample of data collection was an additional 32 participants 
in an extended fatigue condition, with the intention of merging the two 
samples of fatigue groups if they were not statistically different.  
Four participants were excluded from analyses within the fatigue 
group, as they did not report successful inducement of cognitive fatigue 
following the manipulation task. Our final sample was 25 participants (11 
males; M = 21.9 years, SD = 1.44) in the control condition and 47 participants 
(28 males; M =  22.5 years, SD = 1.87) in the fatigue condition. All 
participants were asked to abstain from alcohol and caffeine 24 hours before 
the experiment.  
 
Study procedure 
 Each experimental session lasted approximately 2.5 hours, for which 
participants were paid $10 plus an additional $0 to 10 (dependent on the 
resolution of one randomly selected trial for each choice task). Following IRB 
consent, each session proceeded in the following order: 1) initial 
questionnaires, 2) pre-manipulation phase, 3) manipulation phase, 4) post-
manipulation phase (see Figure 4.1A). At the beginning of the session, 





Figure 4.1. Experimental procedures and tasks. (A) All participants filled 
in the initial questionnaires, followed by a pre-manipulation risk task. In the 
manipulation period, participants in the fatigue condition performed 5-7 
blocks of 300 trials of the N-back task to induce fatigue. Participants in the 
control condition spent an equivalent amount of time (approx. 90 min) 
watching relaxing videos. After the manipulation phase, all participants 
performed the risk task again. (B) The economic decision making task 
comprised of gains and losses domains, whereby participants were required to 
choose between a certain or gamble option. They were given no time limit to 
respond. Participants were paid based on random selection and resolution of 
one trial from each domain after the completion of the entire experiment.  
 
 Initial questionnaires. Participants filled in questionnaires on their 
demographics, their recent health status, a self-reported cognitive fatigue 
question, and the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME) to assess cognitive 
fatigue (subjective fatigue measures; see section below).  
Pre-manipulation phase. Next, all participants completed the two 
computerized economic decision making tasks. Participants were informed 
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that one trial of each task would be randomly selected and resolved at the end 
of the whole experiment to determine their total payment. Importantly, no 
gambles were resolved until the completion of the experiment to prevent 
behavioral alterations due to outcome feedback (i.e., learning effects).  
Manipulation phase. The manipulation phase followed, with 
differential treatments for the participants in the fatigue and control 
conditions. Participants in the fatigue condition performed a cognitively 
demanding N-back task (5-7 blocks of 300 trials, 2-back) for approximately 90 
minutes, while participants in the control group spent 90 minutes watching 
relaxing videos of nature and animated cartoons. Participants in the non-
fatigue group were told to relax and enjoy the videos. The aim was to keep 
them sufficiently engaged such that they would not be drowsy, but rather, in a 
neutral state of wakefulness. They were provided with a menu of 3 videos that 
they could freely switch between: 1) BBC’s ‘The Life of Birds’, 2) Disney’s 
‘Beauty and the Beast’, 3) Disney’s ‘Tangled’. All participants were limited to 
water (no food or other drinks) for the duration of the study.  
Post-manipulation phase. Participants completed the self-reported 
cognitive fatigue question and RSME scale. Participants then repeated the two 
computerized economic decision making tasks. Participants were reminded 
that one trial from each task would be randomly selected and resolved at the 
end of the experiment to determine their final compensation.  
At the end of the session, one trial from each of the 4 economic tasks 
was randomly selected and resolved. Participants were presented with their 
earnings and provided the opportunity to ask any questions they might have 





Subjective fatigue measures 
Throughout the experiment, participants filled in two short 
questionnaires probing state subjective fatigue and effort (below) (see Figure 
4.2). The initial questionnaires were filled in with the initial demographic 
questionnaires, the second after the pre-manipulation economic task, the third 
to seventh (or ninth) were filled in after each block of the N-back task, and the 
last questionnaire was filled in after the post-manipulation economic tasks. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Cognitive fatigue ratings. State fatigue and effort across the 
experimental protocol. The fatigue (orange bars) and control groups (light and 
dark blue bars: 5-blocks and 7-blocks of N-back respectively) did not differ 
significantly in  (A) self-reported cognitive fatigue pre- manipulation and (B) 
RSME scores, at baseline. However, post- manipulation, the fatigue group 
reported significantly higher cognitive fatigue and RSME scores as compared 
to the non-fatigue group, suggesting that the manipulation was successful in 
inducing fatigue in the fatigue groups. 
 
 RSME. The Rating Scale of Mental Effort (RSME) measures the 
subjective amount of effort participants have engaged in (Zijlstra, 1993). It is a 
state measure consisting of one question, asking the respondent how much 
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effort he or she had to invest to perform the activities just completed. This 
scale is scored from 0 to 150, with verbal anchors of ‘absolutely no effort’ to 
‘extreme effort’, respectively. The RSME has been used in numerous studies 
investigating cognitive fatigue, with significant increases in reported cognitive 
effort invested interpreted as indicating cognitive fatigue (van der Linden & 
Eling, 2006). 
Self-reported fatigue. Direct self-reported fatigue was assessed with 
the question of “How cognitively fatigued are you?” with responses on a 10-
point scale ranging from 1-not at all to 10-extremely fatigued.  
 
Cognitive fatigue manipulation: N-back task 
  Cognitive fatigue was induced in participants through completion of 
1500 or 2100 trials of the N-back task (5-7 blocks of 300 trials), over 
approximately 60 to 90 minutes (depending on number of blocks). The N-back 
task is often associated with studies of working memory, and has been shown 
to tax working memory (Shighara et al, 2013; Bailey, Channon & Beaumont, 
2007; Baddeley, 2003; Jaeggi et al., 2008). On each trial, participants were 
required to respond with a right button press for the target stimulus and a left 
button press for any non-target stimulus. We utilized a 2-back condition, in 
which targets were defined as the letter that is the same as the letter that was 
presented two trials prior to the current trial. Stimuli were letters of the 
alphabet, and the full range of letters was used. Each trial was 2 seconds 
(consisting of 500 ms presentation of white letters in the middle of a black 
screen and 1.5 seconds for response and feedback), with an inter-trial interval 
of 200 ms. These values resulted in approximately 15 minutes for each block, 
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with approximately 12 minutes of active task (plus additional time to fill out 
the pen-and-paper effort and fatigue questionnaires, and restart the task). The 
task was performed on a computer using MATLAB (v7.10.0, Mathworks, 
Inc.) and Psychtoolbox extensions (v3) (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et 
al., 2007). 
 
Economic decision making tasks 
 We employed two computerized economic decision making tasks, the 
first relating to the domain of gains (gains choice task), and the second relating 
to the domain of losses (losses choice task) (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; 
Stanton et al., 2011). On each trial, participants chose between a certain option 
and one of the uncertain options (risky or ambiguous).  
The gains choice task consisted of 135 risky trials and 30 ambiguous 
trials intermixed with each other. The amount of money offered by the certain 
option for both risky and ambiguous trials ranged from $3 to $7. In the risky 
trials, participants were offered a gamble of known probability with three 
possible probabilities of winning (25%, 50% and 75%) and nine relative 
expected values (ratio of expected value of the gamble over the value of the 
certain option; 0.5, 1.0, 1.3, 1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 2.5, 3.0 and 3.5). These resulted in 
potential winnings from $2 to $98. In the ambiguous trials, participants were 
offered a gamble with an undetermined probability, having been told that we 
would randomly select a probability (from 0 to 1) before randomly resolving 
the gamble. For ambiguity trials, we examined six ratios of expected value 
(0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 and 6.0), calculated using a 50% probability based on 
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the law of large numbers. These resulted in potential winnings from $2 to 
$168. 
The losses choice task mirrored the gains choice task save for 
alteration of the sign of the value of the options (certain options are certain 
losses, and gambles feature a potential loss against a potential zero outcome), 
and adjustment of the EVG/VC to provide a greater density of rEV values 
below 1. Ten relative expected values were examined for both risky and 
ambiguous trials (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0). These 
resulted in 150 risky trials and 50 ambiguous trials, with potential losses 
ranging from $0.40 to $112 for risk trials and ambiguous trials. Figure 4.1B 
illustrates trials encountered by participants in both the gains and losses 
domains.  
Prior to beginning either task, participants were reminded that their 
final monetary compensation would include a proportion of the total monies 
they gather from resolving a randomly selected trial from each task (four 
altogether; two tasks in the pre-manipulation phase and two tasks in the post-
manipulation phase). Both tasks were self-paced for all trials.  
 
Uncertainty preference metrics 
Across both the gains choice task and the losses choice task, we were 
interested in examining the effects of cognitive fatigue on four different 
uncertainty preferences – risk in gains, ambiguity in gains, risk in losses, and 
ambiguity in losses. With the performance of each task both before and after 




Each preference value was determined through psychometric 
determination of the degree to which participants altered the value of that type 
of gamble, relative to the certain option (Stanton et al., 2011). To derive this 
metric, choice functions were constructed by plotting the percentage of 
choices of the uncertain option as a function of the ratio of the expected value 
of the gamble to the value of the certain option (EVG/VC) (see Figure 4.3 for 
example choice functions). An indifference point was determined as the first 
point at which the choice function crossed 50%, indicating the ratio at which 
the participant was indifferent between the gamble and certain options. This 
indifference point was modified by subtracting 1 to produce a premium metric 
– a measure of how participants alter the expected value of a gamble option 
due to the probabilistic outcome being unknown. Within both domains, a 
premium value of 0 indicates neutrality. Within the gains domain, a positive 
premium indicates aversion (devaluing the gamble) and a negative premium 
value indicates seeking (increasing the value of the gamble). The relationships 
are inverted in the losses domain, resulting in positive premium values 





Figure 4.3. Example choice functions. (A) In the gains domain, the range of 
risk preferences is represented on a continuum from risk seeing (left) to risk 
averse (right). The indifference point of each choice function is marked with a 
red inverted-triangle. Risk premium is determined by the value on the ‘(rEVG / 
Vc ) -1’ (x-axis) at this indifferent point. (B) In the losses domain, the range of 
risk preferences is represented on a continuum from risk averse (left) to risk 
seeking (right).  
 
Of note, a small number of participants presented choice functions that 
did not cross the 50% mark. We are unable to calculate the preference values 
for such choice functions. Furthermore, we cannot differentiate between 
whether these participants were engaging their preferences or simply relying 
on satisficing heuristics (such as always choosing the certain option) (for 
further discussion, see Stanton et al., 2011 and Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). As 
such, these participants were excluded from specific analyses, resulting in 
differential subject counts across tests. Final counts for each metric for each 
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Table 4.1. Mean (standard deviation) differences in uncertainty premiums 
and information strategy metrics in the gains and losses domains between 
controls and fatigued subjects 	




N  Means 
(SD) 
N 
Gains       
Uncertainty 
Premium 
      
Risk -.121 (.213) 
14  -.248 
(.721) 
30 .524 
Ambiguity -.213 (.739) 





      
Choice strategy -.096 (.186) 
23  -.096 
(.205) 
43 .995 
rEV r2 -.031 (.108) 
23  -.064 
(.087) 
46 .186 
pWIN r2 .065  (.122) 
23  -.028 
(.143) 
43 .299 
       
Losses       
Uncertainty 
Premium 
      
Risk .035  (.400) 
23  -.090 
(.582) 
43 .364 
Ambiguity -.016 (.299) 





      
Choice strategy -.005 (.135) 











pWIN r2 .003  (.049) 
25  .010  
(.047) 
45 .555 
Mean differences are calculated as post-pre.  
 
In order to facilitate generalization and comparison of these results, we 
additionally calculated our participants’ pre-manipulation uncertainty 
preference using a power function metric, and tested the correlation of this 
metric with our premium metric. Previously, we have found very high 
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correlations in these metrics across two samples of younger adults (N~300, r > 
|.7|; N=62, r > |.7|) (Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). In the 
current sample, we found high correlations within both domains for both risk 
(Gains: r(48) = -.497, p < .001; Losses: r(66) = -.640, p < .0001) and 
ambiguity (Gains: r(38) = -.773, p < .0001; Losses: r(62) = -.877, p < .0001) 
preferences. These high correlations indicate clearly that these varying specific 
formulations of risk preferences are able to largely capture the same variance 
across participants.   
 
Choice strategy metric  
We investigated the informational strategies that participants employed 
in making their decisions during the gains choice and losses choice tasks. 
Specifically, we were interested in contrasting the reliance on two dominant 
competing strategies, with one corresponding to maximizing behavior and the 
other to satisficing. The maximizing strategy is to compute the ratio of the 
expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain option (rEV). The 
satisficing strategy is to simply rely upon the probability of winning the 
gamble (pWIN), which is evident in the proportion of the pie-shaped 
representation. Employing the maximizing strategy (rEV information) is more 
cognitively taxing as it requires mathematical calculations, but it is the optimal 
strategy, as on average it will result in higher outcomes. The use of the 
satisficing strategy (pWIN information) is much less effortful as it recruits 
readily available perceptual information (probability is inferred from coloured 
segments of the pie), but results in lower expected outcomes on average. 
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 To compare the relative influence of these strategies for each 
participant, we determined how much of the variance in their choices (across 
trials) could be accounted for by each factor. This was done through 
independent linear regressions, which determines how much influence the 
variation in the examined factor across trials has on the choices made on those 
trials (in the R-squared value). Importantly, in this task, the value of the pWIN 
and rEV for each trial are orthogonal across trials (correlation is zero), so the 
independent regressions cannot result in these factors accounting for the same 
choice variance.  
To compare how much each participant relied upon each of these 
competing strategies, we contrasted them directly by taking the difference in 
their R-squared values (rEV minus pWIN) to produce our ‘choice strategy’ 
metric. If choice strategy is positive, this indicates that a participant is 
maximizing (relying more on rEV information than pWIN information). If 
choice strategy is negative, the participant is satisficing (greater use of pWIN 
information over rEV information). A value of 0 would indicate that a 
participant is using the two types of information equally. 
 
Statistical analyses 
All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS version 20 (IBM, 
US) and MATLAB (v7.10.0, Mathworks, Inc.). All statistical tests were two-
tailed and the significance level was set at p < 0.05.  
To compare the effects of our manipulation on the fatigue and control 
groups, we calculated a difference metric for each of our preference and 






Fatigue samples were not statistically different  
We collected two fatigue groups of participants for this experiment, 
varying the degree of the fatigue manipulation. The initial sample (N = 19) 
performed 5 blocks of 300 trials of the N-back task (~60 minutes), while the 
later sample (N = 32) performed 7 blocks of 300 trials of the N-back task (~90 
minutes). 
 Comparing the initial and later sample, we found no significant 
differences in pre- or post- RSME manipulation scores or self-reported 
cognitive fatigue between the 5 blocks or 7 blocks manipulation groups (pRSME 
pre = .705; pRSME post = .391; pfatigue pre = .080; pfatigue post = .667). As participants 
did not self-report differences in fatigue or effort, we merged the two groups 
into a single fatigue group (N = 47) for all subsequent analyses.  
 
Performance on N-back task  
Participants in the fatigue condition completed 5 or 7 blocks of 300 
trials of the N-back task (Table 4.2). To examine whether performance 
declined over blocks, we compared block 4 (peak performance) and the final 
block (block 5 or 7) on measures of percentage of correct trials, misses and 
false alarms. Paired t-tests revealed no significant difference for misses and 
false alarms between block 4 and the final block (misses: t(48) = -.382, p = 
.704); false alarms: t(47) = -1.263, p = .213), and a trend toward significance  
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for percentage of correct trials (t(48) = 1.840, p = .072). Overall, performance 
was maintained across trials. 
 
Table 4.2. Mean (standard deviation) performance on N-back task from 
block 1 to 7.  	
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 
N 51 51 51 51 49 25 25 






























































Cognitive fatigue manipulation check: higher effort and fatigue 
Pre-manipulation, the fatigue and control groups presented similar 
baseline levels, with no significant differences in their RSME scores or self-
reported cognitive fatigue levels (RSME, fatigue group, M = 22.3, SD = 18.5; 
control group, M = 26.6, SD = 27.2; t(69) = .783, p = .436) (Figure 4.2B) (self-
reported fatigue, fatigue group: M = 3.00, SD = 1.85; control group: M = 3.68, 
SD = 1.31; t(69) = 1.626, p = .108) (Figure 4.2A).  
 To ensure the cognitive fatigue manipulation was overall effective, we 
examined the change in RSME scores and self-reported cognitive fatigue 
levels across groups. Change values were calculated as the differences 
between the last values prior to the second economic task minus their initial 
reported values. Significant differences were found across our two subject 
groups, with significantly higher levels of effort and resultant cognitive fatigue 
in the manipulation group (RSME, t(65) = 8.78, p < .0001; cognitive fatigue, 
t(69) = 7.57, p < .0001).  
To examine whether there were differences between fatigue and 
control groups RSME scores we ran two repeated measures ANOVAs with 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction comparing across the 6 time points where 
effort and fatigue levels were measured (initial and each subsequent ~15 
minutes, between blocks for the fatigue group). For the first, examining RSME 
scores (self-reported effort), we found significant differences across time 
points between the fatigue and control groups (F(2.85, 182.32) = 44.38, p < 
.0001). Post-hoc t-tests with full-Bonferroni correction to account for the 6 
between-group comparisons (adjusted threshold p = .008) revealed no 
difference at the initial time point between fatigue and control groups (pre-
	 	
103 
manipulation, t(67) = -.162, p = .872), but significant differences for all 
subsequent time points (t > 7.50, p < .0001).  
For the second, examining self-reported cognitive fatigue levels, we 
also found significant differences across time points for fatigue levels between 
the fatigue and control groups (F(2.36, 162.78) = 37.89, p < .0001). The 
pattern was very similar to that found prior, with no significant difference 
between groups at the initial or second time point (full-Bonferroni adjusted 
threshold p = .008; initial, t(69) = 1.95 , second, p = .056; t(69) = 1.90, p = 
.062), and significant differences between groups for all subsequent time 
points (t > 2.89, p < .006).  
Overall, these results demonstrate that prolonged performance on the 
N-back task successfully induced a state of cognitive fatigue, in accordance 
with previous reports (Shighara et al., 2013; Massar et al., 2010).  
 
Relationship between subjective and objective fatigue  
 Within the fatigue group, we examined whether there were 
relationships between the change in self-reported levels of fatigue (and effort) 
and performance on the N-back task (correct %, miss %, false alarm %, and 
response time) – examining if there are relationships between objective and 
subjective fatigue. For each of these measures, we calculated the change 
measure by subtracting the value in block 1 from the value in block 5. We 
used a full-Bonferroni correction to account for the 4 correlations performed 
on each of the subjective measures of fatigue (change in fatigue and change in 
effort), resulting in a threshold of p = .0125. None of the relationships were 




Cognitive fatigue does not shift economic decision making 
 To examine the effects of cognitive fatigue on our economic decision 
making metrics (preferences and choice strategies), we compared the mean 
difference in changes in economic measures (post-pre) between the fatigue 




Table 4.3. Pre- and post- manipulation means (standard deviations) in 
uncertainty premiums and information strategy metrics in the gains and 
losses domains for both controls and fatigued subjects.  
 
 Control  Fatigue 
 Pre N Post N  Pre N Post N 
Gains          
Uncertainty 
Premium          
Risk .554  (.607) 15 
.518  





Ambiguity 1.392 (1.884) 15 
1.007 






strategy          
Choice strategy .042  (.330) 24 
-.048  





rEV r2 .221  (.169) 24 
-.194  





pWIN r2 .180  (.184) 24 
.241  





Response time (s) 1.665 (.623) 25 
1.187 





          
Losses          
Uncertainty 
Premium          
Risk .192  (.419) 23 
.236  





Ambiguity .040  (.337) 23 
.024  






strategy          















Response time (s) 1.878 (.600) 25 
1.356 











Cognitive fatigue does not shift response times 
 Cognitive fatigue did not alter response times in either the gains or 
losses domains. We found no significant main effect of fatigue on response 
time within either the gains choice task (t-test, Control: Mdiff  = -0.48, SDdiff  = 
.48; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -.49, SDdiff  = .41; t(70) = .110, p = .913) or the losses 
choice task (Control: Mdiff  = -.52, SDdiff  = 0.40; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -.53, SDdiff  = 
.40; t(69) = .112, p = .911) (Tables 4.1 and 4.3). 
 
Cognitive fatigue does not shift risk or ambiguity preferences 
For each metric, we calculated the change in preference or strategy 
(post-pre) and compared between the fatigue and control groups with a simple 
independent sample t-test (Table 4.1). We excluded one participant as an 
outlier in the gains domain analyses, as their risk difference value (risk 
premiumpost – risk premiumpre) was > 5SD from the mean (M = .198, SD = 
.363) (Tables 4.1 and 4.3).  
Within the gains domain, we found no significant main effect of 
fatigue on risk premium (Control: Mdiff  = -0.12, SDdiff  = .21; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -
.12, SDdiff = .21; t(42) = .642, p = .542) or ambiguity premium (Control: Mdif f 
= -.21, SDdiff = .74; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -.42, SDdiff  = 1.28; t(38) = .531, p = .599) 
(Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4). 
 Within the losses domain, similarly, we found no significant main 
effect of fatigue on risk premium (Control: Mdiff  = .04, SDdiff  = .40; Fatigue: 
Mdiff  = -.90, SDdiff  = .58; t(64) = .915, p = .364) or ambiguity premium 
(Control: Mdiff  = -.02, SDdiff  = .30; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -.01, SDdiff  = .55; t(62) = 





Figure 4.4. Uncertainty preferences in the gains and losses domains. 
Relationship between pre- and post- manipulation risk and ambiguity 
premiums values for fatigue (blue) and control (orange) groups in the gains 
and losses domains.  
 
Cognitive fatigue does not shift choice strategy 
Analyses of choice strategy metrics revealed a similar pattern as with 
the preference metrics. Within the gains domain, there were no significant 
differences in the change in choice strategy between the fatigue and control 
groups (Control: Mdiff  = -.10, SDdiff  = .19; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -.10, SDdiff  = .21; 
t(64) = .006, p = .995) (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4). 
As the choice strategy metric is a composite, and a lack of difference in 
the composite measure does not mean there is no change in the components, 
we also examined whether there were any significant differences in the use of 
rEV and pWIN information separately. Concurring with the composite 
























































component (rEV r2 [Control: Mdiff  = -.03, SDdiff = .11; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -.06, 
SDdiff = .09; t(67) = 1.338, p = .186]  and pWIN r2 [Control: Mdiff  = .07, SDdiff  
= .12; Fatigue: Mdiff  = 9.03, SDdiff  = .14; t(64) = 1.048, p = .299]).  
The same pattern of results were found in the losses domain (Table 4.1 
and Figure 4.4), with no significant difference in the change in choice strategy 
between the two groups (Control: Mdiff  = -.01, SDdiff  = .14; Fatigue: Mdiff  = -
.03, SDdiff  = .15; t(68) = .562, p = .576) and no alterations of the independent 
components (rEV r2 [Control: Mdiff  = -.002, SDdif f = .104; Fatigue: Mdiff = -.02, 
SDdiff  = .12; t(68) = .460, p = .647] and pWIN r2 [Control: Mdiff  = .003, SDdiff  
= .05; Fatigue: Mdiff  = .01, SDdiff  = .05; t(68) = .594, p = .555]). 
 
Cognitive fatigue reduces the stability of economic decision making  
Post-hoc, we noticed a pattern of reduced test-retest correlations within 
the fatigue group across the economic decision making measures. To quantify 
this, we used a Fisher’s r-to-z transformation to compare the pre- and post- 






Figure 4.5. Choice strategies in the gains and losses domains. Relationship 
between pre- and post- manipulation independent R-squared values of (A) 
strategy, (B) rEV and (C) pWIN on trial-by-trial choice behavior for both 
fatigue and control groups.  
  






























































Table 4.4. Test-retest correlations for uncertainty premiums and 
information strategy metrics in the gains and losses domains for controls 
and fatigued subjects. 	
 Control  Fatigue  
 r p  r p z p 
Gains        
Uncertainty 
Premium        
Risk .94 < .0001  .56 < .001 3.10 .002 
Ambiguity .69 < .01  .48 .011 .860 .389 
Information 
strategy        
Choice strategy .89 < .0001  .68 < .0001 2.07 .039 
rEV r2 .81 < .0001  .80 < .0001 0.11 .912 
pWIN r2 .70 < .0001  .60 < .0001 0.41 .682 
        
Losses        
Uncertainty 
Premium        
Risk .74 < .0001  .32 .039 2.24 .025 
Ambiguity .63 < .01  .41 < .01 1.13 .259 
Information 
strategy        
Choice strategy .77 < .0001  .41 < .001 2.29 .022 
rEV r2 .70 < .0001  .45 < .01 1.45 .147 
pWIN r2 .80 < .0001  .44 < .01 2.42 .015 
r: correlation coefficient; z: Fisher’s r-to-z transformation test for the 
significance of the difference between two correlation coefficients.  
 
Cognitive fatigue reduces the stability of risk preferences 
Risk premium values in the gains domain showed significantly lower 
test-retest correlations in the fatigue group than the control group (z = 3.10, p 
= .002). This effect was not found for the ambiguity premiums (z = .86, p = 
.389). The losses domain mirrored the results of the gains domain; risk 
premium test-retest correlations were significantly lower in the fatigue group 
than in the control group (z = 2.24, p = .025), with no difference for ambiguity 
premiums (z = 1.13, p = .259).  
 
Cognitive fatigue reduces the stability of choice strategy  
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 Choice strategy values, in both the gains and the losses domains, had 
significantly lower test-retest stability in the fatigue group than in the control 
group (gains, z = 2.07, p = .039; losses, z = 2.29, p = .022) (Table 4.4 and 
Figure 4.5).  
 
Change in fatigue does not relate to individual change in economic metrics 
 It is possible that individual changes in fatigue or effort could account 
for individual differences in the economic metrics. For example, while there is 
no mean shift in risk preference across groups, it is still possible that there 
could be a linear relationship between individual change in fatigue and 
individual change in risk preference. To specifically test for this post-hoc, 
across all participants, we correlated the change in fatigue and effort against 
our economic metrics of risk preference, ambiguity preference, choice 
strategy, the rEV r2, and the pWIN r2, in both the gains and losses domains. 
We applied a full-Bonferroni correction (p = 0.005) to account for these 10 
additional tests on each of our measures of individual fatigue and individual 
effort. None of these factors indicated a relationship that survived the 
necessary multiple comparison correction.  
 
Individual effort/fatigue does not relate to individual change in economic 
metrics 
 We also post-hoc examined whether individual levels self-reported 
fatigue or effort (RSME) relate to changes in our economic measures (risk 
preference, ambiguity preference, the rEV r2, and the pWIN r2). Within each 
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domain (gains or losses), we applied a full Bonferroni corrected threshold to p 




We examined how cognitive fatigue impacts economic decision 
making, focusing on uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) and choice 
strategies in both the gains and losses domains. We found no mean shifts in 
preferences or strategies across either domain. Rather, post-hoc analyses 
revealed that cognitive fatigue resulted in decreases in test-retest stability 
across both risk preferences and choice strategies.  
 
Cognitive fatigue reduces the stability of risk preferences  
We found no mean shifts of uncertainty preferences (risk or ambiguity) 
due to cognitive fatigue. Rather, cognitive fatigue reduced the stability of risk 
preferences. When fatigued, subjects were inconsistent in their risk 
preferences, demonstrating more variable risk attitudes.  
Multiple studies have suggested that suboptimal mental states are 
associated with increased intra-individual variability in performance measures 
such as reaction time (Habeck et al., 2004; Chee et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2004). 
Only one study, by Levy and colleagues (2013), has previously reported on 
altered within-subject variability in risk preferences due to a state 
manipulation, finding that food deprivation led to decreased variability in risk 
preferences. It is likely the case that alterations in decision making due to 
cognitive fatigue and food deprivation occur through different mechanisms, 
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and it is interesting to see opposite effects on choice variability. These results 
highlight the importance of considering alterations in intra-individual 
variability in addition to the standard mean shifts.  
 In contrast to increased instability in risk preferences, we found no 
changes in ambiguity preferences. This finding appears to concur with 
neurobiological evidence that these two preferences may be dissociable 
(Huettel et al., 2006). However, it is not clear if our results should be taken as 
further evidence of such dissociation, as we also found weaker test-retest 
reliability for ambiguity within the control group (greater within-subject 
variability for ambiguity preferences), which would have limited our power 
for detecting alterations due to cognitive fatigue (see Table 4.4). 
 
Cognitive fatigue reduces the stability of choice strategy 
 In both the gains and losses domains, fatigue reduced the stability of 
choice strategy without leading to mean shifts (i.e., a general shift towards 
more satisficing or maximizing behavior). It is quite interesting that this result 
mirrors the alterations we found for risk preferences, as risk preferences and 
choice strategy are not correlated across our participants, and ostensibly 
measure different aspects of decision making.  
 Of note, reduced effort in decision making is potentially an attractive 
explanation for how cognitive fatigue increased the noise in our choice 
strategy metric. However, such a motivational change would actually have 
presented as an increase in satisficing behavior (decreased choice strategy) – 
exactly the shift that we initially hypothesized and did not find. Rather, 
participants continue to, on average, employ the same relative levels of 
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satisficing and maximizing strategies in their choice behavior, suggesting that 
they are maintaining their behavioral motivation in our incentive compatible 
tasks.  
 
Implications and relation to a neural network of fatigue 
Cognitive fatigue results in greater variability in both risk preferences 
and choice strategies, which will result in decreased consistency in the actual 
choices made. Insofar as choice quality can be simply judged based upon 
whether you would repeat your choice given the same options, these results 
indicate that cognitive fatigue reduces choice quality.  
In relation to economic theory, inconsistent preferences or strategies 
may lead to failures of transitivity (if we prefer A to B and B to C, we should 
choose A over C) a key rule of rational choice behavior (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). The implications of these results are that decisions made 
under cognitive fatigue are likely to result in more variable choices than those 
performed under a non-fatigued state, with the potential for regret when the 
chooser returns to a rested state. Concurring, in the field of strategic 
management ‘judgment quality’ describes the effectiveness of decisions with 
reduced response consistency indicating reduced judgment quality, and erratic 
decisions have been associated with less optimal results and economic 
inefficiency (Bowman, 1963; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008; Hogarth & 
Makridakis, 1981). That individual alterations are unsystematic and 
unpredictable consequently make it harder to insure against these 
uncharacteristic and capricious decisions. 
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  Interestingly, our results resemble the behavioral effects of 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage, which leads to inconsistent 
or erratic preference judgements without a slowing of response times (Fellows 
& Farah, 2007; Henri-Bhargava, Simioni, & Fellows, 2012). This suggests 
that cognitive fatigue has a transient effect that results in alterations of 
behavior in ways similar to those with physical damage to their vmPFC. The 
vmPFC is further implicated in the production or subjective experience of 
cognitive fatigue, as individuals with focal lesions in the vmPFC reported 
significantly greater levels of fatigue as compared to individuals with lesions 
in other locations within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Pardini et al., 2010). 
 
Maintained N-back task performance despite cognitive fatigue 
Participants in the fatigue group maintained a high level of 
performance on the N-back task despite reporting increasing levels of fatigue 
and indicating that high levels of mental effort were required to perform each 
subsequent block.  
This observed pattern of unchanged task performance under cognitive 
fatigue is not uncommon (Dobryakova et al., 2013). Surprisingly, despite the 
reliability in observing fatigue carry-over effects, primary time-on-task 
decrements are far less consistently seen, with success in inducing fatigue 
usually determined by its effects on the secondary task (Hockey et al., 2000; 
Robert & Hockey, 1997; Hockey, 2011). It is unclear whether this discrepancy 
may be mediated by the demands of the task that is used to induce fatigue. 
Shigihara and colleagues (2013) reported that while task performance was not 
diminished in 30 min of a 2-back task, performance decreased over time when 
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participants performed the relatively easier 0-back task for the same amount of 
time. The authors suggest that mundane tasks may increase sleepiness, while 
more challenging tasks paradoxically increase motivation and lead to 
maintenance of high levels of performance. A future challenge may be to 
clarify which types of cognitive tasks are most affected by fatigue and to 
construct a unifying explanation of why certain tasks reveal a time-on-task 
effect while others remain impervious to fatigue. 
 
Relating cognitive fatigue to other state alterations 
It is unclear how cognitive fatigue relates to other state alterations, 
such as sleep deprivation, aging, or ego-depletion. A fruitful area for future 
investigations would be to investigate how various state alterations may share 
common mechanisms. 
A priori, one may expect that there would be similarities between the 
effects of cognitive fatigue and sleep deprivation. In fact, there is a recent 
model of sleep deprivation effects, called ‘the state instability hypothesis’, 
whose name sounds strikingly similar to our found effects (Doran, van 
Dongen, & Dinges, 2001). This model posits that sleep-initiating mechanisms 
disrupt a person’s capacity to maintain alertness, resulting in ‘lapses’ that 
occur briefly and are interspersed with otherwise normal performance 
capabilities. Such a model cannot account for the effects of our study, as the 
hypothesized effects would have been apparent in two ways in the comparison 
of the cognitive fatigue group to the control group, both of which were absent, 
1) reduced R-squared values for either the rEV or pWIN (or both) and 2) 
reduced response times. 
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Our cognitive fatigue manipulation involved 60 to 90 minutes of a 
strenuous task that engaged executive control. A similar methodology, 
although involving only ~10% of the manipulation duration, occurs in ego-
depletion manipulations (Baumeister et al., 1998). In ego-depletion studies, 
following the manipulation task, participants are presented with situations or 
tasks in which they would normally exercise willpower to exert self-control 
over their behavior. It is unclear how to conceptually relate cognitive fatigue 
and ego-depletion, but given the similar methodologies, it is interesting to 
consider their potential overlap. Baumeister (2002) hypothesized that ego-
depletion should result in more impulsive consumer behaviors. No prior 
studies have tested this experimentally. Potentially, our current study may be 
considered to test and disprove this hypothesis. We note that there is 
controversy about the effectiveness of the ego-depletion manipulation, with 
the potential that participants’ beliefs strongly influence the effect (Xu et al., 
2014; Job et al., 2013).  
 
Future directions 
 Of specific interest for future studies will be examining how cognitive 
fatigue may dissociably alter sub-components of the cognitive processes 
engaged during economic decision making. As we find a general effect across 
economic decision making metrics, this suggests that cognitive fatigue is 
altering cognitive processes that are engaged across these economic metrics. 
Possible examples include interfering with working memory, preventing 
memory consolidation of prior choices, interfering with the application of 
preferences, or interfering directly with the comparison process.  
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 There is potentially great utility in examining and comparing how 
varied state modulations commonly and dissociably alter economic decision 
making. For example, in these same tasks, we recently showed that aging 
produces specific shifts of risk preferences and strategies in the losses domain, 
without altering these processes in the gains domain (Kurnianingsih et al., 
2015).  
 The duration of our cognitive fatigue manipulation (60 to 90 minutes) 
was specifically aimed at examining a duration that is common in everyday 
life. It is unclear if longer durations of cognitive fatigue will result in specific 
shifts in economic preferences, such as enhanced/reduced risk aversion or 
reduced use of maximizing information. However, we saw no significant 
differences between the 5-blocks and 7-blocks cognitive fatigue groups (60 




 The results of this study show that cognitive fatigue results in 
destabilization of risk preferences and the informational strategies participants 
employ. This increased variability in choice behavior can undermine the 





Chapter 5: Divergence and convergence of risky decision making across 
prospective gains and losses7,8 
 
The previous three chapters demonstrate differential modulation of 
economic decision making by three different state modulations: 1) aging, 2) 
sleep deprivation and 3) cognitive fatigue. Clear behavioral dissociations 
between these three state modulations were found. The gains and losses 
domains were differently affected, especially by aging and sleep deprivation. 
Interestingly, across the three studies, we found no relationship between gains 
and losses risk preferences. This was the base motivation for performing this 
next study that tested the relationship between gains and losses risk 
preferences. We specifically looked at the relationship between gains and 
losses risk preferences, how well cross-domain risk preferences could inform 
individual choice behavior, and risk preference relation to choice strategy 
using a gains and losses intermixed-trial design and a larger sample of young 




People choose differently when facing potential gains than when 
facing potential losses. Clear gross differences in decision making between 
gains and losses have been empirically demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g. 																																																								
7 This paper has been previously published: Kurnianingsih, Y.A. & Mullette-Gillman, O.A. (2015) 
Divergence and Convergence of Risky Decision Making Across Prospective Gains and Losses: 
Preferences and Strategies. Front. Neurosci. 9:457. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2015.00457 
8 Contributions: YA and OAMG designed the experiment, analyzed the data and wrote the manuscript. 
YA collected the data. 	
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framing effect, risk preference, loss aversion). However, theories maintain that 
there are strong underlying connections (e.g. reflection effect). We 
investigated the relationship between gains and losses decision making, 
examining risk preferences and choice strategies (the reliance on option 
information) using a monetary gamble task with interleaved trials. For risk 
preferences, participants were on average risk averse in the gains domain and 
risk neutral/seeking in the losses domain. We specifically tested for a 
theoretically hypothesized correlation between individual risk preferences 
across the gains and losses domains (the reflection effect), but found no 
significant relationship in the predicted direction. Interestingly, despite the 
lack of reflected risk preferences, cross-domain risk preferences were still 
informative of individual choice behavior. For choice strategies, in both 
domains participants relied more heavily on the maximizing strategy than the 
satisficing strategy, with increased reliance on the maximizing strategy in the 
losses domain. Additionally, while there is no mathematical reliance between 
the risk preference and strategy metrics, within both domains there were 
significant relationships between risk preferences and strategies – the more 
participants relied upon the maximizing strategy the more risk neutral they 
were (equating value and utility maximization). These results demonstrate the 
complexity of gains and losses decision making, indicating the apparent 
contradiction that their underlying cognitive/neural processes are both 
dissociable and overlapping – potentially the result of both divergent and 










The purpose of decision making is to select the best possible outcome. 
Broadly, decision making can be divided into two overlapping types – those 
with potential gains and those with potential losses. While mathematically the 
sign makes little difference, there is abundant behavioral evidence that quite 
different cognitive processes may be engaged when outcomes pertain to 
possible gains vs. possible losses. As a powerful example, simply altering the 
wording of the same absolute outcome between a relative gain and a relative 
loss produces stark differences in choices, a phenomenon called the framing 
effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
While it is clear that decision making is different between gains and 
losses, it is unclear what specifically is altered. For example, these differences 
could be due to alterations in risk preferences or alterations in the information 
that participants rely upon to make their decisions (their choice strategy).  
When faced with probabilistic outcomes (uncertainty), individuals, on 
average, show differential preferences when choosing between possible gains 
and possible losses. In prospect theory, individuals are considered on average 
risk averse for gains (prefer smaller certain rewards to larger uncertain 
rewards) and risk seeking for losses (prefer a larger possible loss over a 
smaller certain loss) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This pattern of inverted 
preferences over the gains and losses domains is called the reflection effect, 
and has been suggested to derive from risk preferences arising from each 
individual having a common degree of diminishing weight of marginal utility 
across both gains and losses. This single value (the power function risk 
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preference value) would result in differential behavior across gains and losses, 
as individuals are drawn towards higher gains and away from higher losses.  
It is unclear whether the reflection effect actually occurs within 
individuals, or is only present when comparing group averages. If present in 
an individual, then there should be a fixed relationship between risk 
preferences for gains and risk preferences for losses (negatively correlated, 
e.g. individuals who are most risk averse for gains should be most risk seeking 
for losses) and an individual’s risk preferences from one domain should be 
predictive of their risk preference in the other. When empirically tested, the 
reflection effect has been found in individuals when using hypothetical 
payoffs (Laury & Holt, 2000), but not with real cash payouts (Cohen et al., 
1987; Schoemaker, 1990; Laury & Holt, 2000; Tymula et al., 2013; 
Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015a; Mullette-Gillman et 
al., 2015b). It has recently been suggested that the theoretical reflection effect 
of risk preferences across the gains and losses domains may be the product of 
studying aggregate behavior and does not exist at the level of individual 
behavior (Tymula et al., 2013).  
The changes in choice behavior between the gains and losses domains 
may also be due to changes in the strategies individuals employ (what 
information they use to make their decision). For example, individuals can 
either attempt to maximize their expected outcomes by fully engaging with the 
available information, or they may satisfice to reduce the expended effort 
while sacrificing expected outcomes. The differences in how individuals 
utilize available information may be influenced by sensitivity towards gains 
and losses. Loss aversion is a key example of this, in which individuals tend to 
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weight choices more heavily on possible losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), 
and has been suggested to increase motivation in choice behavior (McCusker 
& Carnevale, 1995), which can be expressed in the use of a more effortful 
strategy (requiring more calculation) as they attempt to maximize the expected 
outcome. Alternatively, Schneider (1992), using hypothetical non-incentivized 
scenarios, suggested that choices were less consistent when described in a loss 
frame. 
Differential processing of gains and losses is also supported by 
biological evidence indicating that the underlying neural computations may be 
separable (for review, see Levin et al., 2012). As examples, 1) amygdala 
lesions result in impaired decisions for gains but not losses (Weller et al., 
2007), 2) numerous brain regions involved in decision making show 
differential responses to gains and losses – including the orbital frontal cortex, 
midbrain, ventral striatum and hippocampus (Elliott et al., 2000; Luking & 
Barch, 2013), 3) aging results in asymmetric alterations of gains and losses 
risk preferences (Mikels & Reed, 2009; Weller et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et 
al., 2015), 4) sleep deprivation modulates risky decision making strategies for 
gains, but not for losses (Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015b), and 5) affect 
manipulations differentially modulate choices across the gains and losses 
domains (Isen, et al., 1988).  
Although such ample evidence shows clear differences between choice 
behaviors and neural responses in the gains and losses domains, it remains 
unclear what cognitive processes / neural mechanisms actually drives these 
differences. To investigate this, we used a monetary gamble task to examine 
the interrelationships of risk preferences and choice strategies across the gains 
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and losses domains. Critically, we used mirrored and intermixed gains and 
losses trials, to avoid any potential order or block effects. Our hypotheses 
were: 1) on average, individuals would be risk averse in the gains domain and 
risk seeking in the losses domain, 2) individual risk preferences would be 
uncorrelated across the gains and losses domains, 3) individuals would show 
higher use of the more effortful and maximizing strategy in the losses domain 
than in the gains domain. In addition, we examined the predictive power of 
cross-domain risk preferences on choice behavior and also the 
interrelationship between risk preferences and choice strategies within and 
across the gains and losses domains  
 
Materials and methods 
 
Participants 
Data was collected from 104 participants (57 females, mean ± SD age 
= 23 ± 2.47 years old) that were students from the National University of 
Singapore. All participants provided written informed consent under a 
protocol approved by the National University of Singapore Institutional 
Review Board.  
 
Monetary gamble task design 
Risk preference and choice strategy measures were quantified based on 
participant’s performance on a monetary gamble task. Data collection and 
analyses were accomplished using MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with 
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the Psychophysics Toolbox for trial presentation (Brainard, 1997), and R 
Statistical Software (R Core Team, 2013).  
The monetary gamble task consisted of 165 gains trials and 165 losses 
trials (Figure 5.1A). On each trial, participants chose between a certain option 
and a gamble option. All gambles featured a possible $0 outcome, to provide a 
clear and consistent anchor point across all trials, to ensure the frame in which 
participants considered the possible outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Within the gains trial, there were five different certain gain options {$3, $4, 
$5, $6, $7}. Gain gambles were constructed based upon three probabilities of 
winning (pWIN, which are {25%, 50%, 75%}), and eleven different relative 
expected values (rEV or EVGamble/ VCertain, which are {0.25, 0.33, 0.50, 0.66, 
0.80, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0}). These probabilities and relative 
expected values resulted in potential gains ranging from $1 to $112. The 
losses trials were constructed using the same method and values, save for 
mirroring the valence of the values offered into negatives. The trial order was 





Figure 5.1. (A) Example task trials. In each trial, participants chose 
between a certain and a risky option. There were two types of trials, the 
gains and losses trials, randomly intermixed. (B) Example individual choice 
functions for six individuals (top: 3 for gains, bottom: 3 for losses). Choice 
functions were plotted within each domain for each participant. Each relative 
expected value (x-axis) was plotted against the percentage of trials (out of 15 
for each point) at which the participant selected the risky option (y-axis). (C) 
An illustration describing the relationship between the relative expected value 
of the gamble (x-axis), the subjective value of the gamble (y-axis) and risk 
premium (slope of the lines).  
 
Before performing the task, participants were informed that the amount 
of their compensation for participation would be between $5 and $25, based 
upon a non-revealed proportion of the total monies that they collected from 
random selection and resolution of one trial from each domain at the end of 
the experiment. Unbeknownst to the participant, the final percentages were 
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ensure positive compensation to the participants. On average, participants 
received $7.77 (SD = $4.22; min = $5.00 and max = $25.00).   
Critically, our design features multiple safeguards to prevent potential 
order, learning, or framing confounds. To prevent order and/or block effects, 
gains and losses trials were randomly intermixed. To prevent alterations of 
preferences and/or strategies due to inter-trial learning, no gambles were 
resolved until the completion of the experiment. To prevent framing 
confounds, all gambles feature a $0 outcome to provide a clear common 
anchor across trials. 
 
Quantifying risk preferences 
Risk preferences are commonly quantified using a variety of 
methodologies. In economics, risk preference is often conceptualized as the 
curvature of the value-to-utility function (a power function) due to diminishing 
marginal utility, based upon expected utility theory (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Risk 
preference has also been quantified as the degree of variance of the expected 
value (Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts & Plott, 2004) measured using the 
coefficient of variation (CV), which is calculated as the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the expected value of the gamble (Weber et al., 2004).  
In psychology, risk-taking behavior has been examined using a large 
range of tasks and models, including the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 
et al., 1994), the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), 
and the Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999). In such tasks, 
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risk preference is often quantified by the proportion of times the participant 
chooses the riskier option. 
As a midpoint, in this study we used a model free psychometric 
approach to empirically examine risk preferences (Stanton et al., 2011; 
Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015a; Mullette-Gillman et 
al., 2015b). This method quantifies risk preference (in each domain) as a risk 
premium metric, which measures the degree to which people appear to alter 
the subjective value of gambles due to outcome uncertainty. In addition, to 
facilitate comparison with studies from economics and test the robustness of 
our analyses/results, we replicated analyses utilizing the power function 
metric.  
 
Risk premium metric. To quantify this psychometric measure of risk, 
choice functions were constructed by plotting a continuous function based 
upon the percentage of gamble selection (y-axis) for each respective examined 
rEV (EVGamble/ VCertain) (Figure 15.B). This identifies the point along the rEV 
axis at which the participant is indifferent between the certain and gamble 
options (Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et 
al., 2015a; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015b). This indifference point is then 
converted to a risk premium value. In the gains domain, the risk premium is 
generated by subtracting 1 from the indifference point value (risk premium = 
indifference point - 1). In the losses domain, as the rEVs are relative to the 
absolute values, the risk premium is obtained by first inverting the indifference 
point value before subtracting 1 (risk premium = 1/indifference point - 1).  
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The risk premium value measures the degree and direction in which an 
individual modulates the subjective value of a gamble due to the outcome 
being unknown (Figure 5.1C). For example, a risk premium value of 1 
indicates that the individual requires a gamble to have an expected value twice 
that of a certain option in order to find the two options equivalent. In other 
words, they are subjectively halving the expected utility of the gamble due to 
uncertainty. For both domains, a zero risk premium value reflects no change in 
valuation (risk neutral), a positive risk premium value denotes diminished 
valuation (risk averse) and a negative risk premium value denotes enhanced 
valuation (risk seeking). 
We note that participants presented highly monotonic choice functions, 
as exemplified by the six presented in Figure 5.1B. A small number of 
participants had choice functions that did not cross the 50% uncertain choice, 
preventing us from calculating their indifference point (gains N = 13, losses N 
= 5). Such participants were excluded from analyses of their risk premium 
values. We note that the majority of such participants did not show extreme 
risk preferences with monotonic choice functions, but rather demonstrated 
dependence on simple heuristics (such as always choosing the certain option, 
or always choosing certain for one probability and gamble for others), 
resulting in choice functions that were flat across our examined range of rEV 
values, and placing their behavior outside of our functional definition of risk 





Power function metric. We also independently computed the power 
function metric of risk preference for each domain (based on Tymula et al., 
2013).  
 
For gains (if V>0):     SV = pWIN×Vα  
For losses (if V<0):    SV = -(1-pWIN)×(-V)α  
 
where SV is the subjective value (utility), pWIN is the probability of receiving 
the better outcome of the gamble, V is the potential objective value offered 
and α is the participant’s risk preference value. In the gains domain, α < 1 
indicates risk averse preference, α = 1 indicates risk neutral preference, and 
α > 1 indicates risk seeking preference. In the losses domain, the relationship 
is inverted, such that, α < 1 indicates risk seeking preference, and α >1 
indicates risk averse preference. 
To estimate individual’s risk preference, we used maximum likelihood 
to fit the choice data of each participant with the probability choice function 
(Tymula et al., 2013):  
 
Probability of choosing the gamble option =  !!!!!(!"!!!"!) 
 
where SVc is the subjective value of the certain option and SVG is the 
subjective value of the gamble option.  
We have previously reported strong correlations (r > |.6|) between our 
risk premium metric and the power function metric (Stanton et al., 2011; 
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Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015a; Mullette-Gillman et 
al., 2015b), and find similar results in the current sample (see Results).  
  
Quantifying choice strategy 
Choice strategy measures the influence of trial factors on the choices 
of each participant, as quantified through the use of linear regressions. 
Analyses were conducted separately within the gains and losses domains, 
through independent linear regressions to determine the influence of two 
factors on the choices of each participant: 1) the relative expected value (rEV) 
of the options, and 2) the probability of winning (pWIN) the gamble option. 
The R-squared value of each factor gives us a measure of the proportion of 
individual’s choice variance (across trials within domain) accounted for by 
each factor. Therefore a high R-squared value for rEV or pWIN would 
indicate that choices could be well-accounted for based on that specific trial 
information (e.g. a participant that accepts all gambles with a 75% chance of 
winning would have a high pWIN R-squared value, and a participant that 
accepts gambles with an rEV equal or higher than 1 would have a high rEV R-
squared value), whereas a low R-squared value would indicate that choices 
were more likely based on other factors (or were made randomly). It is 
important to note that based on task design, the pWIN and rEV trial values are 
orthogonal to each other (the correlation between trial rEV and trial pWIN 
across all trials is zero). In addition, we note that while we chose to focus on 
the rEV factor, in this task this factor is essentially isometric with the 
difference in expected values (for both gains and losses domains, r(102) = .99, 
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p < .0001) and is uncorrelated with pWIN (gains r(102) = -.44, p < .0001; 
losses r(102) = -.50, p < .0001). 
Participants were considered to be ‘maximizing’ when they relied 
highly on the rEV information and ‘satisficing’ when they relied highly on the 
pWIN information. The utilization of the rEV information maximizes average 
outcomes but requires several layers of effortful cognitive calculation, while 
focusing on the pWIN information allows the use of simple heuristics 
requiring less cognitive effort.  
 
Measuring individual numerical ability 
The ability to understand and perform simple mathematical 
calculations was assessed using an 8-item Numeracy Scale developed by 
Weller and colleagues (2013). This assessment was given to the participants 
after they had completed the gamble task, but before resolution of the 
payments for the choices were made for the gamble task.  
 
Measuring behavioral impulsiveness 
 Behavioral impulsiveness was assessed using The Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton & Standford, 1995). Impulsivity has been 
considered as a factor influencing risk-taking behaviors (Zaleskiewicz, 2001; 
Zuckerman, 2007). The 30-item BIS-11 questionnaire consists of three 
subscales – cognitive, non-planning and motor. The sum of the subscale scores 
provides us with a general measure of individual overall impulsiveness. 
Participants completed this survey after completion of the gamble task, but 
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As a first comparison of decision behavior between the gains and 
losses domains, we compared response times between gains and losses trials 
(see Table 1 for summary of the results). We found that on average, response 
time were longer for trials in the losses domain (mean of individual medians ± 
SD difference = .89 ± .54s, gains = 1.90 ± .68s, losses = 2.79 ± 1.00s; t(103) = 
16.58, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.04).  
 
Risk preferences  
Correlations across risk premium and power metrics. To facilitate 
cross-analytic approaches, we compared the model-free risk premium metric 
to the model-based risk preference parameter from the power utility function. 
We found very high correlations between these two risk preference metrics in 
both the gains (r(89) = -.65, p < .0001) and the losses domains (r(96) = .58, p 
< .0001), in concurrence with our prior studies (Stanton et al., 2011; 
Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015a; Mullette-Gillman et 
al., 2015b). These high correlations indicate that the risk premium and power 
function metrics are largely capturing the same variance across participants. 
To confirm this similarity and the robustness of our results, for each analysis 
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we provide the results using both the risk premium and power function 
metrics.  
 
Average risk preference. Participants were, on average, risk averse in 
the gains domain (risk premium mean ± SD = .44 ± .70; significantly different 
from 0, t(90) = 6.05, p < .0001, d = .64) and risk neutral in the losses domain 
(risk premium mean ± SD = .06 ± .30; not significantly different from 0, t(98) 
= 1.97, p = .052, d = .20) (Figure 5.2). Utilizing the power function metric, we 
replicated the above pattern of results (Table 5.1). Individuals were on average 
risk averse for gains (mean ± SD = .68 ± .22; significantly different from 0, 
t(103) = 14.84, p < .0001, d = 1.47) and weakly risk seeking for losses (mean 
± SD = .95 ± .26; significantly different from 0, t(103) = 2.06, p = .04, d = 
.20), with Cohen’s d  indicating small effect size for losses (Cohen, 1988).  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Risk premium distribution across participants in the gains 




































Table 5.1. Comparing economic measures between the gains and losses 
domains  
 
* For response times, median is provided instead of mean.  
** Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants (Gains, 
Losses). 
Abbreviations: rEV, relative expected value; pWIN, probability of winning; s, 
seconds; SD, standard deviation.  
*** Given the differential relationships between the premium and power 
metrics across the gains and losses domains, the sign of the correlation in 
gains was inverted to allow for comparison (comparing correlation of .648 to 
.583)  
 
Testing for non-parametric relationships between risk preferences 
across domains. To begin our examination of whether the reflection effect 





Correlation t-test z-test 








Response Time (s)* 
 
Risk Preference 
a) Risk Premium 
(91, 99)** 
b) Power Function 
(96, 101) 
Correlation between 
a and b 
 
Choice Strategy 
c) rEV R-squared 
(104, 104) 
d) pWIN R-squared 
(104, 104) 
Correlation between 




e) Premium × rEV 
R-squared 
f)  Premium × pWIN 
R-squared 
.901 ± .675 
 
 
.441 ± .695 
.684 ± .217 
r = -.648, 
p < .0001 
 
 
.338 ± .169 
.042 ± .061 
r = -.443, 
p < .0001 
 
 
r = -.143, 
p = .177 
r = .041, 
p = .700 
2.786 ± 1.003 
 
 
.059 ± .296 
.984 ± .259 
r = .583, 
p < .0001 
 
 
.383 ± .117 
.035 ± .050 
r = -.498, 
p < .0001 
 
 
r = -.436, 
p < .0001 
r = .246, 















































































followed the analysis of Tymula and colleagues (2013) by conducting a chi-
square test to examine if there was evidence of a gross categorical relationship 
between individual risk preferences for gains and losses. This analysis groups 
participant based on whether they were risk averse or risk seeking in each 
domain (Figure 5.3). 
 Utilizing the risk premium metric, we found no significant 
relationship across risk preferences across domains (χ2(1) = 2.52, p = .11), 
with only 52.9% of the participants showing the pattern of preferences 
predicted by the reflection effect, indicating no significant relationship 
between risk preferences across domains. Utilizing the power function metric, 
61.5% of the participants had categorical risk preferences in agreement with 
the reflection effect, which produced significance when examined using the 
chi-square (χ2(1) = 5.51, p = .019). Combined, these results show that the 




Figure 5.3. (A) Relationship of within-subject risk premium values across 
the gains and losses domains. The dashed red line visualizes the correlation 
predicted by the theoretical reflection effect, with a slope of -1 for the risk 
premium metric (left) and +1 for the power function metric (right). (B) Cross-
domain predictive comparison, percentage of choice behavior correctly 
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within-domain power function values were obtained through bootstrap 
analysis, randomly resampling risk preference value and participant’s choice 
sets independently (N = 10,000 iterations, with replacement). The standard 
error measurement (SEM) value is the median SEM across iterations. 
 
Testing for parametric relationship of risk preferences across 
domains. The reflection effect predicts a negative correlation between gains 
and losses risk premiums and a positive correlation between gains and losses 
power function (Figure 5.3). We found non-significant positively-signed 
correlations between the gains and losses domains, for both the risk premium 
(r(85) = .15, p = .16) and power function metrics (r(102) = .08, p = .39). This 
clearly indicates that the reflection effect is not detectable at the individual 
level. We note that, in concurrence with the finding of Tymula and colleagues 
(2013), we find effects in the opposite direction to that predicted by the 
reflection effect for the risk premium metric.  
  
Modeling risk preferences across domains. To empirically identify 
the relationships between individual risk preferences across the gains and 
losses domains, we utilized linear regressions to identify the strength and 
direction of the predictive relationship. 
For the risk premium metric, the reflection effect predicts that the 
losses risk premium value of each participant can be predicted based upon a 
transform of the gains risk premium value of that participant:  
 




This is a slightly non-linear transform, which will result in the expected 
relationship between the gains risk premium and the transformed gains risk 
premium being dependent upon the distribution under examination. In the 
current sample, the reflection effect predicts a correlation of -.85. Using a 
linear regression to test for the presence of this relationship, we found a non-
significant regression equation (BIntercept = -.005, p = .88; BSlope = .055, p = .16) 
with an R-squared value of .023, indicating no evidence for the presence of an 
individual reflection effect using the risk premium metric.    
For the risk power function metric, the reflection effect predicts that 
losses risk power function values should be equal to gains risk power function 
values (BSlope = 1). Using linear regression yielded a solved equation with a 
significant intercept, but a non-significant slope (BIntercept = .88, p < .0001; 
BSlope = .10, p = .40) with an R-squared value of .007. This does not agree with 
the theoretical reflection effect, as the significance found for the intercept 
suggests that alterations in risk preferences across the gains and losses 
domains are due to additive effects, while the theoretical reflection effect is 
multiplicative. Finally, the very low overall R-squared value indicates the lack 
of a meaningful predictive relationship between the gain and loss values. 
In summary, using both the risk premium and risk power function 
metrics, we find no evidence for the presence of an individual reflection effect 
– gains risk preferences cannot predict losses risk preferences.    
 
Empirically testing the predictive ability of cross-domain 
preferences. Without a significant within-subject relationship between risk 
preferences across the gains and losses domains, an important question is 
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whether there is any predictive power through which cross-domain 
preferences can predict individual choice behavior. To test this, we calculated 
the within-subject proportion of choices that were predicted by each domains 
preference for each domains choices (2×2; gains preference predicting gains 
choices, gains preference predicting losses choices, losses preference 
predicting gains choices, and losses preference predicting losses choices). The 
cross-domain prediction measures the proportion of choices predicted by 
cross-domain preference assuming the reflection effect was true. We chose to 
limit this analysis to the power function metric, given multiple comparison 
concerns and the slight non-linearity across the gains and losses domains in 
the risk premium metric. 
To guide interpretation, we determined two reference values for 
comparison. The first reference was chance, which definitionally is set at 50% 
(given the two-alternative choice task used). The second reference value 
accounted for behavioral regularities across participants engaged in this task, 
by examining scrambling the relationship between individual preferences and 
individual choices.  
This second reference value, the randomized within-domain, was 
computed (for each domain) based on overall subject behavior in this domain, 
but with the specific removal of the relationship between individual 
preferences and individual choice behaviors. In other words, this reference 
value reflects that there may be regularities in the choice behavior across 
participants in this task, such that knowledge of any participant’s choices may 
facilitate prediction of another participant’s choices. To accomplish this, we 
ran two bootstrap analyses of 10,000 iterations (one for gains, one for losses). 
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In each iteration, we constructed a new sample of participants (N = 104), with 
replacement, by randomly selecting a preference value and then, 
independently, randomly selecting a choice set. Doing so specifically breaks 
the relationship between individual preferences and the actual choice 
behaviors. For each constructed participant, we then determined the proportion 
of choices in the randomly-selected choice set that could be predicted by the 
randomly-selected preference value. For each iteration, we took the mean 
proportion of choices correctly predicted across that sample. The median 
proportion across samples (N = 10,000), is our second reference value, the 
randomized within-domain – the proportion of trials that can be expected to be 
predictable based on knowledge of how participants behave (on average) in 
the task without specific knowledge of the participants preference value 
(essentially, removing all within-subject information). In the gains domain, the 
median value was 53.94% (SD = 8.86%) and in the losses domain the median 
value was 49.39% (SD = 6.03%). Comparing the two different reference 
values, in the gains domain the second reference was slightly higher than 
chance  (t(103) = 6.45, p < .0001, d = .63), while in the losses domain, there 
was no significant difference between the two reference values (t(103) = .67, p 
= .50, d = .07).    
 The purpose of this analysis was to directly test how well individual 
preference values are able to predict behavior cross-domain (see Figure 3B). 
Within the gains domain, an individual’s gains risk preference could account 
for a median of 86.67% (SD = 6.67%) of their choice behavior. Within losses, 
an individual’s losses risk preference could account for a median of 85.76% 
(SD = 5.80%) of their choice. Across domains, we see that an individual’s risk 
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preference for gains accounts for a median of 78.48% (SD = 14.54%) of their 
choice behavior in the losses domain. Similarly, an individual’s risk 
preference for losses accounts for a median of 78.18% (SD = 12.76%) of their 
choice behavior in the gains domain. 
 Contrasting these values, we see that a participant’s within-domain risk 
preferences are always better predictors of their choices compared to their 
cross-domain risk preferences (see Table 5.2; paired-comparison t-tests Gains: 
t(103) = .87, p < .0001, d = .96; Losses: : t(103) = 7.59, p < .0001, d = .92). 
Interestingly, cross-domain risk preferences are able to predict participant’s 
choices significantly better than the two reference values (all one-sample t-




Table 5.2. Proportion of choices correctly predicted by each domain 
preference and reference in each domain 
 Gains Domain Losses Domain Across Domain t-
test 
mean% ± SD% mean% ± SD% t-score p-value 
a) Gains preference (104)* 85.20 ± 6.67 75.02 ± 14.54 7.53 < .0001 
b) Losses preference (104) 75.49 ± 12.76 85.19 ± 5.80 7.59 < .0001 
c) Randomized within-
domain preference** 
55.60 ± 8.86 
median = 53.94 
49.60 ± 6.03 
median = 49.39 
> 100 < .0001 
    
Within Domain t-test t-score p-value t-score p-value  
a and b 7.53 < .0001 7.59 < .0001  
a and c 45.28 < .0001 15.91 < .0001  
a and 50% chance 53.83 < .0001    
b and c 17.84 < .0001 62.59 < .0001  
b and 50% chance 6.45 < .0001 61.87 < .0001  
c and 50% chance   .677 .500  
* Number in parentheses indicates the number of participants.  
** The relationship between individual preference and choice behavior was 
removed, and new samples (each N = 104, with replacement) were 
reconstructed through random selection of risk preference value and 
independent random selection of choice set (bootstrap analysis, with N = 
10,000 iterations). The values of the bootstrap analysis stated above are the 




To examine which information each participant used to make their 
choices, we quantified the degree to which each participant relied on the trial 
rEV and pWIN information, as the amount of choice variance that could be 
explained by each factor (Figure 5.4). In the gains domain, participants relied 
more on the use of rEV information (mean ± SD rEV R-squared = .34 ± .17) 
than pWIN information (mean ± SD pWIN R-squared = .04 ± .06; t(103) = 
14.82, p < .0001, d  = 2.34) , with a negative relationship between the amount 
of rEV and pWIN information used (r(102) = -.44, p < .0001). A similar 
pattern was found in the losses domain, with higher reliance on rEV 
information (mean ± SD rEV R-squared = .38 ± .12, pWIN R-squared = .04 ± 
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.05; t(103) = 23.81, p < .0001, d  = 3.87) and a negative relationship between 
the amount of rEV and pWIN information used (r(102) = -.50, p < .0001).  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Choice strategy metric showing the relationship between the 
amount of trial relative expected value information and trial probability 
of winning information utilized. The R-squared value quantifies the amount 
of choice variances that can be independently explained by each trial factor, 
relative expected value (rEV) and probability of winning (pWIN).  
 
Across domains, participants relied more on rEV information in the 
losses domain (t(103) = 3.41, p < .0001, d  = .31), while there was no 
difference in the amount of pWIN information used (t(103) = 1.02, p < .0001, 
d  = .12). Across domains, there were significant correlations in the amount of 
rEV and pWIN information participants used (rEV: r(102) = .61, p <.0001; 












































Relationship between risk premium and choice strategies 
We investigated the relationship between the risk preferences and 
choice strategies within the gains and losses domains (Figure 5.5A and B; 
Table 5.1). We opted to limit these analyses to the risk premium metric, due to 
multiple comparison concerns, the high correlations between the premium and 
power function metrics, and our prior use of the premium to examine this issue 
in a study with blocked trials (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). Within each 
domain, we looked separately for correlations between the risk premium and 
the two choice strategy components, rEV R-squared and pWIN R-squared. In 
the gains domain, we found no correlation between risk premium and the 
amount of rEV information used (r(89) = -.14, p =.18) or the amount of pWIN 
information used (r(89) = .04, p =.70). In the losses domain, we found 
significant correlations between the risk premium metric and both the amount 
of rEV information used (r(97) = -.44, p <.0001) and the amount of pWIN 
information used (r(97) = .25, p =.014). Comparing these correlations across 
domains, the correlation between risk premium and the amount of rEV 
information used was significantly stronger in the losses domain (z = 2.25, p = 
.025), while there was no significant change in the strength of the correlations 
between risk premium and amount of pWIN information used across domains 





Figure 5.5. Relationship between individual risk premium and the degree 
to which participants relied upon the relative expected value (rEV) 
information in their choices in the (A) gains and (B) losses domains. A 
significant negative correlation is present for losses. Relationship between 
individual deviation from neutral risk preference (absolute risk premium 
accounting for the non-linearity across zero) and reliance upon the rEV 
information in the (C) gains and (D) losses domains. The vertical dashed 
line is drawn at risk neutrality (premium = 0), and the now-unattainable 
negative region is shaded gray. Following this transform, significant negative 
correlations are seen in both domains, indicating that as participants relied 
more heavily on the rEV information, their risk preferences became more risk 
neutral.  
 
These results indicated that, in the losses domain participants with 
lower risk premium values made greater use of rEV information (maximizing) 
and relied less on pWIN information (satisficing). Interestingly, the zero-point 
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for the risk premium metric reflects risk neutrality, so these results indicate 
that, for losses, the more an individual relied upon the maximizing information 
the more risk neutral their risk preferences were. Of note, this relationship is 
not a mathematical dependency (or by-product) of the task design or analyses 
(it is analytically possible for two people to have the same risk preference 
value yet employ different choice strategies). 
This relationship between risk neutrality and maximizing strategies 
replicates a recent study using a blocked version of these tasks (gains trials 
first, then losses trials) (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). Curiously, in that study, 
these effects were found only for older adults in the losses domain, while 
younger adults showed no such relationship. Potential explanations for the 
current expansion of this relationship to younger adults include sampling 
differences or an interaction with the interleaved gains and losses trials. 
 
Relationship between absolute risk premium and choice strategies 
We were curious about the domain-specificity of the relationship 
between risk premium and strategy, present for losses and absent for gains. 
We note that there is a wider distribution of risk preferences in the gains 
domain, with the majority of people risk averse but a significant number of 
people who are risk seeking. In addition, there is a non-linearity in the risk 
premium metric as you cross zero. To test whether this range of values was 
obscuring the same relationship as found in the losses domain, we sought to 
transform the data to reflect the distance of each participant from risk 
neutrality (regardless of sign). Standardly, this would be accomplished by 
taking the absolute value, however with the nonlinear relationship across zero 
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for risk premium, the conversion of negative risk premium values to positive 
requires the formula [absolute premium value = 1/(premium value +1) – 1]. 
We performed this transformation for both the gains and losses domains, and 
re-ran the correlations between absolute risk premium and strategy. This 
resulted in significant negative correlations in both the gains (r(89) = -.30, p = 
.004) and losses (r(97) = -.36, p < .001) domains, with no significant 
difference across domains (z = .43, p = .67). The more each participant relied 
upon the maximizing rEV information, the more risk neutral their preferences 
were (Figure 5.5 C and D), across both gains and losses domains.  
 
Relationship between numeracy and economic measures 
We examined whether risk preferences and choice strategies were 
correlated with individual’s numeracy ability. We found no significant 
correlations between risk premiums and numeracy score in the gains (r(89) = 
.11,  p = .28) or losses domains (r(97) = -.16,  p = .11), concurring with 
Tymula and colleagues (2013), but contrary to the recent findings by Schley 
and Peters (2014). We also examined the relationship between numeracy and 
the reliance on rEV information. We found a positive correlation between the 
amount of rEV information used and numeracy score in both the gains (r(102) 
= .27,  p = .005) and losses domains (r(102) = .23, p = .020), indicating that 
individuals with better numeracy abilities make more use of the calculable 
rEV information.   
 
Relationship between impulsivity and economic measures 
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We also examined whether risk preferences and choice strategies were 
correlated with individual’s level of impulsivity. The average BIS-11 
impulsiveness score across subjects was 63.62 (SD = 8.29). There was no 
significant correlations between risk premiums and impulsivity score in the 
gains (r(89) = .04, p = .70) or losses domains (r(97) = -.03, p = .80), agreeing 
with Huettel and colleagues (2006). For choice strategy, we also looked at the 
relationship between impulsivity and the reliance on trial information, rEV 
and pWIN. There was also no significant correlations between the amount of 
rEV information used and impulsivity score in the gains (r(102) = -.13,  p = 
.18) or losses domain (r(102) = -.05, p = .60), nor were there any significant 
correlations between the amount of pWIN information used and impulsivity in 
the gains (r(102) = .14,  p = .15)  or losses domain  (r(102) = .05, p = .60). 
These results indicate that the behavioral impulsivity measured by BIS-11 is 





We investigated the differences between gains and losses decision 
making by examining the interrelationships between risk preferences and 
choice strategies across the gains and losses domains. On average, we find that 
participants were risk averse for gains and risk neutral for losses. In opposition 
to the reflection effect, individual risk preferences were uncorrelated across 
the gains and losses domains, though cross-domain risk preferences were still 
able to predict choices better than chance or random preference. Investigating 
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the strategies that individuals employ, individuals showed greater reliance on 
the maximizing strategy in the losses domain than in the gains domain. 
Interestingly, we identified a correlation between risk preferences and choice 
strategies in the losses domain in which the more individuals relied upon the 
maximizing strategy the more risk neutral their risk preferences were.  
    
Testing the sample reflection effect – average risk preferences in the gains and 
losses domains 
First, we sought to replicate the classic pattern of risk preferences 
predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) – on average risk 
averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. In the gains domain, individuals 
were on average risk averse (based on risk premium and power function), 
concurring with prospect theory. In the losses domain, however, participants 
were on average risk neutral (risk premium metric) or weakly risk seeking 
(power function metric). These findings overall concur with the findings by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), indicating a sample-level reflection effect. We 
note, that this risk neutrality/weak risk seeking for losses still concurs with the 
original data that individuals are more willing to engage in gambles to prevent 
losses than to achieve gains – i.e., individuals are relatively more risk averse 
for gains than for losses.  
 
Testing the individual reflection effect – are individual preferences correlated 
across domains? 
The reflection effect suggests that the individuals who are most risk 
averse in gains will be the most risk seeking for losses – is this true? No. We 
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do not find a significant relationship in the direction predicted by the reflection 
effect, using either risk preference metric (premium or power function). Our 
results indicate that risk preferences for gains, cannot predict individual risk 
preferences for losses, in concurrence with prior research (Cohen et al., 1987; 
Schoemaker, 1990; Laury & Holt, 2000; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-
Gillman et al., 2015a; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015b). 
Interestingly, we find a non-significant correlation in the opposite 
direction of effect predicted by the reflection effect, using the risk premium 
metric (Table 5.1), in the same direction reported recently by Tymula and 
colleagues (2013). This suggests that the individuals who were most risk 
averse for gains were not the most risk seeking for losses (as predicted by the 
reflection effect), but remained the most risk averse in losses.  
The reflection effect was originally identified in the comparison of 
average group risk behavior across gains and losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). It is possible to reconcile the presence of a sample-level reflection 
effect, with our correlations that are opposite the predicted direction. Simply, 
these two results suggest that, for a significant number of individuals, the 
difference between gains and losses risk preferences is a shift in preferences 
(an additive component, as indicated by our regression analysis for the power 
function metric). In other words, for many people, those who are most risk 
averse for gains shift to become less risk averse, while those that are least risk 
averse shift to become less risk averse, risk neutral, or even risk seeking 
(depending on the degree of the shift).  
Alternatively, while it is common to discuss risk preference as a 
unitary stable concept (such as a personality trait), there is also evidence that 
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risk preferences may be independent across different domains. For example, 
evidence suggests independence of risk attitudes across domains such as 
investment, insurance, health, recreational, work, and social decisions 
(Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Weber et al., 2002). Interestingly, though we 
did not find any correlation between risk preferences across domains, we 
found that individual’s cross-domain risk preferences did contain information 
that was able to facilitate prediction of choice behavior. Therefore, although 
risk preferences may be strongly context and domain dependent, an underlying 
general risk preference may moderate cross-domain factors.  
One interesting question raised by these results is how to consider 
mixed gambles (those with both possible gains and losses components). It is 
unclear whether gains and losses risk preferences would be predictive of 
behavior over mixed-gamble.  
 
Difference in choice strategies between the gains and losses domains 
We examined whether the trial information individuals rely upon to 
make their choices differs across the gains and losses domains. While both 
domains featured greater reliance on the rEV information over the pWIN, 
there was even greater reliance on rEV information in the losses domain than 
in the gains domain. There is inherently no difference in the difficulty of 
calculations across the gains and losses domains, suggesting this result must 
be due to enhanced motivation in the losses domain; that participants were 
more willing to engage in the effortful rEV calculations to avoid possible 
losses than to reach possible gains. This concurs with recent studies that have 
found that incentives framed as losses result in higher work productivity 
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compared to incentives framed as gains (Fryer et al., 2012; Hossain & List, 
2012).  
 
Relationship between risk preference and choice strategy 
 In both the gains and losses domains, we found a negative correlation 
between distance from risk neutrality and the degree to which participants 
used the rEV information (the maximizing strategy in our task). Importantly, 
this relationship is not due to a mathematical dependency in the task or 
analyses, but is the result of the behavior of the participants (in other words, in 
our task/analyses it is possible for participants to have any pairing of risk 
preferences with any strategy value). 
 Risk neutral preferences suggest the absence of value modulation due 
to uncertainty – that participants were unbiased by uncertainty. As risk 
neutrality is the point where utility maximization converges with value 
maximization, this relationship indicates that those people who relied more on 
the use of rEV information, used the information not only to maximize their 
utility but were simultaneously maximizing the expected value of the 
outcomes.  
In our task, the maximizing strategy requires deliberative cognitive 
processing, and we find a relationship between higher reliance on such 
deliberative reasoning and risk neutral preferences. In contrast, higher reliance 
on automatic cognitive processes bias preferences away from neutrality. These 
results concur with suggestions that risk may modulate decision making away 
from neutrality due to inclusion of affective responses (e.g. anticipated fear of 
loss) (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Such differential influences of cognitive and 
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affective processes is described by dual cognitive theory, in which there is a 
competition between slow-deliberative and automatic-effortless processing 
during the decision making process (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Evans, 
2003). As a result, as individuals increased reliance on the maximizing 
strategy, this would have competitively reduced inclusion of affective biases, 
resulting in more neutral risk preferences.  
An interesting possibility is that this relationship between risk 
preferences and choice strategy may provide a potential explanation as to why 
risk preferences appear to vary across different contexts (such as financial, 
health, and social domains; Weber et al., 2002). If risk preferences are driven 
by the choice strategy, and if the available types or quality of information 
varies across contexts, then a stable underlying risk preference could be 
differentially expressed across different contexts/domains. Similar choice 
strategies may reflect the same underlying cognitive processing modulating 
the risk preferences used to govern choices made. As such, varying risk 
preferences across contexts may be due to necessarily differential strategies 
due to domain-specific information.  
 
Explanation for framing effect? 
These findings offer a potential explanation for the framing effect. 
Standardly, studies examining the framing effect observe a shift in risk 
preferences between the presented relative gains and relative losses, with 
participants more willing to accept gambles in which they can avoid a possible 
loss (for review, see Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998). We show that this 
shift in risk preference is not due to the reflection effect, which would have 
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suggested that the same cognitive/neural processes are engaged in either 
domain. Rather, we see independence between risk preferences across the 
gains and losses domains, which suggests that different cognitive/neural 
mechanisms are engaged when prospects are framed as gains and losses and 
that an individual’s choices in one domain cannot predict choices in the other 
domain. In other words, while the relative gain option and the relative loss 
option are mathematically equivalent there may be significant differences in 
the cognitive/neural systems that are engaged to process these options. If so, a 
simple transformation of the available options (such as altering the values 
from absolute to relative a mid-value) could result in dramatically different 




 In this study, we found multiple indicators of independence and 
differentiation in gains and losses decision making. For risk preferences, 
utilizing two different preference metrics, we replicated the differentiation of 
average preferences for gains and losses, with risk averse for gains and risk 
neutral/seeking for losses. However, moving to individual participants, we 
were unable to show the interrelationship of risk preferences predicted by 
prospect theory and the reflection effect. Examining the strategies that 
participants employed to make their choices, across domains, individuals 
placed greater reliance on the effortful maximizing strategy, and the more they 
relied on this choice strategy the more their preferences were neutral. 
However, we did not show pure independence across gains and losses decision 
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making. Cross-domain risk preferences still had predictive information about 
choices, even though we found not only non-significant but also opposite-
signed correlations from that predicted by prospect theory’s reflection effect.  
 Taken together, these findings suggest that gains and losses decision 
making are the result of both separable and overlapping cognitive/neural 
mechanisms. The separability is suggested by the independence of risk 
preferences across domains – even in intermixed gains and losses trials 
preferences across domains were uncorrelated. The overlap is suggested by the 
maintained predictive power of cross-domain risk preferences and the cross-
domain relationship between risk preferences and strategies.  
 A possible explanation for such simultaneous separability and overlap 
is in the encoding and interactions of the valuative and executive processes. 
Although gains and losses are trivially related mathematically, and both 
provide motivation for decision making, they are the result of extremely 
different evolutionary pressures and the cognitive processes / neural 
mechanisms will reflect such convergence and divergence. Separabilities in 
behavior will arise to the degree there is differential/divergent neural encoding 
of the valuative/affective signals for gains and losses (Bartra et al., 2013; 
Pessiglione & Delgado, 2015). Overlapping behavior will arise from 
engagement of shared/convergent non-valuative processes, such as executive 
processes related to working memory and contingency processing (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Mullette-Gillman & Huettel, 2009). As these shared executive 
and differential valuative processes interact (Mullette-Gillman et al., 2011), 
they will result in aspects of behavior that exhibit both convergence and 
divergence between the gains and losses domains.   
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Chapter 6: Neural mechanisms of the transformation from objective 
value to subjective utility9,10  
 
This chapter reports about an fMRI study where we sought to identify 
neural regions that were related to the degree and direction of individual’s 
value modulation. In the previous four chapters, we found consistent patterns 
in risk preferences across all our behavioral studies. Importantly, we were able 
to quantify individuals’ risk preference and demonstrate that individuals were 
making their choices based on their risk preference. As risk preference 
measures the degree to which individuals are modulating value, this opens up 
exploration of how and where in the brain this value modulation is taking 
place. Additionally, we found no relationship between gains and losses risk 
preferences – preferences in one domain cannot predict preferences in the 
other. We leveraged the independences of gains and losses risk preferences to 
perform a within-study replication across almost perfectly matched trials (only 
the signs between gains and losses were different).  
 
Abstract 	
When deciding, we aim to choose the “best” possible outcome. This is 
not just selecting the most numerous or physically largest, as options are 
translated from objective value (count) to subjective value (worth or utility). 
We localized the neural instantiation of the value-to-utility transformation to 																																																								
9 This paper has been previously published: Kurnianingsih, Y.A. & Mullette-Gillman, O.A. (2015). 
Neural mechanisms of the transformation from objective value to subjective utility. Front. Neurosci. 
10:507. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2016.00507 
10 Contributions: OAMG conceived the experiment. OAMG and YA designed the experiment; YA 




the dorsal anterior midcingulate cortex (daMCC), with independent 
replication. The daMCC encodes the context-specific information necessary to 
convert from count to worth. For a given value, daMCC activation 
corresponds to diminished subjective valuation, deactivation to enhanced 
subjective valuation, and non-modulated activation with non-modulated 
subjective valuation. This encoding is not simply a representation of utility, as 
the relationship of brain activation to value is dependent on individual 
preference, with both positive and negative slopes across the population 
depending on whether each individual’s preference results in enhancement or 
diminishment of the valuation. Further, functional connectivity analyses 
identified brain regions (positive connectivity with the inferior frontal gyrus 
and negative connectivity with the nucleus accumbens) through which 
contextual information may be integrated into the daMCC and allow for 
outputs to modulate valuation signals. These results identify the neural locus 
of the value-to-utility transformation, and provide a specific computational 
function for the daMCC in the production of subjective valuation through the 






In decision making, we strive to select the best option, but this is not 
simply the selection of the physically largest option or the option with the 
most numerous items. We determine the subjective valuation of each option 
(utility or worth) by integrating context and history. For instance, whereas a 
hungry person has a high subjective value for food, a satiated person may find 
the same food neutral or aversive. In monetary decision making, varied 
subjective valuation is clearly demonstrated in individual responses to risky 
gambles (uncertain outcomes), in that individuals may be willing to pay quite 
different prices for a lottery ticket with an expected value of $10 (50% 
chances of $20 or $0). While most individuals place their subjective valuation 
below the expected value (risk aversion), others enhance the subjective value 
of the ticket (risk seeking). The degree and direction of their subjective 
valuation describes the specific value-to-utility transformation each participant 
is performing.  
As subjective valuation is the basis of choices, it is essential to 
understand the mechanism behind the value-to-utility transformation. Many 
prior studies have investigated how value is encoded in the brain. Meta-
analyses of fMRI studies examining neural correlates of value have found that 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) encodes value signal (Clithero & 
Rangel 2013; Bartra et al., 2013). Although consistently found across tasks 
and modalities, the majority of studies focus only on the reward/gains. While a 
few studies investigating losses have also reported value signals in the 
vmPFC, we note that those studies used either mixed gambles (Tom et al., 
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2007) or avoidance of aversive stimuli (Plassman et al., 2010; Litt et al., 2011) 
which may potentially be interpreted positively as relief from negative stimuli 
(Kim, Shimojo & O’Doherty, 2006), causing the possibility of interaction with 
the reward system in the losses. As such, it has not been clearly demonstrated 
whether there is a general valuation system encompassing both gains and 
losses valuation or whether there are significant differences in the neural 
processing of valuation across gains and losses.  
In order to determine utility, the value under consideration and 
individual’s preference based on the specific context must be integrated. 
Several lines of evidence have suggested the involvement of dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) in integrating information during decision making 
(Rushworth & Behren, 2008; Venkatraman et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2009, Hare 
et al., 2011) and also in action-based value comparison (Wunderlich et al., 
2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010; see Walton et al., 2007 for review). Based on 
these previous findings, we posit the dmPFC as a potential locus of the 
executive modulation of value processing. In addition to the dmPFC, there 
have been suggestions that value may be modulated in other areas of the brain, 
for example, in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) during empathic decision 
making (Janowski, Camerer & Rangel, 2011) and in the dorsal lateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) for decision making involving self control (Hare, 
Camerer & Rangel, 2009).  
In this study, we identified the brain region that encodes the 
information necessary to perform the value-to-utility transformation. To do so, 
we employed a precise computational model that leveraged the idiosyncratic 
subjective valuation of each participant across 9 levels of objective value – 
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identifying a brain region that not just encodes a linear signal of value, but 
whose slope (from positive to negative) is dependent upon the preferences of 
each individual.  
To ensure the viability of our computational model, we first replicated 
prior studies (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014) by localizing 
valuation signals to the vmPFC. These analyses identify brain regions whose 
activation is correlated with the presented values, with a common slope across 
individuals. Critically, we then expanded upon these analyses by covarying the 
value regressor by each individual’s behaviorally derived risk preferences – to 
identify regions that encode a linear value signal whose slope varies across 
individuals based upon their specific value-to-utility transformation. Our final 
aim was to identify the network of brain regions involved in the value-to-
utility transformation, through functional connectivity analyses.  
Thirty participants engaged in a two-alternative forced choice risky 
monetary decision task (Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman, 2015)  while 
undergoing fMRI scanning. Participants performed 270 trials choosing 
between a certain and a risky option, with half of the trials in the gains domain 
and half in the losses domain (Figure 6.1). For gains, the trial matrix was made 
up of five different values of the certain option (VCertain){$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}, 
with the gamble option constructed from three probabilities of winning 
(pWIN){25%, 50%, 75%} and nine relative expected values between the 
certain and gamble options (rEV = EVGamble/ VCertain){.25, .50, .66, .80, 1.0, 
1.25, 1.50, 2.0, 4.0}. Losses trials were constructed from the same matrix, 
with negatively mirrored certain values (Vcertain). An additional 74 trials 
consisted of choices between two certain options (see Materials and Methods). 
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The trials were divided equally into four runs, with trial order randomized 
independently for each participant. Choices were incentive compatible, with 
resolution of one randomly selected trial from each domain for each run. This 
study features within-study replication – neuroimaging analyses were first 
performed on gains trials and then replicated within losses trials, allowing for 




Figure 6.1. Example trial of the risky monetary decision task. Each trial 
begins with the presentation of two options, followed by an arrow appearing at 
the side of each option (position randomly interchanged) to indicate which 
button should be pressed to select that option.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants  
Thirty healthy subjects (15 males, mean ± SD age = 22 ± 1.74 years 
old) were recruited from the National University of Singapore as participants 
in this study. They were all right-handed with no history of neurological or 
Fixation Option presentation
Response







psychiatric disorders. Participants provided written informed consent under a 
protocol approved by the National University of Singapore Institutional 
Review Board. fMRI scanning was conducted in the Duke-NUS Graduate 
Medical School, Singapore.  
 
Study Procedure 
Participants participated in two sessions: a behavioral session followed 
by an fMRI session (8 to 152 days in between). During the behavioral session 
participants performed the risky monetary decision task using a computer 
outside the scanner (results published in Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman 
(2015)). Participants whose choices did not rely on confounding behavioral 
choice patterns (such as always choosing the risky or certain option) were 
invited to return for the fMRI session. During the fMRI session, participants 
performed the risky monetary decision task inside the MRI scanner.   
 
Risky Monetary Decision Task. We used a modified version of a 
risky monetary decision task (Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman, 2015), with 
an equal number of trials evaluating the gains and losses domains, randomly 
intermixed. On each trial, participants chose between a gamble and a certain 
option (270 trials) or between two certain options (74 trials). For certain vs. 
certain trials in the gains domain, the trial matrix was constructed from five 
different certain values for the first option (VCertain1){$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}, and 
the values of the second option were calculated based on the combination of 
VCertain1 and rEV (VCertain2 = rEV × VCertain1), with nine different relative 
expected values (rEV){.25, .50, .66, .80, 1.0, 1.25, 1.50, 2.0, 4.0}. Note, that 
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this process results in a small number of duplicate trials, which were not 
included. The losses trials were similar to the gains trials, save for shifting the 
valence of the values offered into negative values. Behavioral data collection 
and analyses were achieved using Matlab R2010B (Mathworks, Natick, MA) 
with Psychtoolbox (www.psychtoolbox.org) (Brainard, 1997) for trial 
presentation. No trials were resolved before the end of the experimental 
session, to prevent feedback from altering subsequent behavior (learning). At 
the beginning of the session, participants were informed that at the end of the 
session their payment would be determined from resolution of one gains trial 
and one losses trial randomly selected from each run (four actual runs and one 
practice run, for a total of 10 trials).  
 
fMRI task design. Each participant underwent four runs; each run 
consisted of 43 gains trials and 43 losses trials, lasting for 9 minutes and 22 
seconds. Each trial began with the presentation of the two options (2000 ms–
3000 ms) followed by arrows appearing at the left or right side of each option 
(2000 ms). Participants had 2000 ms to respond, by pressing the key on the 
button box that corresponded to the direction of the arrow presented beside 
their preferred option (position randomly interchanged). After a response was 
made, the screen presentation was immediately replaced by a fixation cross for 
the remainder of the 2000 ms and then continued during the inter-trial 
intervals (500 ms–5500 ms). In other words, quick responses do not reduce the 
duration of the run but increase the baseline time (improving the fMRI signal 
to noise ratio). All trials and time intervals within each block were fully 
randomized for each participant. 
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 To ensure that participants were incentivized to not miss trials, they 
were informed that if a missed trial was selected for resolution towards their 
payment, an option would be randomly selected and an additional penalty of -
$2 applied. Any such missed trials were excluded from analyses. On average, 
participants missed .18 gains trials (SD = .52, with a range of 0 to 3, mean ± 
SD = .43% ± 1.21%) and .41 losses trials (SD = .87, with a range of 0 to 5, 
mean ± SD = .96% ± 2.02%). Missed trials were excluded from analyses. 
 We excluded one run of one participant from fMRI analyses due to a 
technical problem during data acquisition.  
 
Practice task. Before entering the MRI scanner, participants were 
given a set of computerized practice trials. The practice task consisted of 60 
risky vs. certain trials, constructed from two possible rEV{.33, 3.0} and three 
possible probabilities of winning (pWIN){25%, 50%, 75%} in both the gains 
and losses domains. Trials were presented as they would be inside the MRI 
scanner, but were not included in behavioral analyses.  
 
Behavioral Analysis. Quantifying risk preferences. We quantified 
risk preferences separately for the gains and losses domains, by using these 
power functions (Tymula et al., 2013; Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman, 
2015): 
 
For gains (if V > 0):     SV = pWIN×Vα  




where SV is the subjective value (utility) of the gamble, pWIN is the 
probability of receiving the better outcome of the option (assuming linear 
probability weighting), V is the objective value of the option (which is the 
nominal value that was presented), and α is the degree of the power function 
curvature that represents the degree each participant modulates the values of 
the options. In the gains domain, an α < 1 indicates value diminishment (SV 
< V, risk averse), an α = 1 indicates the absence of value modulation (SV = 
V, risk neutral), and an α > 1 indicates value enhancement (SV > V, risk 
seeking). Due to the negative signs in the losses domain, the opposite applies. 
In the losses domain, an α < 1 indicates value enhancement (risk seeking), an 
α = 1 still indicates the absence of value modulation (risk neutral), and an α 
> 1 indicates value diminishment (risk averse).  
 In order to determine participant’s risk preference, participant’s choice 
data were fitted using maximum likelihood with a probability choice function:  
 
Probability of choosing the gamble option =  !!!!!(!"!!!"!) 
 
Where SVc is the subjective value of the certain option and SVG is the 
subjective value of the gamble option. 
 
MRI Data Acquisition. MR images were acquired on a 3T Siemens 
Tim Trio (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Visual stimuli were back-projected 
onto a screen positioned behind the scanner bore (Epsom EMP1715, 800×600 
pixels, 60 Hz). Four runs of 283 volumes each were acquired using a gradient 
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echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following parameters: repetition 
time (TR) = 2000 ms; echo time = 30 ms; flip angle = 90 degrees; field-of-
view (FoV) = 192×192 mm; matrix size = 64 × 64 with resolution of 3 mm × 
3 mm). Each volume consisted of 36 slices collected in an interleaved 
ascending manner. The slices were aligned to the anterior commissure-
posterior commisure (AC-PC) plane. We also obtained a T1-weighted 
coplanar image and a high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical volume (1 mm 
× 1 mm) acquired using a 3D-MPRAGE sequence to assist with image co-
registration.  
 
Image preprocessing and statistical analysis. Image processing and statistical 
analysis were conducted using FSL Version 5.0.2.2 FEAT Version 6.0 
(Brainard, 1997) and MATLAB R2010B (Mathworks, Natick, MA ), with 
visualization of neural results using MRIcron (Rorden et al., 2007) and 
MRIcroGL (http://www.cabiatl.com/mricrogl/). A total of ten volumes were 
discarded to ensure sufficient time for the scanner signal to reach equilibrium. 
Brain extraction of the functional and anatomical images was performed with 
FSL’s Brain Extraction Tool (BET) (Smith, 2002). Functional runs were 
spatially smoothed using a 5mm full-width-half-maximum Gaussian kernel, 
filtered in the temporal domain using a high pass filter cutoff of 30s and 
motion corrected using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002). Translation 
movements were less than 1 voxel for all runs of all subjects. Functional 
images were normalized using FLIRT (Jenkinson & Smith, 2001; Jenkinson, 
2002), by estimating the transform from individuals’ T1-weighted coplanar (6 
degree-of-freedoms) and high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image (7 
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degree-of-freedoms); the resulting data were then aligned into MNI standard 
space (12 degree-of-freedoms). All reported neuroimaging main effects and 
contrasts unless specified utilize a height threshold of z > 2.3 and a standard 
cluster probability of p < .05. 
 
General Linear Model (GLM). GLM1. The base GLM model had five 
predictors, each convolved using a double gamma hemodynamic response 
function. This model is a basic 2×2 design (risky/certain × gains/losses), with 
box-car encoding the decision phase (option onset to button press) of each of 
the four types of trials (#1 gains trials with risky vs. certain options regressor, 
#2 losses trials with risky vs. certain options regressor, #3 gains trials with 
certain vs. certain options regressor, and #4 losses trials with certain vs. 
certain options regressor), and including a nuisance regressor for button 
presses (regressor #5, 500ms starting at press). For main effects of trial types, 
and contrasts between, see Tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
 
GLM2 a, b and c. These three additional models investigated value signal 
coding across trials in varied theoretical formulations. The [Value] 
formulations examined were rEV (relative expected value; expected value of 
the gamble divided by the value of the certain option), CV (chosen value; the 
expected value of the chosen option), and rCV (relative chosen value; the 
expected value of the chosen option divided by the expected value of the 
unchosen option). Separate GLMs were performed to examine each of [Value] 
formulations (GLM2 a, b and c, respectively), as they are correlated across 







Table 6.1. Median correlations between parametric regressors across runs 	
Median (SD) RC Trials CC Trials 
rEV rCV CV rEV rCV 
Gains 
RC Trials rCV 
.357 
(.234) 
    
CV .831 (.138) 
.537 
(.085) 
   







CC Trials rCV 
   1.000 
(.035) 
 




RC Trials rCV 
-.348 
(.288) 
    
CV -.413 (.121) 
-.398 
(.198) 
   







CC Trials rCV 
   .956 
(.256) 
 
CV    .249 (.201) 
-.259 
(.219) 
*Relative expected value in the certain vs. certain trials is calculated based on 
the ratio of the larger certain value to the smaller certain value.  
Abbreviations: RC, risky vs. certain; CC, certain vs. certain; rEV, relative 
expected value; rCV, relative chosen value; CV, chosen value; pWIN, 
probability of winning. 
 
 Each of the GLM2 (a, b, and c) models featured the addition of six 
additional predictors: #6 parametric regressor of [Value] in gains trials with 
risky vs. certain options, #7 parametric regressor of [Value] in losses trials 
with risky vs. certain options, #8 parametric regressor of pWIN in gains trials 
with risky vs. certain options, #9 parametric regressor of pWIN in losses trials 
with risky vs. certain options, #10 parametric regressor of [Value] in gains 
trials with certain vs. certain options, and #11 parametric regressor of [Value] 
in losses trials with certain vs. certain options. Each of these regressors (#6 to 
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#11) encoded the entire decision phase, from onset of option presentation to 
the button press response, and were convolved with a double gamma 
hemodynamic response function. The pWIN regressors were both 
orthogonalized with respect to the risky vs. certain options [Value] regressor 
within their respective domains.  
 To identify the neural encoding of the value-to-utility transformation, 
covariate analyses were performed separately for the gains and losses domains 
by including each individual’s risk preference values for each domain as a 
between-subject covariate into the GLM model. Beta values were extracted 
from a daMCC ROI (Figure 6.3C and 6.4C), constructed through a 
conjunction analysis of the separate gains and losses covariate analyses. 
 
GLM3. This categorical model allows for the extraction of the actual 
functional neural encoding of the rEV value signal. This model consisted of 
GLM1 plus 18 additional categorical regressors. The risky vs. certain trials 
were grouped according to their rEV (2 domains × 9 rEVs) and each rEV 
value was represented by a boxcar task regressor encoding the entire decision 
phase, from option presentation to response button press, and convolved with 
a double gamma hemodynamic response function.  
 
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. This analysis was performed 
to examine brain regions that have task-related functional connectivity with 
the daMCC during the decision period. We utilized the daMCC ROI produced 
as the conjunction of the voxels found to contain the value-to-utility 
transformation information across both the gains and losses domains. For each 
	 	
172 
individual, an average time series of the voxels within the daMCC seed ROI 
was computed from the voxels for each trial type. A GLM model was 
estimated by adding in eight additional regressors to GLM1 model (two 
additional regressors for each trial type). These additional regressors were the 
time course of the seed ROI averaged across the ROI voxels, and the 
interaction between the time course regressor and boxcar trial type regressor 




Contrasting decision types within and across gains and losses.  
We determined gross differences in brain activations between the trials 
in which participants chose between risky and certain options and those trials 
in which they chose between two certain options, examined separately within 
the gains and losses domains (Table 6.2). We also identified differences in the 




Table 6.2. GLM1: Brain areas exhibiting significant differences in 
activation across trial types within each domain. 	






stat  x y z 






-2 34 32 5.75 
  mid 0 24 46 5.65 
  Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus 
L 






-38 -88 8 6.99 
   L -34 -86 8 6.82 





L -2 -24 28 5.21 
  mid 6 -30 26 4.58 
  Caudate R 14 20 -4 4.16 





-2 48 -20 4.13 
  (*vmPFC) L -6 40 -22 3.73 
  Frontal Pole R 4 60 6 3.53 
  
2422 
Supramarginal Gyrus R 62 -36 28 5.85 
   R 62 -44 34 5.35 
   R 62 -26 22 5.12 
  
1865 
Supramarginal Gyrus L -64 -34 26 5.02 
   L -66 -26 26 4.81 
   L -64 -42 42 4.42 
  
809 
Postcentral Gyrus R 12 -38 50 4.06 
  Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
mid 0 -14 40 3.99 
  Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
R 10 -28 40 3.67 






-34 -90 12 6.39 
  R 28 -64 52 5.84 
  Middle Temporal 
Gyrus 






-4 26 38 6.53 
  Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
L -2 20 44 6.12 
  Frontal Pole L -40 48 0 5.66 
  
4092 
Lateral Ventricle R 6 0 22 4.56 
  Thalamus L -20 -30 2 4.41 
   R 16 -18 0 4.15 





66 -36 32 4.99 
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  R 64 -42 36 4.69 





(*vmPFC) L -10 50 -10 4.46 
  Cingulate Gyrus L 4 36 -8 4.28 
  Subcallosal Cortex  





L -66 -28 26 4.57 
  L -60 -28 24 4.17 
  L -62 -40 36 4.07 
Abbreviations: RC, risky vs. certain; CC, certain vs. certain; vmPFC, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. 
Regions are labeled based upon their Harvard-Oxford Atlas designations, with 
parenthetical inclusion of labels from text. 
The coordinates for the three peak activations are provided for each cluster, in 




Table 6.3. GLM1: Brain areas exhibiting significant difference in 
activation across the gains and losses domains, within each trial type. 	
  # 





stat  x y z 
CC Losses 
> Gains 443 
Caudate R 16 26 -8 4.04 
 R 22 28 4 3.5 





48 10 22 3.41 
 R 30 14 20 3.32 






-42 -90 -8 6.27 




-20 -94 -14 5.4 
  
5095 
Occipital Pole R 34 -92 -4 5.55 
  Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 
R 
32 -88 -14 5.21 
  Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus 
R 
38 -72 -16 5.06 




mid 0 42 -14 3.58 
 (*vmPFC) R 8 40 -22 3.37 







44 12 26 5.6 
 L -40 10 22 4.79 
Paracingulate Gyrus 
(*dmPFC) mid 0 16 46 4.6 
890 
Thalamus R 8 -14 8 3.83 
 R 18 -10 18 3.5 
 L -20 -30 8 3.25 
  
17479 
Occipital Pole L -26 -98 -8 5.55 
  Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus 
R 
30 -86 -10 5.51 
  Hippocampus L -34 -34 -90 5 
Abbreviations: RC, risky vs. certain; CC, certain vs. certain; vmPFC, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. 
Regions are labeled based upon their Harvard-Oxford Atlas designations, with 
parenthetical inclusion of labels from text. 
The coordinates for the three peak activations are provided for each cluster, in 




Identifying the neural encoding of value signal for gains.  
Numerous studies have shown that activation within the vmPFC is 
parametrically modulated by the value presented on each trial (Bartra et al., 
2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014). While this result is robust across numerous 
studies, it is still unclear how value is specifically represented in the brain. As 
we sought to utilize a value signal as a component of our localization of the 
value-to-utilty information, we first tested three different ways of formulating 
the value on each trial, in order to identify the one most robustly represented 
in the vmPFC during decision making. These three formulations were: 1) the 
ratio of the expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain option 
(EVgamble/Vcertain, which we will refer to as rEV); 2) the expected value of the 
chosen option (which we will refer to as CV); and 3) the ratio of the expected 
value of the chosen option to the expected value of the unchosen option 
(EVchosen/EVunchosen, which we will refer to as rCV). Each of these value 
formulations was tested with an independent general linear model (GLM), 
examining the whole-brain encoding of parametric value signals within the 
trials in which participants chose between risky and certain options in the 






Figure 6.2. Neural encoding of value signals for gains. (A) Whole brain 
analyses localizing value signals with three different value regressors (relative 
expected value, rEV; chosen value, CV; relative chosen value, rCV). The 
white circle indicates the unbiased 10 mm spherical vmPFC ROI (x = -2, y = 
40, z = -8). (B) vmPFC ROI analyses demonstrate the strength of the encoding 
for each of the three tested formulations of trial value (*: significantly 
different from 0; **: significantly different from each other). (C) Extracted 
functional relationship between vmPFC activation and each gain rEV 
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Table 6.4. GLM2: Brain areas exhibiting significant encoding of 
parametric value signals in the gains domain.   	












R 4 50 -8 3.97 
 R 










R 6 -30 30 3.65 
 R 4 -34 36 3.63 






58 -56 -6 3.68 
  R 62 -54 -6 3.66 
 Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus 
R 






24 -82 50 3.49 
  R 26 -60 42 3.29 
  R 32 -66 46 3.28 
 
2381 
Occipital Pole L 
-20 
-
102 0 4.29 
 Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 
L 
-40 -90 16 3.84 





R 6 40 -14 4 
R 2 44 -8 3.83 
 L -10 38 -12 3.47 
 
1128 
Occipital Pole L 
-20 
-
102 0 3.73 
  L -26 -98 6 3.4 
 Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 
L 
-22 -76 52 3.39 
Abbreviations: rEV, relative expected value; CV, chosen value; vmPFC, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex.  
Regions are labeled based upon their Harvard-Oxford Atlas designations, with 
parenthetical inclusion of labels from text. 
The coordinates for the three peak activations are provided for each cluster, in 




We found clear indications of the encoding of parametric value signals 
within the vmPFC for both the rEV and CV value formulations, with large 
overlap between the two models (Figure 6.2A). We compared these models by 
extracting the beta values for each parametric value regressor from an 
unbiased 10mm spherical vmPFC region-of-interest (ROI) (x = -2, y = 40, z = 
-8), centered on the peak coordinate of parametric value signals reported in a 
meta-analysis study by Bartra and colleagues (2015) (Figure 6.2B). The 
strengths of the representations of the rEV and CV value formulations were 
not significantly different from one another (t29 = .15, p = .88). The rCV 
formulation resulted in no significant voxels at the whole-brain level, and the 
ROI analyses confirmed that the strength of the encoding was not significantly 
greater than zero (t29 = 1.46, p = .15) and was significantly less than the rEV 
and CV formulations (rEV t29 = 2.03, p = .051; CV t29 < 2.90, p = .007).  
Given the design of our task, with 15 trials for each of the 9 levels of 
the rEV formulation, we were able to visualize the actual neural encoding of 
the rEV formulation within the vmPFC ROI by extracting the beta values for 
each level of the rEV formulation (utilizing GLM3). The encoding of gains 
value signals in the vmPFC demonstrated a clear positive relationship between 
value and brain activation (Figure 6.2C). As the rEV and CV formulations 
were equally well represented, we chose to focus further analyses on the rEV 
factor. Post-hoc analyses (below) demonstrate the congruence of results across 
both the rEV and CV formulations.  
 
Identifying the neural encoding of the value-to-utility transformation, in gains 
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The purpose of this project was to examine the neural mechanisms of 
the value-to-utility transformation. To do so requires quantifying the value-to-
utility transformation that each participant is engaging in. We determined the 
value modulation of each participant based on their risk preference as 
expressed by their choices, modeled as the degree of curvature (α) of their 
individual utility function, a power function (Tymula et al., 2013). In the gains 
domain, participants were on average risk averse (utility less than value, mean 
± SD α = .84 ± .21), with a wide range of preference values (Figure 6.3A).  
 
 
Figure 6.3. Value-to-utility transformation for gains. (A) Distribution of 
risk preferences in the gains domain as measured by power function values (α
). (B) Distribution of individual value-to-utility transformations revealed by 
individual preferences. (C) Neural regions encoding the value-to-utility 
transformation. (D) Relationship between individual preferences and extracted 
daMCC beta values (slopes) from the covariate analysis. (E) Relationship 
between individual preferences and extracted daMCC betas values (activation) 
from the categorical model.  
 
We found clear evidence that the vmPFC encodes parametric value 
signals for both the rEV and CV value formulations, with large overlap in the 
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voxels identified for each of the two models (Figure 6.2A). We compared the 
quality of the fits for these formulations by extracting the beta values for each 
parametric value regressor from an unbiased 10mm spherical vmPFC region-
of-interest (ROI) (x = -2, y = 40, z = -8), centered on the peak coordinate of 
parametric value signals reported in a meta-analysis study by Bartra and 
colleagues (1) (Figure 6.2B). The strengths of the representations of the rEV 
and CV value formulations were not significantly different from one another 
(t29 = .15, p = .88). The rCV formulation resulted in no significant voxels at 
the whole-brain level, and the ROI analyses confirmed that the strength of the 
encoding was not significantly greater than zero (t29 = 1.46, p = .15) and was 
significantly less than the rEV and CV formulations (rEV t29 = 2.03, p = .051; 
CV t29 = 2.90, p = .007).  
Given the design of our task, with 15 trials for each of the 9 levels of 
the rEV formulation, we were able to visualize the actual neural encoding of 
the rEV formulation within the vmPFC ROI by extracting the beta values for 
each level of the rEV formulation (utilizing GLM3). The encoding of gains 
value signals in the vmPFC demonstrated a clear positive relationship between 
value and brain activation (Figure 6.2C). As the rEV and CV formulations 
equally well captured the value signals within the vmPFC, we chose to first 
focus analyses on the rEV factor. Post-hoc analyses demonstrate the 
congruence of results across both the rEV and CV formulations (below).  
 
Identifying the neural encoding of the value-to-utility transformation, in gains.  
The purpose of this project was to examine the neural mechanisms of 
the value-to-utility transformation. To do so required precisely quantifying the 
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value-to-utility transformation that each participant was performing, captured 
based on their risk preference as expressed by their choices (modeled as the 
degree of curvature (α) of their individual utility function, a power function 
(Tymula et al., 2013)). In the gains domain, participants were on average risk 
averse (utility less than value, mean ± SD α = .84 ± .21), with a wide range of 
preference values (Figure 6.3A).  
Armed with the behaviorally derived quanitification of each 
individual’s value-to-utility transformation, we sought the neural instantiation 
by covarying the value on each trial (rEV regressor here, and CV post-hoc 
below) against each individual’s risk preference. This between-subject 
covariate analysis identifies neural regions that encode a linear value signal 
across trials, whose slope varies (positive to negative) based on the degree and 
direction of the value-to-utility transformation each individual is using to 
make their choices (Figure 6.3B). Whole-brain analyses revealed a significant 
fit to this function in voxels within the dorsal anterior midcingulate cortex 
(daMCC) (Bush, 2009) (Figure 6.3C; Table 6.5), in a region also referred to as 
the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) (Vogt, 2005) or more generally as 






Table 6.5. Neural encoding of the value-to-utility transformation across 



















(referred to as 
daMCC, aMCC, or 
dmPFC) 
L -2 32 26 3.91 
R 2 26 36 3.87 
mid 0 32 30 3.83 
301 
Supramarginal Gyrus R 46 -44 56 3.21 
R 44 -42 46 3.1 







-44 30 12 3.32 




-42 14 24 3.29 
683 
Paracingulate Gyrus 
(referred to as 
daMCC, aMCC, or 
dmPFC) 
L -6 28 26 3.73 




-14 16 48 3.64 
482 




-30 30 -10 3.56 
 L -44 28 -20 3.15 
362 
Postcentral Gyrus L -42 -22 30 3.23 
 L -50 -14 38 3.2 
Precentral Gryus L -48 -14 46 3.08 
1645 




34 -66 -22 3.85 
Hippocampus R 22 -26 -10 3.78 
1545 
Supramarginal Gyrus L -28 -64 4 3.94 
 L -4 -62 -8 3.68 




R 18 -68 58 3.77 
 R 8 -72 60 3.18 




L -28 -80 42 3.33 
L -14 -74 58 3.19 
L -10 -70 60 3.12 
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Abbreviations: rEV, relative expected value; α, alpha; daMCC, dorsal 
anterior midcingulate cortex; aMCC, anterior midcingulate cortex; dmPFC, 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. 
Regions are labeled based upon their Harvard-Oxford Atlas designations, with 
parenthetical inclusion of labels from text. 
The coordinates for the three peak activations are provided for each cluster, in 
MNI space (in mm).  
 
To examine the nature of the relationship between these indicated 
voxels and the value-to-utility transformation, we performed ROI analyses on 
the daMCC cluster, confirming a linear relationship between individual 
subjective value modulation and the extracted beta values from the covariate 
analysis (r28 = -.73, p < .0001) (Figure 6.3D). As the extracted beta values are 
derived from a parametric regressor (9 levels of rEV) they indicate the slope 
of the relationship between that regressor and daMCC activation. 
Interestingly, the resulting distribution of beta values is zero-centered with 
positive betas (slopes) for value diminishment and negative betas (slopes) for 
value enhancement.  
Given the complexity of the covariate analyses, we sought to clearly 
describe the relationship between daMCC activation and the value-to-utility 
transformation – how modulated daMCC activation/deactivation corresponds 
to reduced/enhanced subjective valuation. We anticipated finding the same 
zero-centered negative relationship as apparent in the covariate ROI analysis. 
To confirm this relationship, for each participant we extracted their daMCC 
activation level for each of the 9 levels of the categorical rEV regressors (from 
GLM3), and across participants, regressed these values against each 
individual’s risk preference (a 270 point fit). The solution was significant 
(F1,268 = 13.02, p < .001) with a slope of -.13 (SEM = .036) and an intercept of 
.11 (SEM = .031).  The negative slope confirms the overall relationship 
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between daMCC activation and the value-to-utility transformation – the more 
activated the daMCC is the more diminished the subjective value will be (and 
the reverse). Further, based on the intercept we can calculate the daMCC 
activation at risk neutrality (α = 1) to be -.02, which is within 1 SEM from 
zero, confirming the zero-centeredness of this function (Figure 6.3E).  
Enhanced activation in the daMCC corresponds to diminished 
subjective valuation, deactivation of the daMCC corresponds to enhanced 
subjective valuation, and baseline daMCC corresponds to non-modulation of 
subjective valuation (utility = value). This near-zero-centered bi-directional 
function provides a perfect substrate for the value-to-utility transformation. 
 
Replicating the neural encoding of the value-to-utility transformation, in 
losses.  
For the within-study replication, we repeated our analyses in the 
intermixed losses trials. On average, participants were risk neutral (mean ± SD 
α = 1.04 ± .26) (Figure 6.4A), with a range of preferences. There was no 
significant correlation between individual risk preferences across the gains and 
losses domains (r28 = .26, p = .16), concurring with recent studies 
(Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman, 2015; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; 
Mullette-Gillman, Kurnianingsih, & Liu, 2015; Mullette-Gillman, Leong, & 
Kurnianingsih, 2015). We then replicated our analyses to identify the regions 
encoding the value-to-utility transformation, covarying the rEV value 
regressor by individual preferences (Figure 6.4B). These whole brain analyses 
identified a significant cluster within the daMCC encoding the value-to-utility 
transformation each individual was performing, replicating the results in the 
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gains domain (Figure 6.4C and Table 6.5). ROI analysis within the daMCC 
revealed a clear linear relationship between value modulation (risk preference) 
and daMCC betas (losses: r28 = .64, p < .001) (Figure 6.4D). In near-perfect 
agreement with the function found for gains, positive daMCC betas 
correspond to value diminishment, negative betas correspond to value 
enhancement, and daMCC betas of zero correspond to no value modulation (
α = 1).  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Value-to-utility transformation for losses. (A) Distribution of 
risk preferences in the losses domain as measured by power function values (
α). (B) Distribution of individual value-to-utility transformations revealed by 
individual preferences. (C) Neural regions encoding the value-to-utility 
transformation. (D) Relationship between individual preferences and extracted 
daMCC beta values (slopes) from the covariate analysis. Note the inverted 
relationship between risk preference and value modulation across gains and 
losses (compare x-axes of Figure 6.3D and 6.4D) resulting in matched 
relations between daMCC beta values and the sign and degree of the value-to-
utility transformation. 
 
Critically, these results confirm that the information for the value-to-
utility transformation localizes to the daMCC (Figure 6.5). Across both our 
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initial investigation within the gains domain and the replication in the losses 
domain, we not only identified the same brain region across whole-brain 
analyses but also independently identified the same zero-centered functional 
relationship between the daMCC (slopes and activation) and the 
degree/direction of the value-to-utility transformation. 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Overlap of regions encoding the value-to-utility 
transformation information across gains (Figure 6.3C) and losses (Figure 
6.4C). 
 
Identifying brain regions involved in the value-to-utility transformation 
through functional connectivity analyses.  
We examined the network of brain regions that communicate during 
the value-to-utility transformation, through functional connectivity analyses. 
To identify brain regions that have task-related functional connectivity with 
the daMCC during risky choices, psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analyses were performed separately for the decision periods of risky gains and 










conjunction analysis across gains and losses, between Figure 6.3C and 6.4C). 
This analysis identified only two brain regions with significant functional 
connectivity with these daMCC voxels. The daMCC is positively connected to 
the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and negatively connected to the nucleus 




Table 6.6.  Brain areas exhibiting significant functional connectivity with 
the dmPFC seed region during the decision period of risky vs. certain 
trials within each domain. 	
  # 





stat  x y z 




L -44 28 18 3.56 
 L -40 30 10 3.45 
 L -38 20 16 3.23 
Negative 
390 




R 40 -62 52 3.79 
 R 36 -60 56 3.2 
  
2568 
Occipital Pole R 6 -92 6 4.43 
   L -6 -
100 
0 4.29 
   L -8 -98 6 4.2 




L -38 24 20 3.54 
 L -52 18 30 3.52 





L -20 16 -14 3.36 
 L -14 16 -12 3.22 






R 34 -62 48 3.62 
 R 42 -60 46 3.45 
 R 38 -62 50 3.39 
 
1847 
Occipital Pole L 8 -
100 
0 4.09 
  L -6 -94 14 3.98 
 Lingual Gyrus L -2 -74 2 4.07 
Regions are labeled based upon their Harvard-Oxford Atlas designations. 
The coordinates for the three peak activations are provided for each cluster, in 





Figure 6.6. Functional connectivity of the daMCC during decision 
making. (A) Brain areas with decision-related functional connectivity to the 
daMCC. The daMCC has whole-brain significant positive connectivity to the 
left IFG for both gains and losses and negative connectivity to the NAcc for 
losses. (B) Connectivity between daMCC and IFG, extracted from the 
conjunction of the significant voxels in the IFG for both gains and losses. (C) 
Connectivity between daMCC and NAcc, extracted from the losses NAcc 
region. ROI analyses revealed significant functional connectivity in the NAcc 
for gains (t29 = 5.01, p < .0001) (for boxplot: red line is median, blue solid box 
indicates the 25 to 75 percentile, error bar indicates the range of non-outlier 
extreme values, ‘+’ indicates outliers).  
 
Post hoc replication of the value-to-utility covariate analyses with alternative 
value and preference metrics.  
Our analyses demonstrate that the daMCC encodes the information 
necessary for the value-to-utility transformation. These results were obtained 
using a specific formulation for the value on each trial (rEV) and a common 
measure of individual risk preferences (α). To test the robustness and 
generalizability of the encoding of value subjectifcation in the daMCC, we 
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repeated our analyses using an alternative formulation of value (chosen value, 
CV) and an alternative metric for quantifying individual risk preferences (risk 
premium, a linear formulation) (Stanton et al., 2011; Mullette-Gillman, Leong, 
& Kurnianingsih, 2015; Mullette-Gillman, Kurnianingsih, & Liu, 2015; 
Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman, 2015; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). These 
alternatives extend our analyses from simply across gains and losses to an 
additional 2×2 space across risk preferences (α and premium) and value 
formulations (rEV and CV). The goal is to examine whether the relationship 
between daMCC activation and value subjectification is robust across these 
alternative ways of quantifying components of value subjectification.  
 
Alternative risk preference measure: Risk premium. We 
additionally quantified each individual’s risk premium using psychophysical 
indifference point analyses  (for details see Mullette-Gillman, Leong, & 
Kurnianingsih, 2015; Mullette-Gillman, Kurnianingsih, & Liu, 2015; 
Kurnianingsih & Mullette-Gillman, 2015; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015), which 
measures the degree and direction of value subjectification in a zero-centered 
multiplicative/linear form (as compared to the one-centered power function 
form of the α risk preference metric). Although these metrics have different 
theoretical assumptions, we find strong correlations between them in this 
study (gains: r26 = -.74, p < .0001; losses: r27 = -.45, p < .0001) and previous 
studies (Mullette-Gillman, Leong, and Kurnianingsih, 2015; Mullette-Gillman, 
Kurnianingsih, and Liu, 2015; Kurnianingsih and Mullette-Gillman, 2015; 




Alternative value regressor: Chosen value. The CV regressor was 
constructed as the value of the chosen option on each trial, and was previously 
included in GLM2b and ROI analyses comparing the degree to which the 
vmPFC encodes different formulations of value regressors. Of note, these 
analyses indicated that the vmPFC equally encodes both the rEV and CV 
formulations of valuation.  
 
ROI analyses. In our main analyses, we identified a daMCC region as 
the conjunction of value subjectification across both the gains and losses 
domains. We performed ROI analyses on this region to visualize the 
relationship between daMCC beta values and value subjectification. We then 
repeated this analysis three more times, to produce a 2×2 set of analyses, 
defined by the selected formulation of value on one side and the selected risk 
preference metric on the other. Within each of these four cells, we examined 
the relationship independently for the gains and losses domains – resulting in a 
total of eight scatterplots and correlations (Figure 6.7). 
 
Robustness of value subjectification in the daMCC.  In the gains 
domain, we find significant correlations between daMCC beta values and 
individual risk preferences for all four pairings of value metrics and risk 
preference metrics (Figure 6.7; Table 6.7). In the losses domain, statistical 
significance is only present for the initially performed rEV and power function 
pairing, however, all four of the losses pairings show the same relationship 
between value subjectification (enhancement or diminishment) and daMCC 
beta values, with correlation coefficients greater than |.2|. This clear 
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consistency across metrics demonstrates the robustness of the encoding of 
value subjectification in the daMCC.  
 
 
Figure 6.7. Relationship between individual preferences and daMCC 
betas (slopes) across alternative formulations of value and risk 
preference. Results from Figure 6.3C and 6.4C (in top left cell; gains in green 
and losses in red) were tested for robustness across a 2×2 space. Note that the 
relationship between risk preference and value subjectification is inverted 
across gains and losses, and also across the two risk preference measures. For 
each graph, the relation of the preference metric and value subjectification is 
shown in color at the bottom. Of note, all eight subplots show the same 
relationship between daMCC betas and value subjectification – increasing for 
value diminishment and decreasing for value enhancement. 
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Table 6.7. Testing the robustness of value-to-utility transformation 
encoding in the dmPFC – correlations between dmPFC ROI beta values 
and individual preferences, across two formulations of value (rEV and 
CV) and two measures of risk preference (power function and premium).  
 
  Risk Preference Metric 
  Power Function Premium 
 [Value] 
 regressor  
formulatio
n 
rEV Gains: r = -.73, p < .0001 Losses: r = .64, p < .0001 
Gains: r = .68, p < .0001 
Losses: r = -.22, p = .24 
CV Gains: r = -.75, p < .0001 Losses: r = .22, p = .24 
Gains: r = .65, p < .0001 
Losses: r = -.23, p = .21 
 
Abbreviations: rEV, relative expected value; CV, chosen value. 
Expanding from rEV [Value] regressor covaried by power function risk 
preference metric (top left cell of correlations) to 2×2 of [Value] by [Risk 
Preference] 
 
Post hoc replication of the value-to-utility covariate analyses within trials with 
two certain options.  
Our initial and replication analyses indicate that the daMCC encodes 
the degree and direction of value subjectification on a trial-by-trial basis, that 
it represents the currently engaged value-to-utility transformation across 
intermixed gains and losses trials. To strengthen this relationship, we tested 
the context-specificity of this encoding – hypothesizing that the daMCC would 
not encode the risk-based value-to-utility transformations on the trials in 
which participants are comparing the value of two certain options. As this 
analysis covaries individual risk preferences against the trial value regressor 
on trials in which risk is absent, there is an expectation that risk preferences 
will not be significantly encoded within the daMCC on these trials, even 
though we have demonstrated that it is present during the intermixed gains and 
losses trials with risk. These analyses were performed replicating the rEV 
regressor for gains and losses within trials with two certain options, for each 
domain, and covarying the rEV regressor of each domain by the corresponding 
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risk preference of each participant. Whole-brain analyses identified no voxels 
with significant relations. In addition, ROI analyses were performed on the 
daMCC ROI, revealing no significant relationship between daMCC beta 
values and individual risk preference values (gains: r28 = -.15, p = .42; losses: 
r28 = .16, p = .41). This analysis indicates that the value-to-utility 
transformation encoded by the daMCC is context specific, and that this 
information is not significantly represented outside of the appropriate context. 
In short, the daMCC encodes the information necessary to compute the value-
to-utility transformation that is currently being performed.   
 
Identifying the neural encoding of parametric losses: No whole-
brain significant voxels and no significant encoding in the vmPFC ROI. We 
investigated the neural encoding of linear value signals for losses. For all of 
three parametric formulations of the value on each trial (rEV, CV, rCV), 
whole-brain analyses (utilitizing GLM2a, b, c) identified no voxels with a 
significant relationship between reduced activation and reduced value. We 
tested the encoding of linear loss value signals within the vmPFC through ROI 
analyses using the same unbiased 10mm spherical vmPFC ROI (x = -2, y = 40, 
z = -8) used in gains, extracting the beta values for each value formulation. 
None of these formulations of loss value were significantly encoded within the 






Figure 6.8. Neural encoding of value in losses. (A) ROI analyses measuring 
the encoding of three different value formulations (relative expected value, 
rEV; chosen value, CV; relative chosen value, rCV). (B) Functional encoding 
of value in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), across gains and 
losses. Beta weights indicate vmPFC activation for each rEV value. (C) 
Distributions of the correlation between each individual’s beta weights against 
the rEV values.  
 
 To confirm the absence of a loss value signal in the vmPFC, we 
extracted and plotted the actual value function encoded within the vmPFC 
ROI, replicating our previous method in the gains domain. In brief, we 
extracted the activation for each of the nine rEV levels across losses (utilizing 
GLM3) from the same vmPFC ROI used previously. While gains presented a 
clear positive monotonic function relating the rEV to brain activation levels 
within the losses domain the function is flat, showing no relationship between 
brain activation and value across the rEV levels (Figure 6.2C and Figure 
6.8B).  
 As a final step, we investigated the encoding of value signals within 
each individual, correlating their individual activation for each rEV against the 
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correlation analysis revealed a clear positive average correlation in the gains 
domain (mean ± SD r = .28 ± .36, difference from r = 0: t29 = 4.27, p < .0001). 
In losses, this correlation analysis revealed a mean-zero distribution with a 
near uniform distribution, save a large peak at zero (mean ± SD r = .02 ± .39, 




The daMCC encodes the context-specific information necessary to 
perform the value-to-utility transformation, as demonstrated through highly 
specific modeling and confirmed with in-task replication. Further, we specify 
that, for a given value, enhanced activation of the daMCC corresponds to 
value diminishment and deactivation of the daMCC corresponds to value 
enhancement. These results provide a specific and novel functional role in 
decision making for the daMCC (also referred to as the aMCC or dmPFC) 
(Bush, 2009; Vogt, 2005).  
Previous studies have implicated the daMCC/dmPFC in decision 
making, with a range of potential roles from outcome evaluation (Botvinick, 
2007), decision conflict (Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004; Pochon et al., 
2008), reward prediction error (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008), strategic 
preference (Venkatraman et al., 2009), or degree of uncertainty (Christopoulos 
et al., 2009). Notably, although Pochon and colleagues beautifully 
demonstrated that this same region (which they referred to generically as 
anterior cingulate cortex) is involved in decision making rather than motor 
planning (Pochon et al., 2008), their task and analyses could not differentiate 
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between a number of co-occurring cognitive processes, ranging from attention, 
memory, theory of mind, and even face processing. In fact, their full results 
suggest that their decision conflict analysis may have reflected all of these 
cognitive processes, as they identified parametric encoding of decision conflict 
in numerous brain regions (including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, and even striate visual area) (Pochon 
et al., 2008). In contrast, the high precision of our between-subject covariate 
analyses (a 270-point fit [9 levels of rEV covaried by the preference values of 
30 participants], with 15 trials per point) safeguards our results from being the 
result of co-occurring cognitive processes – the specificity of the 
computational model allows specificity of the identified cognitive processes. 
We note explicitly that our results cannot be due to choice difficulty, as the 
value-to-utility functions fit are orthogonal to choice difficulty (as both a 
within- and between-subject fit). Further, choice difficulty is not a cognitive 
process or computation, but rather is a comparison of task states that reflects 
the need for greater computations to compare across options to reach a 
decision (i.e., a comparative need for greater processing, but not what those 
processes are). Our precise analyses suggest a specific computation that is 
occurring within the daMCC - that the daMCC encodes the information 
necessary to perform the value-to-utility transformation. We note that a 
potential reconciliation of these results is that choice difficulty reflects greater 
required precision of the value-to-utility transformation. 
Even with the high specificity of our analyses, they cannot provide 
causal evidence of the role of the daMCC in the value-to-utility 
transformation. However, a recent study has indicated that activation patterns 
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within a proximal dmPFC region can predict risky decision making prior to 
the presentation of the available options (Huang et al., 2014). The predictive 
power of this information suggests causal evidence – that is, varied activation 
patterns within the daMCC can modulate how not-yet-presented stimuli will 
be judged. Our study suggests an intriguing mechanism for this predicted 
choice behavior: that fluctuation in the daMCC prior to option presentation 
may modulate the value-to-utility transformation of the incoming options, 
altering their computed utilities and therefore biasing choice behavior.  
 Our functional connectivity analyses indicate the functional network of 
regions with which the daMCC communicates during risky decision making – 
the IFG and NAcc. Although these analyses cannot inform on the 
directionality of signals, given the known role of the NAcc in valuation (Abler 
et al., 2006; Knutson et al., 2011; Knutson et al., 2005; Peters & Büchel, 
2010), and IFG’s role in executive processing and working memory (Duncan 
& Owen, 2000; Mullette-Gillman & Huettel, 2009), we hypothesize that the 
value-to-utility transformation within the daMCC is ‘set’ contextually by 
inputs from the IFG, and outputs to modulate value signals within the NAcc.  
 We see an excellent substrate for the value-to-utility transformation in 
the interactions of the daMCC and NAcc, combining across the value-to-
utility transformation covariate analyses and the functional connectivity 
analyses. Our covariate analyses demonstrate that the daMCC activation has a 
zero-centered negative relationship with the degree of the value-to-utility 
transformation – daMCC activation results in reduced subjective valuation, 
daMCC deactivation results in enhanced subjective valuation, and baseline 
daMCC activation (non-modulated) results in non-modulated subjective 
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valuation (i.e., subjective value = objective value). Numerous studies have 
shown that the activity of the NAcc is positively correlated with reward value 
(Knutson et al., 2011; Knutson et al., 2005; Peters & Büchel, 2010). The 
negative functional connectivity identified between the daMCC and NAcc, 
and the presence of value signals within the NAcc, combine to suggest that 
inhibitory or excitatory signals from the daMCC to NAcc could drive altered 
subjective valuation. Simply, our results suggest that subjective valuation 
could be the result of daMCC activation inversely modulating valuative 




In conclusion, we identify the neural instantiation of the value-to-
utility transformation within the daMCC. Further, we describe a simple 
network of regions through which contextual information (contingency and 
long-term history) could be integrated to determine the gain of the value-to-




Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 
Summary 
In this dissertation risky monetary decision making was investigated to 
understand the neural mechanisms underlying choice behavior by looking at 
how individuals modulate subjective value across monetary gains and losses in 
response to outcome uncertainty. The studies in this dissertation looked at 
behavioral measures of risk preferences and choice strategy, how different 
state modulations alter these behavioral measures, the relationships and 
differences between these behavioral measures in the gains and losses 
domains, and the neural mechanism of the value-to-utility transformation of 
decision making. 
The effects of aging, sleep deprivation, and cognitive fatigue on 
uncertainty preferences and choice strategies under both the gains and losses 
domains were investigated. Across the three different states, we found that: 1) 
aging alters uncertainty preferences and choice strategy for losses; 2) sleep 
deprivation alters choice strategy for gains; 3) cognitive fatigue reduces 
stability in uncertainty preferences and choice strategy in both domains. 
Aging, sleep deprivation and cognitive fatigue have all been found to produce 
deleterious effect on executive function and vigilance (Berardi, Parasuraman, 
& Haxby, 2001; Pang et al., 2006; Persson et al., 2007; Lim & Dinges, 2008). 
Although no study has directly compared the neural mechanism across these 
states,  our studies suggest clear dissociation between the effects of aging, 
sleep deprivation and cognitive fatigue on economic decision making and that 
they do not affect the neural mechanisms of decision making in the same 
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manner (see summary in Table 7.1). Furthermore, our findings suggest that 
aging and sleep deprivation are more likely to affect neural mechanisms that 
do not overlap between gains and losses decision making, as both produced 
different effects in the gains and losses domains, while cognitive fatigue 
affects neural mechanisms that overlap between gains and losses decision 
making, as cognitive fatigue had similar effects in both domains. 
Unfortunately, due to the complexity of decision making, it remains difficult 
to identify or infer what specific neural mechanisms or brain regions are 
altered by these different states just by looking at behavioral alterations in risk 
preference and choice strategy without any direct neuronal investigation. 
 
Table 7.1. Dissociable effect of aging, sleep deprivation, and cognitive 
fatigue on economic decision making 
 
 Aging Sleep Deprivation Cognitive Fatigue 
Gains    
Risk preference - - Less stable 
Ambiguity preference - - - 
Strategy - Less maximizing Less stable 
Use of rEV information - Decreased - 
Use of pWIN information - Increased - 
Losses    
Risk preference More risk averse - Less stable 
Ambiguity preference More risk averse - - 
Strategy Less maximizing - Less stable 
Use of rEV information Decreased - - 
Use of pWIN information - - Less stable 
Abbreviations: pWIN, probability of winning; rEV, relative expected value.  
	
Across the three state modulation studies, there was no correlation 
between gains and losses found, suggesting that they are independent from 
each other. This motivated further investigation about the differences and 
similarities between gains and losses decision making. Several behavioral and 
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neural differences and similarities between gains and losses decision making 
were found, suggesting that they are the result of both dissociable and 
overlapping cognitive/neural mechanisms (see summary in Table 7.2.). 
Behaviorally, the classical pattern of risk preferences was replicated – across 
all studies participants were risk averse in the gains domain and risk 
seeking/neutral in the losses domain demonstrating the existence of the 
reflection effect within the aggregate level on average across participants 
(Prospect Theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  On the contrary, within the 
individual level, we repeatedly found no correlation between individual gains 
and losses risk preferences across studies when gains and losses trials were 
given separately. We further tested the correlation between gains and losses 
risk preferences using a larger sample with an intermixed-trial task design, 
where subjects were asked to repeatedly call up their gains and losses risk 
preferences. The absence of correlation still remained suggesting 
independence. Interestingly, although there were no significant correlations 
between gains and losses risk preferences, we found that cross-domain risk 
preferences had predictive power over choice behavior that were significantly 
better than chance and that in both domains, the more participants relied on the 
maximizing choice strategy, the more risk neutral they were (equating value 
and utility maximization).  
  
Table 7.2. Summary of main results across all studies showing the 
differences and similarities between gains and losses decision making 	






1) On average, people 
are risk averse in the 
gains domain and risk 
 
1) Cross-domain risk 
preferences have 














seeking/neutral in the 
losses domain 
2) Only losses domain 
risk preference is 
altered by aging, with 
older adults being more 
risk averse 
 
1) People rely more on 
the use of the more 
maximizing strategy in 
the losses domain 
2) Only gains domain 
choice strategy is 
altered by sleep 
deprivation with lesser 
use of the maximizing 
strategy and more use 
of the satisficing 
strategy 
choice behavior  
2) Cognitive fatigue 
reduces stability in risk 





1) Cognitive fatigue 
reduces stability in 
choice strategy in both 
domains 
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1) The vmPFC encodes 
value signal for gains, 








1) The same neural 
instantiation of the 
value-to-utility 
transformation is in 
overlapping areas in the 
daMCC for both 
domains 
2) The daMCC has 
positive functional 
connectivity with the 
IFG and negative 
functional connectivity 
with the nucleus 
accumbens during 
decision making in both 
domains. 
 
Abbreviations: daMCC, dorsal anterior midcingulate cortex; IFG, inferior 
frontal gyrus; rEV, relative expected value. 
 
Using fMRI, we were able to localize the neural instantiation of the 
value-to-utility transformation to the daMCC and found large overlapping 
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regions encoding the value-to-utility transformation across gains and losses. 
Furthermore, similar patterns of functional connectivity were identified across 
the gains and losses domains. In both domains, the daMCC has positive 
functional connectivity with the IFG and negative functional connectivity with 
the nucleus accumbens. Besides these neural similarities, we found differences 
in the neural encoding of value signals for gains and losses. While we found 
linear value signal for gains encoded in the vmPFC, we found no significant 
evidence for linear value signal for losses encoded in the brain.  
 In the following sections risk preference, the encoding of value signal, 
the value-to-utility transformation and the possibility of exploring other 
domains are further discussed.  
 
The consistency of risk preference across contexts 
 There are several evidence in our findings showing that risk 
preferences are not the result of a single neural mechanism. First, if risk 
preferences were indeed the result of the same neural mechanism, we would 
have found high correlations between gains and losses risk preferences 
(especially in the intermixed-trial design). On the contrary, we did not find any 
significant correlations between gains and losses risk preferences across all 
our behavioral studies (r(200) = .12, p = .094). The low correlation 
coefficients between gains and losses risk preferences show that most of the 
variances in gains and losses risk preferences do not come from the same 
source – in opposition to the reflection effect which suggests strong 
underlying connection between gains and losses risk preferences. Second, we 
found that aging alters risk preferences in the losses domain but not in the 
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gains domain and that aging and cognitive fatigue do not alter risk preference 
in the same manner. These differential alterations of risk preferences show that 
there are multiple neural mechanisms that can influence our risk assessment 
and preference, and that different factors can influence different neural 
mechanisms that shape our preferences.  
Although our results show that gains and losses risk preferences are 
not the results of the same underlying neural mechanisms, the results also 
show that they are not completely independent from each other. As supporting 
evidence, cognitive fatigue does not differentially alter risk preference, choice 
strategy or test re-test risk preference stability. Moreover, cross-domain risk 
preference still had predictive power over choice behavior that was 
significantly better than chance or than scrambling the relationship between 
within-domain risk preference and choices across participants. The proposed 
similarities and differences in the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms 
seem to be able to explain the inconsistencies in many studies that have 
suggested that risk preferences are independent across domains/contexts (e.g. 
Weber et al., 2002; Soane & Chimel, 2005), while several other studies have 
suggested that individual’s overall attitude toward risk should be stable across 
domains/contexts (e.g. Weber & Milliman, 1997; Lusk & Coble, 2005; Soane 
& Chimel, 2005; Weber & Johnson, 2008; Einev et al., 2010). The closeness 
of the interrelationships across domain risk preferences may be influenced by 
the relatedness of the components and decision making factors contributing to 




The generalizability of the linear value signal in the vmPFC – absence of 
linear value signal for losses  
The value scale ranges from positive to negative values. As positive 
neural correlates of value signal can also be interpreted as increase in 
attention/arousal, the finding for a positive value signal cannot immediately be 
generalized to the losses domain without being empirically tested. In our fMRI 
study, we were able to find the neural encoding of  value signal for gains in 
the vmPFC, but found no evidence of the neural encoding of value signal for 
losses in the brain (Chapter 6). While over 200 neuroimaging studies clearly 
and robustly show that activation within the vmPFC  encodes value signal for 
gains (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014), there are only three 
studies that suggest that the vmPFC also encodes value signal for losses. In all 
three, there are reasons to doubt the generalizability of their results, ranging 
from the unjustified re-coding of low gains as losses (Plassmann et al., 2010; 
Litt et al., 2011) to a potential interaction from the use of mixed gambles (Tom 
et al., 2007). Another difference is that, unlike our decision task, the tasks in 
these three studies (Tom et al., 2007; Plassman et al., 2010; Litt et al., 2011) 
did not involve comparison or calculation between options as each trial only 
required evaluation of a single item. 
It remains unclear whether losses values are encoded in the same way 
gains values are encoded in the brain. Behaviorally, in the losses domain, we 
have consistently shown increased reliance on the rEV information (the more 
maximizing and deliberative choice strategy). In more difficult decisions 
requiring more deliberative cognition, activation in the vmPFC (linked to the 
valuative/affective system) has been found to be weaker in easier decisions 
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(Rolls et al., 2010). Previous studies have also shown that simple numerical 
value comparisons (which only involve count but not worth) do not show 
increase or value-related activation in the vmPFC (Kadosh et al., 2005; Hunt 
2012; in trials with certain vs. certain options in Chapter 6). Although it may 
seem possible that decisions in the losses domain are only treated as simple 
numerical value comparisons, this is less likely to be the case in our study, as 
the same neural instantiation of the value-to-utility transformation found in the 
gains domain was also found in the losses domain.   
Another possible explanation for the asymmetry of value encoding in 
the vmPFC is that the vmPFC encodes an integrated value signal that 
incorporates both gains and losses, but is limited to positive final values or the 
final value comparison between losses value and gains value. If so, this signal 
would be present for trials with only gains and mixed trials, but would show 
no value signal in trials with only losses values. Such a result would suggest 
that the vmPFC signal is not a truly multipurpose value signal, but rather 
expresses the ‘approach motivation’ of the options (how much you like the 
option you are selecting). The possibility of such a result is suggested by 
behavioral differences between approach and avoidance behaviors, i.e. while 
gains (or rewards) lead to graded approach behaviors, losses (or punishment) 
often leads to all-or-nothing behaviors (such as choosing not to act/choose at 
all or even flight). In other words, while there is evolutionary value in 
encoding varying degrees of gain, it may be that negative values are simply 
motivationally categorized as ‘avoid’. Of note, we can certainly use math to 
make decisions between any numbers of any sign, however the motivational 
system may not have been evolved to care about truly negative prospective 
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options as in most cases, in our evolutionary past, we had the option of 
avoiding them. This result would suggest a deep insight into motivated 
behavior and decision making. 
 
The generalizability of the value-to-utility transformation in the 
daMCC/dmPFC  
 We localized the neural instantiation of the value-to-utility 
transformation to the daMCC/dmPFC in our fMRI study using a within-study 
replication across the gains and losses domains (Chapter 5). An intriguing 
question is that if it is true that losses are simply avoidance or comparison 
between counts, why do we still perform the value-to-utility transformation for 
losses? Some possible explanations would be, first, our task does not allow 
participants to avoid choosing as they were all forced trials where participants 
had to consider and choose between the given options. It is therefore 
impossible to simply avoid both options in the task. Second, even though 
losses decision making might not involve so much of the valuative system as 
in the gains domain, especially when no evidence of losses value signal was 
found in the vmPFC, the choices could not have been based on just counts as 
participants still had to weight the riskiness of each gamble. If participants 
only calculated the expected value of the gambles to make their comparisons, 
they would all be risk neutral. Instead we see variability in losses risk 
preferences across participants. This shows that many of them were actually 
modulating their utility of the options due to the risk/uncertainty of the 
outcome. In contrast, in the certain vs. certain trials where no risk was 
involved and simple comparison between counts was sufficient for choosing 
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the best option, we found no evidence of the value-to-utility transformation 
being performed in either the gains or losses domain.  
 
Exploring other forms of monetary decision making 
 The studies in this dissertation focused on risky decision making, 
specifically looking at risk preference, choice strategy, and the neural 
mechanism of subjective value modulation across the gains and losses 
domains. Just as subjective value can be modulated by risk, subjective value 
can also be modulated by other factors, including time and effort, and the 
degree of value modulation can be different across the gains and losses 
domains. It would be interesting to investigate other forms of monetary 
decision making. Prior studies have found differences between gains and 
losses decision making in temporal discounting where people tend to discount 
the subjective value of delayed gains significantly more than delayed losses 
(Estle et al., 2006),  and in effort discounting where people are more willing to 
expend more effort to avoid losses than to gain the same amount, showing that 
they value losses more than gains of the same amount (Hannan, Hoffman, & 
Moser, 2005). Although this dissertation provides evidence of independence 
between gains and losses risk preferences, it is unclear whether we would also 
see this independence between the gains and losses in temporal discounting or 
effort discounting. It would also be interesting to investigate the 
generalizability of the value-to-utility transformation in the daMCC/dmPFC – 
whether we can still find value signal whose slope is dependent on how much 




The value-to-utility modulation in other domains  
As part of our executive function, the value-to-utility transformation is 
not only specific to monetary decision making. Value modulation is 
commonly seen in other domains as well. For example, aesthetic values of 
artworks are modulated by different context such as whether they are seen in 
daily life or in an art gallery (Kirk et al., 2009),  attractiveness of faces are 
modulated by social context such as the beliefs and attitudes of others (Zaki, 
Schirmer & Mitchell, 2010), food reward processing is modulated by hunger 
and satiety (Siep et al., 2009), and moral judgment is modulated by disgust 
(Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Ong, 2014). As such, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether activation in the daMCC/dmPFC associated to value 
modulation could be replicated in other domains beyond the monetary domain. 
As an initial step, in a recent study where we investigated the neural circuitry 
of moral judgment modulation by disgust priming, we found that individual 
change in moral acceptability between disgust and neutral priming conditions 
covaried with individual differences in activation in the dmPFC (which is in 
close proximity to the daMCC/dmPFC region found in Chapter 6) (Lim et al., 
in sub), suggesting that the value-to-utility mechanism is also involved in 
other domains.  
 
Limitations 
 There were several limitations in the studies in this dissertation. First, 
there exists several potential confounds in the state modulation studies. For 
example, in the aging study, the demographics of  younger and older adults 
population do not allow the match of factors that are mostly associated with 
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age and cohort, such as educational level, marital status and economic status. 
In the sleep deprivation study design, there were time differences between the 
RW and SD sessions that might have affected the results. Second, across all 
studies, the gains and losses decision making were investigated separately, so 
it is unclear whether the same findings would be found when decision involve 
both gains and losses. This will be discussed further in the next chapter as a 
potential future research. Third, the predictive power of our risk measurements 
over real life decision has not been tested. To ensure ecological validity, 
participants were given remuneration corresponding to the outcome of the 
choices that they made. However, unlike in our decision tasks, choices are not 
always binary and the exact outcome probability is not always known in real 
life decisions. The ecological validity of the task can be tested by looking at 
how well risk preference can predict real life scenario risky decisions or how 
well choice strategy can predict the amount of choice information individual 
gather when making decisions.  
 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we investigated economic decision making in the 
gains and losses domains, looking specifically on how individual modulate 
value in response to outcome uncertainty. Gains and losses risk preferences as 
a measure of subjective valuation were differently altered by aging and sleep 
deprivation, and were consistently found to be uncorrelated across all studies. 
Using fMRI, overlapping areas of the value-to-utility transformation for gains 
and losses were found in the daMCC, which is commonly associated to 
executive function, but only value signal for gains were found to be encoded 
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in the vmPFC, which is commonly associated to the valuative/affective 
system. The dissociable effects of different state modulations and the 
differences and overlaps between the gains and losses domains are the result 
of differential encoding and interaction between the valuative/affective system 
(e.g. the encoding of value signal) and the engagement of shared non-valuative 
processes such as executive processes (e.g. the value-to-utility transformation, 
the calculation of expected value). Overall, these results demonstrate the 
complexity of decision making – suggesting that there are both dissociable and 




Chapter 8: Future Research Direction 
 
Many decisions involve the integration of information for both 
potential gains and losses. In the studies in this dissertation, although we 
investigated decision making in both the gains and losses domains, we looked 
at each domain separately. Critically, most natural decisions feature both 
potential gains and losses (e.g. investing in risky shares or foreign exchange), 
so these aspects must be integrated. However, it remains unclear whether 
decision making in the gains and losses domains are predictive of decision 
making when potential gains and potential losses coexist. Building up from 
our current findings, we propose a continuation study using gambles with both 
prospective gains and losses (mixed gambles).  
The proposed future study aims at examining the core components of 
human decision making – the relationship between gains and losses valuation 
and their integration in the brain. The study builds on the significant 
behavioral and neural evidence (from decades of behavioral studies, our recent 
studies, and presented preliminary data below) that gains and losses decision 
making are not the result of a general-purpose machinery – our brains treat 
gains and losses differently. Specifically, we aim to: 1) continue our 
investigation for the neural encoding of value signal for losses using fMRI and 
2) determine the interactions between gains and losses in the transformation 
from objective value to an integrated subjective utility. 
 
Identifying the neural encoding of value signal for losses using fMRI 
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In Chapter 6, we showed that while there is clear encoding of value 
signal for gains in the vmPFC, there is no evidence of encoding of value signal 
for losses. We note that our study was highly powered statistically, as we had 
30 participants each of whom completed 15 trials for each of the nine 
examined value levels in each domain. As such, this finding suggests that 
gains and losses are encoded differently in the brain. These results will have 
huge implications in our understanding of value encoding in the brain (e.g. 
understanding the framing effect better, understanding whether the vmPFC 
signal is truly a multipurpose value signal or just an approach motivation 
signal).  
 Our plan is to test whether we can still replicate the absence of value 
signal for losses using another risky decision task different from the one used 
in our previous fMRI study in Chapter 6. We will determine which brain 
regions encode value signal for losses and specifically look for its presence in 
the vmPFC. Secondly, we will also determine the neural encoding of the 
interaction of gains and losses values in mixed gamble – how prospective 
gains and losses values are integrated to form the overall representation of the 
gamble value by searching for areas encoding the integration of gains and 
losses values in mixed gambles. It may be that the vmPFC encodes the final 
value that incorporates both the potential gains and potential losses, but is 
limited to positive final values. If this is the case, the vmPFC value signal 
would only be found in gains gambles and mixed gambles with positive final 
values, but not for losses gambles or mixed gambles with negative final 
values. Such result would suggest that the vmPFC value signal encodes the 
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degree of ‘approach motivation’ of the option instead of a multipurpose value 
signal (as discussed in Chapter 7).  
 
 Determining the interactions between gains and losses in the transformation 
from objective value to an integrated subjective utility 
In Chapter 6, we also localized the information necessary to perform 
the value-to-utility transformation to the daMCC, with overlapping areas 
between the gains and losses domains. As we examined the gains and losses 
domains independently, it remains unknown how these signals 
interact/integrate when both potential gains and potential losses are 
introduced. 
One main question we would like to answer is whether our brain is 
able to perform multiple value-to-utility computations simultaneously to form 
the overall representation of the subjective value of an object –  how are gains 
and losses value integrated together to form the subjective value of an option? 
Using risky gambles, we plan to empirically test which of these possible 
value-to-utility mechanisms actually happens in the brain:  
1) The gains and losses values are first integrated to create an overall 
expected value representation before the value-to-utility computation takes 
place (Figure 8.1A). The brain first calculates the objective expected value of 
the option. If the overall expected value of the option is positive (in the gains 
domain), the value-to-utility transformation will be performed based on gains 
risk preference value, otherwise, if the expected value of the option is negative 
(in the losses domain),  the value-to-utility transformation will be performed 
based on losses risk preference value. In either way, only a single value-to-
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utility computation is performed each time. If this is true, we would expect the 
gains and losses risk preferences to remain uncorrelated as found in Chapter 6 
as the gains and losses value-to-utility transformation do not interact with each 
other. 
2) The gains and losses value-to-utility transformations are performed 
independently one after another (but not simultaneously)  and thereafter, their 
subjective values are integrated together (Figure 8.1B). If this is true, again we 
would expect the gains and losses risk preferences to remain uncorrelated as 
the gains and losses value-to-utility transformations still happens 
independently. 
3) The gains and losses value-to-utility transformations are performed 
simultaneously but still independently and their subjective values are 
integrated together afterwards (Figure 8.1C).  If this is the case, again we 
would expect the gains and losses risk preferences to remain uncorrelated  as 
the gains and losses value-to-utility transformations still do not 
interact/interfere with each other. 
4) The gains and losses value-to-utility transformations are performed 
together with interaction/interference across transformations such that the 
presence of multiple simultaneous value-to-utility transformations result in 
alterations in the value-to-utility calculations (Figure 8.1D). If this is true, we 
would expect to find a significant correlation between gains and losses risk 
preferences in mixed gambles as gains risk preferences are now influenced by 
losses risk preferences and vice versa. This could possibly mean that the gains 
and losses risk preferences merge together forming a combined risk 
preference, so only one transformation is performed for both gains and losses 
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values. If this is the case, much like there is a bottleneck in information 
processing for attention (we can only attend to a small number of items at a 
time), it may be the case that we can only perform one transformation at a time 
without interference across transformations.  
 
Figure 8.1. Modeling independent and interactive possible value-to-utility 
transformations. (A) The gains and losses values are first integrated to create 
Independent value-to-utility transformations
Positive 
expected value Gains preference* = Gains utility






Losses value * = Losses utility
Gains value Gains preference* = Gains utility
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an overall expected value representation before the value-to-utility 
transformation takes place. (B) The gains and losses value-to-utility 
transformations are performed independently one after another and their 
utilities are integrated together afterwards. (C) The gains and losses value-to-
utility transformations are performed simultaneously but still independently 
and their utilities are integrated together afterwards. (D) The gains and losses 
value-to-utility transformations are performed together with 
interaction/interference across transformations forming a combined risk 
preference value.  	
Task designs and potential analyses 
  With the aim of identifying brain regions that encode value signal and 
the value-to-utility transformation, we have recently developed an fMRI 
decision task. Additionally, we have also developed a behavioral decision task 
with the purpose of quantifying individuals risk preferences in the isolated 
gains domain, isolated losses domain and mixed domain. The task designs and 
potential analyses are described below.  
 
  fMRI decision task. We have developed a gamble rating task to focus 
on the specific cognitive processes we aim to engage and compare using fMRI 
which is the value encoding of isolated gains, isolated losses and intermixed 
gains and losses. To this end, we have removed the comparison of two options 
(as used in all the studies in this current dissertation), and instead present 
participants with a single gamble and ask them to rate it on a 4-point scale 
(strongly dislike, dislike, like, strongly like). Each gamble is composed of 
three potential components, 1) a zero outcome, 2) a positive outcome, and 3) a 
negative outcome, with 33.33% likelihood for each outcome (Figure 8.2). All 
gambles feature a zero outcome for at least 1 pie piece. Across trials, the 
gamble includes varying values of positive or negative outcomes (from -$18 to 
$18) in order to construct 4 trials types, trials that feature 1) just zeros, 2) just 
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gains, 3) just losses, or 4) both (mixed trials). By varying the value of each 
option independently, we will be able to explicitly map out the independent 
value signals for gains only and losses only, and their intermixed resolution.  
 
 
Figure 8.2. Example fMRI task trials. (A) Neutral trial, (B) gains trial, (C) 
losses trial, and (D) mixed trial. 
 
Analyses of the neuroimaging data will be performed in FSL 
(Jenkinson et al., 2012). General Linear Model (GLM) analysis will be 
performed to identify regions containing neural activity of interest. We plan to 
create multiple models as described below (similar to the GLMs created in the 
fMRI study in Chapter 6) for the purpose of investigating different research 
questions and achieving our study aims. 
1) GLM 1: Categorical trial types. This is the base model used to 
categorically separate trial types. Each of the four trial types will be 
represented by a simple box-car regressor, convolved with a double gamma 
hemodynamic response function. The four regressors will represent: #1 neutral 
trials, #2 gains trials, #3 losses trials, and #4 mixed trials. We will also include 
a nuisance regressor, #5 button press. This model will be used to identify the 
main effects of trials types and contrasts between trial types.  
2) GLM 2: Separated gains and losses values. This model will include 
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parametric regressors modeling trial values during the decision period: #6 
gains values in gains trials, #7 losses values in losses trials, #8 gains values in 
mixed trials, and #9 losses values in mixed trials.  
3) GLM 3: Combined gains and losses values in mixed trials. This 
model is similar to GLM 2, but instead of having two parametric value 
regressors for the mixed trial, we will only have one regressor, which is the 
difference between the gains value and losses values in the mixed trials. This 
model will include all the regressors in the base model (regressor #1-5), with 
the addition of 3 parametric regressors modeling trial values during the 
decision period: #6 gains values in gains trials, #7 losses values in losses trials, 
#8 difference between gains and losses values in mixed trials.  
4) GLM 4: Categorical examination of value levels. This model is 
designed to extract the actual neural encoding of the gains and losses value 
signals. This model will include all the regressors in the base model (regressor 
#1-5), with the addition of 19 box-car task regressors (2 domains x 9 value 
levels and one for neutral trial).  
By conducting whole brain analyses using these GLMs, we will be 
able to: 1) determine what brain areas encode gains value signal in gains trials 
(GLM 2 regressor #6; replicating prior studies) and in mixed trials (GLM 2 
regressor #8), 2) determine what brain areas encode losses value signal in 
losses trials (GLM 2 regressor #7) and in mixed trials (GLM 2 regressor #8), 
and 3) determine the neural encoding of the interaction of gains and losses 
values in mixed gamble (GLM 2 regressor #7). By conducting region-of-
interest (ROI) analysis, we will be able to specifically test the presence of 
losses value signal in the vmPFC by extracting the beta values of the 9 losses 
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value level regressors (GLM 4) from the vmPFC. We could also perform ROI 
analyses in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala.  
In addition, Support Vector Machine (SVM) analyses will be 
performed to test for non-linear encoding of gains and losses value signals. 
These analyses will be limited to comparison of two categories. We plan to 
compare neural encoding of ‘dislike’ and ‘strongly dislike’ responses and of 
‘like’ and ‘strongly like’ responses separately for gains and losses trials.  
 
Behavioral decision task. We have developed a gamble rating task to 
quantify risk preferences in the isolated gains domain, isolated losses domain, 
and mixed domain. These risk preferences will be used as covariates in our 
fMRI analyses to identify the interaction between gains and losses value-to-
utility transformations. We created mixed gambles composing of three parts, 
with each part having either a 25%, 33.33%, 50%, 66.67% or 75% probability 
(for a sum of 100% in each gamble). These three parts are either 1) a 
prospective gain, 2) a prospective loss, or 3) zero (Figure 8.3). Gambles were 
again constructed to have specific expected values and were intermixed 
together with isolated (pure) domain trials. We will compute risk preferences 
for pure gains, pure losses, mixed gains and mixed losses independently using 


















Figure 8.3. Example of behavioral task trials. (A) presents a trial with 
prospective gains, (B) presents a trial with prospective losses, and (C) shows 
trial with both prospective gains and losses. 
 
Preliminary Results 
We have begun collection of preliminary behavioral data using this 
newly modified version of our behavioral decision task that includes mixed 
gambles. We collected data from 60 participants (29 males; mean ± SD age = 
22.30 ± 1.97 years). We quantified their gains and losses risk preferences in 
the mixed domain and identified the interrelationships between isolated (pure) 
domain and mixed domain risk preferences using the previously used power 
function metric to empirically test the possible mechanisms previously 
mentioned (see Figure 8.1).  First, we tested the correlation between gains and 
losses risk preferences to see whether we could replicate our prior studies. We 
found absence of correlations between gains and losses risk preferences for the 
isolated trials (trials with only gains or only losses components) (r(58) = .14, p 
= .28). We also tested the relationship between isolated and mixed trials within 
each domain and found strong correlations  (gains: r(37) = .69, p < .0001; 
losses: r (52) = .56, p < .0001). Next we tested the correlation between gains 
and losses risk preferences in mixed trials – the crucial test. If these risk 
preferences were the results of independent processes, we would expect to find 
that the absence of correlation maintained in the mixed trials as found between 
the gains and losses isolated trials. Instead, we found a very strong correlation 
between mixed gains and mixed losses risk preferences (r(31) = .70, p < 
.0001; correlation significantly different from cross-domain pure risk 
preferences correlation: z = 4.47, p < .0001) (Figure 8.4). This provides 
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evidence that the presence of multiple simultaneous value-to-utility 
computations (for gains value and losses value), results in alterations of the 
calculations. This suggests evidence for a neural bottleneck in the value-to-
utility computation where we can only perform one transformation at a time 
without interference across transformations.  
 
 
Figure 8.4. Relationships between gain and loss preferences between 
isolated (pure) and mixed trial types. Critically, there is an absence of 
correlation between pure gains and losses, but a strong correlation when they 
appear simultaneously as mixed gains and mixed losses. 
 
Further Analyses 
Our next step is to perform a neural examination of the bottleneck in 
the value-to-utility transformation using fMRI. This component will utilize the 
data from the fMRI decision task described above and also the risk preferences 
obtained from the behavioral decision task. All participants will perform the 
behavioral task before they enter the scanner, such that we will be able to 
integrate their expressed risk preferences for gains and losses into the 
calculation of the separable and combined valuation signals.  
Analyses of the neuroimaging data will also be performed in FSL 
(Jenkinson et al., 2012). We will construct GLMs with individual’s risk 
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preference values as a between-subject covariate to identify brain regions that 
encode a linear value signal whose slope varies across individuals as a 
function of the specific value-to-utility transformation that they are performing 
– an analysis that we developed previously (Chapter 6). We will perform this 
analysis separately for pure gains, pure losses, mixed gains and mixed losses 
risk preferences. Based on our previous study, we expect to find this pattern of 
activation within the daMCC, overlapping across domains. We will be able to 
test whether the daMCC still encodes the pure gains risk preference and pure 
losses risk preference independently (perhaps multiplexing the signal) during 
mixed trials, or if the system now reflects a single value-to-utility 
transformation that is intermediate between the two isolated preferences. 
Critically, this will allow us to differentiate whether the interaction is 
occurring at the value-to-utility stage or at a later stage of the decision process.  
Functional connectivity analyses will allow us to identify the neural 
system that is involved in the value-to-utility transformation for each trial 
type. Previously, in Chapter 6, while investigating gains and losses separately, 
we found that the daMCC ROI was positively connected with the dlPFC/IFG 
and negatively functionally connected with the NAcc.  
 
Implications 
The importance of these findings should not be understated. While it is 
theoretically possible that our decision making processes can handle gains and 
losses processing independently (e.g. existing studies on framing effect that 
only look at pure domain decisions have shown that people respond differently 
for gains and losses), these results indicate that composite decisions may result 
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in interactions in the information processing. Such interactions will inevitably 
result in poorer quality decision making when compared to independent 
processing of each dimension’s information. If this is true, the proof of the 
existence of this bottleneck will result in a simple strategy to avoid these 
maladaptive decisions – a strategy of treating each component in a serial 
process. 
Overall, this proposed future project will extend current understanding 
about the neural mechanisms of decision making by looking at how gains and 
losses interactions are represented in the brain. As mentioned earlier, many of 
our real life risky decisions involve both potential gains and losses. 
Unfortunately, no study has investigated the neural mechanisms of how gains 
and losses value-to-utility transformations are integrated. This research will 
provide an insight of the neural mechanisms involved in the clear behavioral 
differences that occur between gains and losses decision making (such as 
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Appendix A. Gains and Losses Tasks used in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  








1 3 0.25 6 0.5 
2 3 0.5 3 0.5 
3 3 0.75 2 0.5 
4 3 0.25 12 1 
5 3 0.5 6 1 
6 3 0.75 4 1 
7 3 0.25 15.6 1.3 
8 3 0.5 7.8 1.3 
9 3 0.75 5.2 1.3 
10 3 0.25 19.2 1.6 
11 3 0.5 9.6 1.6 
12 3 0.75 6.4 1.6 
13 3 0.25 22.8 1.9 
14 3 0.5 11.4 1.9 
15 3 0.75 7.6 1.9 
16 3 0.25 26.4 2.2 
17 3 0.5 13.2 2.2 
18 3 0.75 8.8 2.2 
19 3 0.25 30 2.5 
20 3 0.5 15 2.5 
21 3 0.75 10 2.5 
22 3 0.25 36 3 
23 3 0.5 18 3 
24 3 0.75 12 3 
25 3 0.25 42 3.5 
26 3 0.5 21 3.5 
27 3 0.75 14 3.5 
28 4 0.25 8 0.5 
29 4 0.5 4 0.5 
30 4 0.75 2.7 0.5 
31 4 0.25 16 1 
32 4 0.5 8 1 
33 4 0.75 5.3 1 
34 4 0.25 20.8 1.3 
35 4 0.5 10.4 1.3 
36 4 0.75 6.9 1.3 
37 4 0.25 25.6 1.6 
38 4 0.5 12.8 1.6 
39 4 0.75 8.5 1.6 










41 4 0.5 15.2 1.9 
42 4 0.75 10.1 1.9 
43 4 0.25 35.2 2.2 
44 4 0.5 17.6 2.2 
45 4 0.75 11.7 2.2 
46 4 0.25 40 2.5 
47 4 0.5 20 2.5 
48 4 0.75 13.3 2.5 
49 4 0.25 48 3 
50 4 0.5 24 3 
51 4 0.75 16 3 
52 4 0.25 56 3.5 
53 4 0.5 28 3.5 
54 4 0.75 18.7 3.5 
55 5 0.25 10 0.5 
56 5 0.5 5 0.5 
57 5 0.75 3.3 0.5 
58 5 0.25 20 1 
59 5 0.5 10 1 
60 5 0.75 6.7 1 
61 5 0.25 26 1.3 
62 5 0.5 13 1.3 
63 5 0.75 8.7 1.3 
64 5 0.25 32 1.6 
65 5 0.5 16 1.6 
66 5 0.75 10.7 1.6 
67 5 0.25 38 1.9 
68 5 0.5 19 1.9 
69 5 0.75 12.7 1.9 
70 5 0.25 44 2.2 
71 5 0.5 22 2.2 
72 5 0.75 14.7 2.2 
73 5 0.25 50 2.5 
74 5 0.5 25 2.5 
75 5 0.75 16.7 2.5 
76 5 0.25 60 3 
77 5 0.5 30 3 
78 5 0.75 20 3 
79 5 0.25 70 3.5 
80 5 0.5 35 3.5 
81 5 0.75 23.3 3.5 
82 6 0.25 12 0.5 










84 6 0.75 4 0.5 
85 6 0.25 24 1 
86 6 0.5 12 1 
87 6 0.75 8 1 
88 6 0.25 31.2 1.3 
89 6 0.5 15.6 1.3 
90 6 0.75 10.4 1.3 
91 6 0.25 38.4 1.6 
92 6 0.5 19.2 1.6 
93 6 0.75 12.8 1.6 
94 6 0.25 45.6 1.9 
95 6 0.5 22.8 1.9 
96 6 0.75 15.2 1.9 
97 6 0.25 52.8 2.2 
98 6 0.5 26.4 2.2 
99 6 0.75 17.6 2.2 
100 6 0.25 60 2.5 
101 6 0.5 30 2.5 
102 6 0.75 20 2.5 
103 6 0.25 72 3 
104 6 0.5 36 3 
105 6 0.75 24 3 
106 6 0.25 84 3.5 
107 6 0.5 42 3.5 
108 6 0.75 28 3.5 
109 7 0.25 14 0.5 
110 7 0.5 7 0.5 
111 7 0.75 4.7 0.5 
112 7 0.25 28 1 
113 7 0.5 14 1 
114 7 0.75 9.3 1 
115 7 0.25 36.4 1.3 
116 7 0.5 18.2 1.3 
117 7 0.75 12.1 1.3 
118 7 0.25 44.8 1.6 
119 7 0.5 22.4 1.6 
120 7 0.75 14.9 1.6 
121 7 0.25 53.2 1.9 
122 7 0.5 26.6 1.9 
123 7 0.75 17.7 1.9 
124 7 0.25 61.6 2.2 
125 7 0.5 30.8 2.2 










127 7 0.25 70 2.5 
128 7 0.5 35 2.5 
129 7 0.75 23.3 2.5 
130 7 0.25 84 3 
131 7 0.5 42 3 
132 7 0.75 28 3 
133 7 0.25 98 3.5 
134 7 0.5 49 3.5 
135 7 0.75 32.7 3.5 












































































































1 -3 0.25 -1.2 0.1 
2 -3 0.5 -0.6 0.1 
3 -3 0.75 -0.4 0.1 
4 -3 0.25 -3.6 0.3 
5 -3 0.5 -1.8 0.3 
6 -3 0.75 -1.2 0.3 
7 -3 0.25 -6 0.5 
8 -3 0.5 -3 0.5 
9 -3 0.75 -2 0.5 
10 -3 0.25 -9.6 0.8 
11 -3 0.5 -4.8 0.8 
12 -3 0.75 -3.2 0.8 
13 -3 0.25 -12 1 
14 -3 0.5 -6 1 
15 -3 0.75 -4 1 
16 -3 0.25 -15.6 1.3 
17 -3 0.5 -7.8 1.3 
18 -3 0.75 -5.2 1.3 
19 -3 0.25 -18 1.5 
20 -3 0.5 -9 1.5 
21 -3 0.75 -6 1.5 
22 -3 0.25 -24 2 
23 -3 0.5 -12 2 
24 -3 0.75 -8 2 
25 -3 0.25 -36 3 
26 -3 0.5 -18 3 
27 -3 0.75 -12 3 
28 -3 0.25 -48 4 
29 -3 0.5 -24 4 
30 -3 0.75 -16 4 
31 -4 0.25 -1.6 0.1 
32 -4 0.5 -0.8 0.1 
33 -4 0.75 -0.5 0.1 
34 -4 0.25 -4.8 0.3 
35 -4 0.5 -2.4 0.3 
36 -4 0.75 -1.6 0.3 
37 -4 0.25 -8 0.5 
38 -4 0.5 -4 0.5 
39 -4 0.75 -2.7 0.5 
40 -4 0.25 -12.8 0.8 
41 -4 0.5 -6.4 0.8 










43 -4 0.25 -16 1 
44 -4 0.5 -8 1 
45 -4 0.75 -5.3 1 
46 -4 0.25 -20.8 1.3 
47 -4 0.5 -10.4 1.3 
48 -4 0.75 -6.9 1.3 
49 -4 0.25 -24 1.5 
50 -4 0.5 -12 1.5 
51 -4 0.75 -8 1.5 
52 -4 0.25 -32 2 
53 -4 0.5 -16 2 
54 -4 0.75 -10.7 2 
55 -4 0.25 -48 3 
56 -4 0.5 -24 3 
57 -4 0.75 -16 3 
58 -4 0.25 -64 4 
59 -4 0.5 -32 4 
60 -4 0.75 -21.3 4 
61 -5 0.25 -2 0.1 
62 -5 0.5 -1 0.1 
63 -5 0.75 -0.7 0.1 
64 -5 0.25 -6 0.3 
65 -5 0.5 -3 0.3 
66 -5 0.75 -2 0.3 
67 -5 0.25 -10 0.5 
68 -5 0.5 -5 0.5 
69 -5 0.75 -3.3 0.5 
70 -5 0.25 -16 0.8 
71 -5 0.5 -8 0.8 
72 -5 0.75 -5.3 0.8 
73 -5 0.25 -20 1 
74 -5 0.5 -10 1 
75 -5 0.75 -6.7 1 
76 -5 0.25 -26 1.3 
77 -5 0.5 -13 1.3 
78 -5 0.75 -8.7 1.3 
79 -5 0.25 -30 1.5 
80 -5 0.5 -15 1.5 
81 -5 0.75 -10 1.5 
82 -5 0.25 -40 2 
83 -5 0.5 -20 2 
84 -5 0.75 -13.3 2 










86 -5 0.5 -30 3 
87 -5 0.75 -20 3 
88 -5 0.25 -80 4 
89 -5 0.5 -40 4 
90 -5 0.75 -26.7 4 
91 -6 0.25 -2.4 0.1 
92 -6 0.5 -1.2 0.1 
93 -6 0.75 -0.8 0.1 
94 -6 0.25 -7.2 0.3 
95 -6 0.5 -3.6 0.3 
96 -6 0.75 -2.4 0.3 
97 -6 0.25 -12 0.5 
98 -6 0.5 -6 0.5 
99 -6 0.75 -4 0.5 
100 -6 0.25 -19.2 0.8 
101 -6 0.5 -9.6 0.8 
102 -6 0.75 -6.4 0.8 
103 -6 0.25 -24 1 
104 -6 0.5 -12 1 
105 -6 0.75 -8 1 
106 -6 0.25 -31.2 1.3 
107 -6 0.5 -15.6 1.3 
108 -6 0.75 -10.4 1.3 
109 -6 0.25 -36 1.5 
110 -6 0.5 -18 1.5 
111 -6 0.75 -12 1.5 
112 -6 0.25 -48 2 
113 -6 0.5 -24 2 
114 -6 0.75 -16 2 
115 -6 0.25 -72 3 
116 -6 0.5 -36 3 
117 -6 0.75 -24 3 
118 -6 0.25 -96 4 
119 -6 0.5 -48 4 
120 -6 0.75 -32 4 
121 -7 0.25 -2.8 0.1 
122 -7 0.5 -1.4 0.1 
123 -7 0.75 -0.9 0.1 
124 -7 0.25 -8.4 0.3 
125 -7 0.5 -4.2 0.3 
126 -7 0.75 -2.8 0.3 
127 -7 0.25 -14 0.5 










129 -7 0.75 -4.7 0.5 
130 -7 0.25 -22.4 0.8 
131 -7 0.5 -11.2 0.8 
132 -7 0.75 -7.5 0.8 
133 -7 0.25 -28 1 
134 -7 0.5 -14 1 
135 -7 0.75 -9.3 1 
136 -7 0.25 -36.4 1.3 
137 -7 0.5 -18.2 1.3 
138 -7 0.75 -12.1 1.3 
139 -7 0.25 -42 1.5 
140 -7 0.5 -21 1.5 
141 -7 0.75 -14 1.5 
142 -7 0.25 -56 2 
143 -7 0.5 -28 2 
144 -7 0.75 -18.7 2 
145 -7 0.25 -84 3 
146 -7 0.5 -42 3 
147 -7 0.75 -28 3 
148 -7 0.25 -112 4 
149 -7 0.5 -56 4 
150 -7 0.75 -37.3 4 
     








1 -3  -0.6 0.1 
2 -3  -1.8 0.3 
3 -3  -3 0.5 
4 -3  -4.8 0.8 
5 -3  -6 1 
6 -3  -7.8 1.3 
7 -3  -9 1.5 
8 -3  -12 2 
9 -3  -18 3 
10 -3  -24 4 
11 -4  -0.8 0.1 
12 -4  -2.4 0.3 
13 -4  -4 0.5 
14 -4  -6.4 0.8 
15 -4  -8 1 
16 -4  -10.4 1.3 










18 -4  -16 2 
19 -4  -24 3 
20 -4  -32 4 
21 -5  -1 0.1 
22 -5  -3 0.3 
23 -5  -5 0.5 
24 -5  -8 0.8 
25 -5  -10 1 
26 -5  -13 1.3 
27 -5  -15 1.5 
28 -5  -20 2 
29 -5  -30 3 
30 -5  -40 4 
31 -6  -1.2 0.1 
32 -6  -3.6 0.3 
33 -6  -6 0.5 
34 -6  -9.6 0.8 
35 -6  -12 1 
36 -6  -15.6 1.3 
37 -6  -18 1.5 
38 -6  -24 2 
39 -6  -36 3 
40 -6  -48 4 
41 -7  -1.4 0.1 
42 -7  -4.2 0.3 
43 -7  -7 0.5 
44 -7  -11.2 0.8 
45 -7  -14 1 
46 -7  -18.2 1.3 
47 -7  -21 1.5 
48 -7  -28 2 
49 -7  -42 3 














1 3 0.25 3.0 0.25 
2 3 0.5 1.5 0.25 
3 3 0.75 1.0 0.25 
4 3 0.25 4.0 0.33 
5 3 0.5 2.0 0.33 
6 3 0.75 1.3 0.33 
7 3 0.25 6.0 0.5 
8 3 0.5 3.0 0.5 
9 3 0.75 2.0 0.5 
10 3 0.25 7.9 0.66 
11 3 0.5 4.0 0.66 
12 3 0.75 2.6 0.66 
13 3 0.25 9.6 0.8 
14 3 0.5 4.8 0.8 
15 3 0.75 3.2 0.8 
16 3 0.25 12.0 1 
17 3 0.5 6.0 1 
18 3 0.75 4.0 1 
19 3 0.25 15.0 1.25 
20 3 0.5 7.5 1.25 
21 3 0.75 5.0 1.25 
22 3 0.25 18.0 1.5 
23 3 0.5 9.0 1.5 
24 3 0.75 6.0 1.5 
25 3 0.25 24.0 2 
26 3 0.5 12.0 2 
27 3 0.75 8.0 2 
28 3 0.25 36.0 3 
29 3 0.5 18.0 3 
30 3 0.75 12.0 3 
31 3 0.25 48.0 4 
32 3 0.5 24.0 4 
33 3 0.75 16.0 4 
34 4 0.25 4.0 0.25 
35 4 0.5 2.0 0.25 
36 4 0.75 1.3 0.25 
37 4 0.25 5.3 0.33 
38 4 0.5 2.6 0.33 
39 4 0.75 1.8 0.33 










41 4 0.5 4.0 0.5 
42 4 0.75 2.7 0.5 
43 4 0.25 10.6 0.66 
44 4 0.5 5.3 0.66 
45 4 0.75 3.5 0.66 
46 4 0.25 12.8 0.8 
47 4 0.5 6.4 0.8 
48 4 0.75 4.3 0.8 
49 4 0.25 16.0 1 
50 4 0.5 8.0 1 
51 4 0.75 5.3 1 
52 4 0.25 20.0 1.25 
53 4 0.5 10.0 1.25 
54 4 0.75 6.7 1.25 
55 4 0.25 24.0 1.5 
56 4 0.5 12.0 1.5 
57 4 0.75 8.0 1.5 
58 4 0.25 32.0 2 
59 4 0.5 16.0 2 
60 4 0.75 10.7 2 
61 4 0.25 48.0 3 
62 4 0.5 24.0 3 
63 4 0.75 16.0 3 
64 4 0.25 64.0 4 
65 4 0.5 32.0 4 
66 4 0.75 21.3 4 
67 5 0.25 5.0 0.25 
68 5 0.5 2.5 0.25 
69 5 0.75 1.7 0.25 
70 5 0.25 6.6 0.33 
71 5 0.5 3.3 0.33 
72 5 0.75 2.2 0.33 
73 5 0.25 10.0 0.5 
74 5 0.5 5.0 0.5 
75 5 0.75 3.3 0.5 
76 5 0.25 13.2 0.66 
77 5 0.5 6.6 0.66 
78 5 0.75 4.4 0.66 
79 5 0.25 16.0 0.8 
80 5 0.5 8.0 0.8 
81 5 0.75 5.3 0.8 
82 5 0.25 20.0 1 










84 5 0.75 6.7 1 
85 5 0.25 25.0 1.25 
86 5 0.5 12.5 1.25 
87 5 0.75 8.3 1.25 
88 5 0.25 30.0 1.5 
89 5 0.5 15.0 1.5 
90 5 0.75 10.0 1.5 
91 5 0.25 40.0 2 
92 5 0.5 20.0 2 
93 5 0.75 13.3 2 
94 5 0.25 60.0 3 
95 5 0.5 30.0 3 
96 5 0.75 20.0 3 
97 5 0.25 80.0 4 
98 5 0.5 40.0 4 
99 5 0.75 26.7 4 
100 6 0.25 6.0 0.25 
101 6 0.5 3.0 0.25 
102 6 0.75 2.0 0.25 
103 6 0.25 7.9 0.33 
104 6 0.5 4.0 0.33 
105 6 0.75 2.6 0.33 
106 6 0.25 12.0 0.5 
107 6 0.5 6.0 0.5 
108 6 0.75 4.0 0.5 
109 6 0.25 15.8 0.66 
110 6 0.5 7.9 0.66 
111 6 0.75 5.3 0.66 
112 6 0.25 19.2 0.8 
113 6 0.5 9.6 0.8 
114 6 0.75 6.4 0.8 
115 6 0.25 24.0 1 
116 6 0.5 12.0 1 
117 6 0.75 8.0 1 
118 6 0.25 30.0 1.25 
119 6 0.5 15.0 1.25 
120 6 0.75 10.0 1.25 
121 6 0.25 36.0 1.5 
122 6 0.5 18.0 1.5 
123 6 0.75 12.0 1.5 
124 6 0.25 48.0 2 
125 6 0.5 24.0 2 










127 6 0.25 72.0 3 
128 6 0.5 36.0 3 
129 6 0.75 24.0 3 
130 6 0.25 96.0 4 
131 6 0.5 48.0 4 
132 6 0.75 32.0 4 
133 7 0.25 7.0 0.25 
134 7 0.5 3.5 0.25 
135 7 0.75 2.3 0.25 
136 7 0.25 9.2 0.33 
137 7 0.5 4.6 0.33 
138 7 0.75 3.1 0.33 
139 7 0.25 14.0 0.5 
140 7 0.5 7.0 0.5 
141 7 0.75 4.7 0.5 
142 7 0.25 18.5 0.66 
143 7 0.5 9.2 0.66 
144 7 0.75 6.2 0.66 
145 7 0.25 22.4 0.8 
146 7 0.5 11.2 0.8 
147 7 0.75 7.5 0.8 
148 7 0.25 28.0 1 
149 7 0.5 14.0 1 
150 7 0.75 9.3 1 
151 7 0.25 35.0 1.25 
152 7 0.5 17.5 1.25 
153 7 0.75 11.7 1.25 
154 7 0.25 42.0 1.5 
155 7 0.5 21.0 1.5 
156 7 0.75 14.0 1.5 
157 7 0.25 56.0 2 
158 7 0.5 28.0 2 
159 7 0.75 18.7 2 
160 7 0.25 84.0 3 
161 7 0.5 42.0 3 
162 7 0.75 28.0 3 
163 7 0.25 112.0 4 
164 7 0.5 56.0 4 
165 7 0.75 37.3 4 
166 -3 0.25 -12.0 4 
167 -3 0.5 -12.0 4 
168 -3 0.75 -12.0 4 










170 -3 0.5 -9.0 3 
171 -3 0.75 -9.0 3 
172 -3 0.25 -6.0 2 
173 -3 0.5 -6.0 2 
174 -3 0.75 -6.0 2 
175 -3 0.25 -4.5 1.5 
176 -3 0.5 -4.5 1.5 
177 -3 0.75 -4.5 1.5 
178 -3 0.25 -3.8 1.25 
179 -3 0.5 -3.8 1.25 
180 -3 0.75 -3.8 1.25 
181 -3 0.25 -3.0 1 
182 -3 0.5 -3.0 1 
183 -3 0.75 -3.0 1 
184 -3 0.25 -2.4 0.8 
185 -3 0.5 -2.4 0.8 
186 -3 0.75 -2.4 0.8 
187 -3 0.25 -2.0 0.66 
188 -3 0.5 -2.0 0.66 
189 -3 0.75 -2.0 0.66 
190 -3 0.25 -1.5 0.5 
191 -3 0.5 -1.5 0.5 
192 -3 0.75 -1.5 0.5 
193 -3 0.25 -1.0 0.33 
194 -3 0.5 -1.0 0.33 
195 -3 0.75 -1.0 0.33 
196 -3 0.25 -0.8 0.25 
197 -3 0.5 -0.8 0.25 
198 -3 0.75 -0.8 0.25 
199 -4 0.25 -16.0 4 
200 -4 0.5 -16.0 4 
201 -4 0.75 -16.0 4 
202 -4 0.25 -12.0 3 
203 -4 0.5 -12.0 3 
204 -4 0.75 -12.0 3 
205 -4 0.25 -8.0 2 
206 -4 0.5 -8.0 2 
207 -4 0.75 -8.0 2 
208 -4 0.25 -6.0 1.5 
209 -4 0.5 -6.0 1.5 
210 -4 0.75 -6.0 1.5 
211 -4 0.25 -5.0 1.25 










213 -4 0.75 -5.0 1.25 
214 -4 0.25 -4.0 1 
215 -4 0.5 -4.0 1 
216 -4 0.75 -4.0 1 
217 -4 0.25 -3.2 0.8 
218 -4 0.5 -3.2 0.8 
219 -4 0.75 -3.2 0.8 
220 -4 0.25 -2.6 0.66 
221 -4 0.5 -2.6 0.66 
222 -4 0.75 -2.6 0.66 
223 -4 0.25 -2.0 0.5 
224 -4 0.5 -2.0 0.5 
225 -4 0.75 -2.0 0.5 
226 -4 0.25 -1.3 0.33 
227 -4 0.5 -1.3 0.33 
228 -4 0.75 -1.3 0.33 
229 -4 0.25 -1.0 0.25 
230 -4 0.5 -1.0 0.25 
231 -4 0.75 -1.0 0.25 
232 -5 0.25 -20.0 4 
233 -5 0.5 -20.0 4 
234 -5 0.75 -20.0 4 
235 -5 0.25 -15.0 3 
236 -5 0.5 -15.0 3 
237 -5 0.75 -15.0 3 
238 -5 0.25 -10.0 2 
239 -5 0.5 -10.0 2 
240 -5 0.75 -10.0 2 
241 -5 0.25 -7.5 1.5 
242 -5 0.5 -7.5 1.5 
243 -5 0.75 -7.5 1.5 
244 -5 0.25 -6.3 1.25 
245 -5 0.5 -6.3 1.25 
246 -5 0.75 -6.2 1.25 
247 -5 0.25 -5.0 1 
248 -5 0.5 -5.0 1 
249 -5 0.75 -5.0 1 
250 -5 0.25 -4.0 0.8 
251 -5 0.5 -4.0 0.8 
252 -5 0.75 -4.0 0.8 
253 -5 0.25 -3.3 0.66 
254 -5 0.5 -3.3 0.66 










256 -5 0.25 -2.5 0.5 
257 -5 0.5 -2.5 0.5 
258 -5 0.75 -2.5 0.5 
259 -5 0.25 -1.7 0.33 
260 -5 0.5 -1.7 0.33 
261 -5 0.75 -1.7 0.33 
262 -5 0.25 -1.3 0.25 
263 -5 0.5 -1.3 0.25 
264 -5 0.75 -1.3 0.25 
265 -6 0.25 -24.0 4 
266 -6 0.5 -24.0 4 
267 -6 0.75 -24.0 4 
268 -6 0.25 -18.0 3 
269 -6 0.5 -18.0 3 
270 -6 0.75 -18.0 3 
271 -6 0.25 -12.0 2 
272 -6 0.5 -12.0 2 
273 -6 0.75 -12.0 2 
274 -6 0.25 -9.0 1.5 
275 -6 0.5 -9.0 1.5 
276 -6 0.75 -9.0 1.5 
277 -6 0.25 -7.5 1.25 
278 -6 0.5 -7.5 1.25 
279 -6 0.75 -7.5 1.25 
280 -6 0.25 -6.0 1 
281 -6 0.5 -6.0 1 
282 -6 0.75 -6.0 1 
283 -6 0.25 -4.8 0.8 
284 -6 0.5 -4.8 0.8 
285 -6 0.75 -4.8 0.8 
286 -6 0.25 -4.0 0.66 
287 -6 0.5 -4.0 0.66 
288 -6 0.75 -4.0 0.66 
289 -6 0.25 -3.0 0.5 
290 -6 0.5 -3.0 0.5 
291 -6 0.75 -3.0 0.5 
292 -6 0.25 -2.0 0.33 
293 -6 0.5 -2.0 0.33 
294 -6 0.75 -2.0 0.33 
295 -6 0.25 -1.5 0.25 
296 -6 0.5 -1.5 0.25 
297 -6 0.75 -1.5 0.25 










299 -7 0.5 -28.0 4 
300 -7 0.75 -28.0 4 
301 -7 0.25 -21.0 3 
302 -7 0.5 -21.0 3 
303 -7 0.75 -21.0 3 
304 -7 0.25 -14.0 2 
305 -7 0.5 -14.0 2 
306 -7 0.75 -14.0 2 
307 -7 0.25 -10.5 1.5 
308 -7 0.5 -10.5 1.5 
309 -7 0.75 -10.5 1.5 
310 -7 0.25 -8.8 1.25 
311 -7 0.5 -8.8 1.25 
312 -7 0.75 -8.8 1.25 
313 -7 0.25 -7.0 1 
314 -7 0.5 -7.0 1 
315 -7 0.75 -7.0 1 
316 -7 0.25 -5.6 0.8 
317 -7 0.5 -5.6 0.8 
318 -7 0.75 -5.6 0.8 
319 -7 0.25 -4.6 0.66 
320 -7 0.5 -4.6 0.66 
321 -7 0.75 -4.6 0.66 
322 -7 0.25 -3.5 0.5 
323 -7 0.5 -3.5 0.5 
324 -7 0.75 -3.5 0.5 
325 -7 0.25 -2.3 0.33 
326 -7 0.5 -2.3 0.33 
327 -7 0.75 -2.3 0.33 
328 -7 0.25 -1.8 0.25 
329 -7 0.5 -1.8 0.25 




Appendix C. Gains and Losses fMRI Task used in Chapter 6.  
 








1 3 0.25 3 0.25 
2 3 0.5 1.5 0.25 
3 3 0.75 1 0.25 
4 4 0.25 4 0.25 
5 4 0.5 2 0.25 
6 4 0.75 1.3 0.25 
7 5 0.25 5 0.25 
8 5 0.5 2.5 0.25 
9 5 0.75 1.7 0.25 
10 6 0.25 6 0.25 
11 6 0.5 3 0.25 
12 6 0.75 2 0.25 
13 7 0.25 7 0.25 
14 7 0.5 3.5 0.25 
15 7 0.75 2.3 0.25 
16 3 0.25 6 0.5 
17 3 0.5 3 0.5 
18 3 0.75 2 0.5 
19 4 0.25 8 0.5 
20 4 0.5 4 0.5 
21 4 0.75 2.7 0.5 
22 5 0.25 10 0.5 
23 5 0.5 5 0.5 
24 5 0.75 3.3 0.5 
25 6 0.25 12 0.5 
26 6 0.5 6 0.5 
27 6 0.75 4 0.5 
28 7 0.25 14 0.5 
29 7 0.5 7 0.5 
30 7 0.75 4.7 0.5 
31 3 0.25 7.9 0.66 
32 3 0.5 4 0.66 
33 3 0.75 2.6 0.66 
34 4 0.25 10.6 0.66 
35 4 0.5 5.3 0.66 
36 4 0.75 3.5 0.66 
37 5 0.25 13.2 0.66 
38 5 0.5 6.6 0.66 










40 6 0.25 15.8 0.66 
41 6 0.5 7.9 0.66 
42 6 0.75 5.3 0.66 
43 7 0.25 18.5 0.66 
44 7 0.5 9.2 0.66 
45 7 0.75 6.2 0.66 
46 3 0.25 9.6 0.8 
47 3 0.5 4.8 0.8 
48 3 0.75 3.2 0.8 
49 4 0.25 12.8 0.8 
50 4 0.5 6.4 0.8 
51 4 0.75 4.3 0.8 
52 5 0.25 16 0.8 
53 5 0.5 8 0.8 
54 5 0.75 5.3 0.8 
55 6 0.25 19.2 0.8 
56 6 0.5 9.6 0.8 
57 6 0.75 6.4 0.8 
58 7 0.25 22.4 0.8 
59 7 0.5 11.2 0.8 
60 7 0.75 7.5 0.8 
61 3 0.25 12 1 
62 3 0.5 6 1 
63 3 0.75 4 1 
64 4 0.25 16 1 
65 4 0.5 8 1 
66 4 0.75 5.3 1 
67 5 0.25 20 1 
68 5 0.5 10 1 
69 5 0.75 6.7 1 
70 6 0.25 24 1 
71 6 0.5 12 1 
72 6 0.75 8 1 
73 7 0.25 28 1 
74 7 0.5 14 1 
75 7 0.75 9.3 1 
76 3 0.25 15 1.25 
77 3 0.5 7.5 1.25 
78 3 0.75 5 1.25 
79 4 0.25 20 1.25 
80 4 0.5 10 1.25 
81 4 0.75 6.7 1.25 
82 5 0.25 25 1.25 
	 	
279 
83 5 0.5 12.5 1.25 
84 5 0.75 8.3 1.25 
85 6 0.25 30 1.25 
86 6 0.5 15 1.25 
87 6 0.75 10 1.25 
88 7 0.25 35 1.25 
89 7 0.5 17.5 1.25 
90 7 0.75 11.7 1.25 
91 3 0.25 18 1.5 
92 3 0.5 9 1.5 
93 3 0.75 6 1.5 
94 4 0.25 24 1.5 
95 4 0.5 12 1.5 
96 4 0.75 8 1.5 
97 5 0.25 30 1.5 
98 5 0.5 15 1.5 
99 5 0.75 10 1.5 
100 6 0.25 36 1.5 
101 6 0.5 18 1.5 
102 6 0.75 12 1.5 
103 7 0.25 42 1.5 
104 7 0.5 21 1.5 
105 7 0.75 14 1.5 
106 3 0.25 24 2 
107 3 0.5 12 2 
108 3 0.75 8 2 
109 4 0.25 32 2 
110 4 0.5 16 2 
111 4 0.75 10.7 2 
112 5 0.25 40 2 
113 5 0.5 20 2 
114 5 0.75 13.3 2 
115 6 0.25 48 2 
116 6 0.5 24 2 
117 6 0.75 16 2 
118 7 0.25 56 2 
119 7 0.5 28 2 
120 7 0.75 18.7 2 
121 3 0.25 48 4 
122 3 0.5 24 4 
123 3 0.75 16 4 
124 4 0.25 64 4 
125 4 0.5 32 4 
126 4 0.75 21.3 4 
	 	
280 
127 5 0.25 80 4 
128 5 0.5 40 4 
129 5 0.75 26.7 4 
130 6 0.25 96 4 
131 6 0.5 48 4 
132 6 0.75 32 4 
133 7 0.25 112 4 
134 7 0.5 56 4 
135 7 0.75 37.3 4 








1 3 1 0.8 0.25 
2 4 1 1 0.25 
3 5 1 1.3 0.25 
4 6 1 1.5 0.25 
5 7 1 1.8 0.25 
6 3 1 1.5 0.5 
7 4 1 2 0.5 
8 5 1 2.5 0.5 
9 7 1 3.5 0.5 
10 3 1 2 0.66 
11 4 1 2.6 0.66 
12 5 1 3.3 0.66 
13 7 1 4.6 0.66 
14 3 1 2.4 0.8 
15 4 1 3.2 0.8 
16 6 1 4.8 0.8 
17 7 1 5.6 0.8 
18 3 1 3.8 1.25 
19 4 1 5 1.25 
20 5 1 6.3 1.25 
21 6 1 7.5 1.25 
22 7 1 8.8 1.25 
23 3 1 4.5 1.5 
24 4 1 6 1.5 
25 5 1 7.5 1.5 
26 6 1 9 1.5 
27 7 1 10.5 1.5 
28 3 1 6 2 
29 4 1 8 2 
30 5 1 10 2 
31 6 1 12 2 










33 3 1 12 4 
34 4 1 16 4 
35 5 1 20 4 
36 6 1 24 4 
37 7 1 28 4 
     








1 -3 0.25 -3 0.25 
2 -3 0.5 -1.5 0.25 
3 -3 0.75 -1 0.25 
4 -4 0.25 -4 0.25 
5 -4 0.5 -2 0.25 
6 -4 0.75 -1.3 0.25 
7 -5 0.25 -5 0.25 
8 -5 0.5 -2.5 0.25 
9 -5 0.75 -1.7 0.25 
10 -6 0.25 -6 0.25 
11 -6 0.5 -3 0.25 
12 -6 0.75 -2 0.25 
13 -7 0.25 -7 0.25 
14 -7 0.5 -3.5 0.25 
15 -7 0.75 -2.3 0.25 
16 -3 0.25 -6 0.5 
17 -3 0.5 -3 0.5 
18 -3 0.75 -2 0.5 
19 -4 0.25 -8 0.5 
20 -4 0.5 -4 0.5 
21 -4 0.75 -2.7 0.5 
22 -5 0.25 -10 0.5 
23 -5 0.5 -5 0.5 
24 -5 0.75 -3.3 0.5 
25 -6 0.25 -12 0.5 
26 -6 0.5 -6 0.5 
27 -6 0.75 -4 0.5 
28 -7 0.25 -14 0.5 
29 -7 0.5 -7 0.5 
30 -7 0.75 -4.7 0.5 
31 -3 0.25 -7.9 0.66 
32 -3 0.5 -4 0.66 
33 -3 0.75 -2.6 0.66 










35 -4 0.5 -5.3 0.66 
36 -4 0.75 -3.5 0.66 
37 -5 0.25 -13.2 0.66 
38 -5 0.5 -6.6 0.66 
39 -5 0.75 -4.4 0.66 
40 -6 0.25 -15.8 0.66 
41 -6 0.5 -7.9 0.66 
42 -6 0.75 -5.3 0.66 
43 -7 0.25 -18.5 0.66 
44 -7 0.5 -9.2 0.66 
45 -7 0.75 -6.2 0.66 
46 -3 0.25 -9.6 0.8 
47 -3 0.5 -4.8 0.8 
48 -3 0.75 -3.2 0.8 
49 -4 0.25 -12.8 0.8 
50 -4 0.5 -6.4 0.8 
51 -4 0.75 -4.3 0.8 
52 -5 0.25 -16 0.8 
53 -5 0.5 -8 0.8 
54 -5 0.75 -5.3 0.8 
55 -6 0.25 -19.2 0.8 
56 -6 0.5 -9.6 0.8 
57 -6 0.75 -6.4 0.8 
58 -7 0.25 -22.4 0.8 
59 -7 0.5 -11.2 0.8 
60 -7 0.75 -7.5 0.8 
61 -3 0.25 -12 1 
62 -3 0.5 -6 1 
63 -3 0.75 -4 1 
64 -4 0.25 -16 1 
65 -4 0.5 -8 1 
66 -4 0.75 -5.3 1 
67 -5 0.25 -20 1 
68 -5 0.5 -10 1 
69 -5 0.75 -6.7 1 
70 -6 0.25 -24 1 
71 -6 0.5 -12 1 
72 -6 0.75 -8 1 
73 -7 0.25 -28 1 
74 -7 0.5 -14 1 
75 -7 0.75 -9.3 1 
76 -3 0.25 -15 1.25 










78 -3 0.75 -5 1.25 
79 -4 0.25 -20 1.25 
80 -4 0.5 -10 1.25 
81 -4 0.75 -6.7 1.25 
82 -5 0.25 -25 1.25 
83 -5 0.5 -12.5 1.25 
84 -5 0.75 -8.3 1.25 
85 -6 0.25 -30 1.25 
86 -6 0.5 -15 1.25 
87 -6 0.75 -10 1.25 
88 -7 0.25 -35 1.25 
89 -7 0.5 -17.5 1.25 
90 -7 0.75 -11.7 1.25 
91 -3 0.25 -18 1.5 
92 -3 0.5 -9 1.5 
93 -3 0.75 -6 1.5 
94 -4 0.25 -24 1.5 
95 -4 0.5 -12 1.5 
96 -4 0.75 -8 1.5 
97 -5 0.25 -30 1.5 
98 -5 0.5 -15 1.5 
99 -5 0.75 -10 1.5 
100 -6 0.25 -36 1.5 
101 -6 0.5 -18 1.5 
102 -6 0.75 -12 1.5 
103 -7 0.25 -42 1.5 
104 -7 0.5 -21 1.5 
105 -7 0.75 -14 1.5 
106 -3 0.25 -24 2 
107 -3 0.5 -12 2 
108 -3 0.75 -8 2 
109 -4 0.25 -32 2 
110 -4 0.5 -16 2 
111 -4 0.75 -10.7 2 
112 -5 0.25 -40 2 
113 -5 0.5 -20 2 
114 -5 0.75 -13.3 2 
115 -6 0.25 -48 2 
116 -6 0.5 -24 2 
117 -6 0.75 -16 2 
118 -7 0.25 -56 2 
119 -7 0.5 -28 2 










121 -3 0.25 -48 4 
122 -3 0.5 -24 4 
123 -3 0.75 -16 4 
124 -4 0.25 -64 4 
125 -4 0.5 -32 4 
126 -4 0.75 -21.3 4 
127 -5 0.25 -80 4 
128 -5 0.5 -40 4 
129 -5 0.75 -26.7 4 
130 -6 0.25 -96 4 
131 -6 0.5 -48 4 
132 -6 0.75 -32 4 
133 -7 0.25 -112 4 
134 -7 0.5 -56 4 
135 -7 0.75 -37.3 4 
     








1 -3 1 -0.75 0.25 
2 -4 1 -1 0.25 
3 -5 1 -1.25 0.25 
4 -6 1 -1.5 0.25 
5 -7 1 -1.75 0.25 
6 -3 1 -1.5 0.5 
7 -4 1 -2 0.5 
8 -5 1 -2.5 0.5 
9 -7 1 -3.5 0.5 
10 -3 1 -1.98 0.66 
11 -4 1 -2.64 0.66 
12 -5 1 -3.3 0.66 
13 -7 1 -4.62 0.66 
14 -3 1 -2.4 0.8 
15 -4 1 -3.2 0.8 
16 -6 1 -4.8 0.8 
17 -7 1 -5.6 0.8 
18 -3 1 -3.75 1.25 
19 -4 1 -5 1.25 
20 -5 1 -6.25 1.25 
21 -6 1 -7.5 1.25 
22 -7 1 -8.75 1.25 
23 -3 1 -4.5 1.5 










25 -5 1 -7.5 1.5 
26 -6 1 -9 1.5 
27 -7 1 -10.5 1.5 
28 -3 1 -6 2 
29 -4 1 -8 2 
30 -5 1 -10 2 
31 -6 1 -12 2 
32 -7 1 -14 2 
33 -3 1 -12 4 
34 -4 1 -16 4 
35 -5 1 -20 4 
36 -6 1 -24 4 
37 -7 1 -28 4 
 
